psychology, natural vs cultural science

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Can anyone tell me the difference between psychology as a natural/mechanical science vs cultural/organicism science. I just can't seem to grasp this difference. Thanx

-- Travis Johnston (mittyrox@yahoo.com), April 12, 2002

Answers

One could start with Kant's critique of psychology's potential as a natural science. But more relevant is W. Wundt's dualistic conceptualization of psychology. Indeed, Wundt suggested that basic psychological processes should be studied from a natural scientific position whereas complex psychological processes (humans in society) require methods of the human sciences (experimental psychology versus Voelkerpsychologie).

The idea that psychology's specific subject matter should be studied from a human scientific position was promoted by W. Dilthey. From: Teo, T. (2001). Karl Marx and Wilhelm Dilthey on the socio-historical conceptualization of the mind. In C. Green, M. Shore, and T. Teo (Eds.). The transformation of psychology: Influences of 19th-century philosophy, technology and natural science (pp. 195-218). Washington, DC: APA. "Dilthey justified philosophically a dualistic view of science encompassing the natural sciences [Naturwissenschaften] and human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. The latter include history, political science, law, political economy, theology, literature, and art. More generally, Geisteswissenschaften refer to sciences that "have the historical-social reality as their subject matter" (Dilthey, 1883/1959, p. 4). The topic of these Geisteswissenschaften is "the historical-social reality as far as this reality has been conserved historically in the consciousness of humankind" (Dilthey, 1883/1959, p. 24). Dilthey himself was not completely content with the term Geisteswissenschaften, which he borrowed from Schiel, who translated Mill’s On the Logic of the Moral Sciences. The term Geisteswissenschaft "expresses highly imperfectly the subject matter of this study" (Dilthey, 1883/1959, p. 5). Dilthey was concerned once more that a focus on the mental (Geist) would draw attention away from the emotional and the motivational: "A theory that describes and analyzes social-historical facts, cannot ignore the totality of human nature and limit itself to the mental" (Dilthey, 1883/1959, p. 6). Dilthey (1883/1959) was cautious about his scientific dualism. On the one hand he emphasized that natural and mental processes are incomparable (p. 11) and that the "total experience of the mental world" (p. 9) justifies the concept of the Geisteswissenschaften, which cannot be executed according to the empirical study of nature. Thus, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Schelling are more relevant for his epistemological reflections than Comte, Mill, or H. Spencer (1820-1903) (see Dilthey, 1883/1959). On the other hand he emphasized that mental life is only one part of the psycho-physical life-unit and put forth the notion of the "relative independence of the Geisteswissenschaften" (Dilthey, 1883/1959, p. 17)"

See also:Windelband, W. (1998). History and natural science (Trans., J. T. Lamiell). Theory & Psychology, 8(1), 5-22. (German original work published 1894).

The underlying idea is that if psychology is a human science (or important parts of psychology relate to the human sciences) than psychology requires different methods than those promoted by mainstream psychology. From: Teo, T. (1999). Functions of knowledge in psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 17 (1), 1-15. While Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) (1961) demanded the location of psychology within the "Geisteswissenschaften" (an untranslatable term meaning something similar to the humanities), thus suggesting that he preferred a psychology that came close to what was called CULTURA in this article, Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) promoted psychology as SCIENTIA. Dilthey (1961) argued that psychology's subject matter is human experience and thus its method must be understanding (verstehen), while Ebbinghaus (1896) put forward the idea that there is no need for understanding, that explanation is qualified enough, and that psychology should rely on experimental methods (see also Staeuble, 1985).

Researchers who promote the idea of performing psychology from a human-scientific perspective suggest that the specific subject matter of psychology (i.e., human subjectivity – located within society and culture) requires an alternative methodology than experiment and statistics. See: Teo, T. (1998). Klaus Holzkamp and the rise and decline of German Critical Psychology. History of Psychology, 1 (3), 235-253. "… Holzkamp (1972b) argued that a basic difference exists between the subject matter of physics and psychology. From an ontic point of view, research in physics can be characterized in terms of a subject-object relationship, whereas empirical research in psychology can be understood only in terms of as a subject-subject relationship. The argument was repeated and developed in an article completed in 1969 in which Holzkamp (1972c) reveals that the experiment depends on the acceptance of pre-arranged, reversible roles: The experimenter expects implicitly that the research subject demonstrates the role of a subject in an experiment and thus only displays limited behavior. However, if the experiment depends on a cooperative subject, then the conceptualization of psychology as a natural science, as a nomothetic science, is misleading."

The literature on this division is extensive and includes authors such as Habermas, Kuhn, Foucault in the philosophy of science, and the whole tradition of existential and humanistic psychology, which was forced to justify alternative methodologies.

Summary:

A dualistic perspective: Psycho-physiological processes can be studied with the methods of the natural sciences, but complex psychological processes require methods of the human sciences. Thus, I can study the process of memory with experimental methods, but in order to capture the very content of my memory, relating to my lived experience as a human, including my biography, and my meaning structure, needs hermeneutic methods.

A natural scientific monistic perspective suggests that the methods of the natural sciences are sufficient in order to study all issues of psychology.

A human scientific monistic perspective suggests that the methods of the natural sciences are unable to grasp the complexity of the human psyche and thus psychology must be based on the methods of the human sciences (e.g., hermeneutics).

I have suggested a tripartite conceptualization of psychology in Teo, T. (1999). Functions of knowledge in psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 17 (1), 1-15.

-- Thomas Teo (tteo@yorku.ca), April 13, 2002.


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