The Independent (UK)

Bruce Anderson: We must ignore the peace lobby and show no restraint

'If it meant Mr bin Laden survived, he would have learned he has nothing to lose from retaliation'

24 September 2001

It was not until 11 September 2001 that the US finally recovered from the Vietnam War. It took an atrocity to displace that pernicious, self-defeating post-Vietnam military doctrine, according to which the first duty of American commanders was to avoid American casualties. It took a terrorist outrage to remind Americans why they spend so much on their intelligence services, and to persuade them that there is no point in having a CIA unless, in Donald Rumsfeld's words, it is prepared to fight dirty.

In America – as in Britain – this war will have one effect. It will be much easier for those charged with national security to resist the twin onslaughts of human rights and political correctness, and to remind everyone else why we need politically incorrect armed forces and security services. That is the only way to protect the most basic human right: the right to life.

Yet there is a grim paradox. The American military may be about to cast off the constraints of Vietnam. But they are doing so in order to take part in an equally daunting conflict. The mountains of Afghanistan present a strategic challenge which could prove at least as formidable as the swamps and jungles of Vietnam.

There is a further parallel with Vietnam: the domino theory. The argument was that America had to win in Vietnam because defeat would destabilise the entire region. That proved not to be the case. This time, however, the dominoes really could come crashing down. If Mr bin Laden and his terrorist network are not destroyed, the West will lost all credibility in the Arab world. Its allies in the region would come under intolerable pressure.

So we have to fight, and large scale mobilisation is already taking place. On Friday, on the A1, I passed an RAF ammunition convoy. Truck after truck, it seemed to stretch for ever. That was no routine re-supply operation. It is also easy to sense a pre-conflict atmosphere in those areas of Whitehall which will be most closely involved; there is a mixture of determination, edginess and excitement.

It is, indeed, surprising that the Americans have not yet issued an ultimatum with a time limit. It may be that they still do not have enough hardware in place to begin to enforce it, but there is another explanation. George Bush's speech to Congress could not have been more explicit. The Taliban have been warned, and are not entitled to a repetition. They may not receive one.

One should have known that the President would eventually rise to the linguistic challenge as well as the strategic one. During the Republican Convention in Philadelphia, he made an outstanding speech which would have received accolades if anyone else had delivered it. The same was true of his inaugural address. On Thursday, however, even liberal commentators could not withhold their applause. Mr Bush may not have drafted his own text; few senior politicians do. But he made those words his own; they expressed the man. They also expressed the will of a united Congress and a united nation.

It will not be easy to enforce that will in Afghanistan, but the West has local assets. The Taliban are ruling a country which they have ravaged and in which millions of people who are already in poverty could rapidly face starvation. It is hard to believe that their popularity is indestructible, and there are Afghans ready to assail them.

The Northern Alliance, the principal anti-Taliban faction, suffered a grievous blow with the assassination of its gallant and charismatic commander, Ahmed Shah Masood. But it is still a fighting force, and could be made even more effective if it was rapidly supplied with artillery, anti-tank weapons, air support, the assistance of special forces and anything else it needs. It may be too late for the Northern Alliance to launch a major offensive until the spring, but its forces have nearly reached Kabul on previous occasions. With unlimited Western help, it could do so again, especially if we spend the intervening months bombing every Taliban position we can detect. Mr bin Laden might be able to skulk undetected from cave to cave, but an army cannot hold down a country if it has to spend all its time in hiding.

In Vietnam, the Americans' principal mistake was to overthrow the monarchy and Americanise the war, which led the South Vietnamese to lose their enthusiasm for fighting. But there is no need to Americanise this war. There seems little danger that the Northern Alliance will lose its enthusiasm for fighting. It, too, has its dead to avenge.

There is a further advantage to be gained from waging war alongside the Northern Alliance. Any such campaign would automatically become a humanitarian one. The Taliban not only provide a haven for terrorists. They run a brutal and incompetent regime; there is no worse government in the world. The people of Afghanistan, who made such a stirring contribution to the defeat of Communism, deserve better than the Taliban. They could hardly end up with worse.

It is difficult to see how the West could win this conflict without the assistance of the Northern Alliance, and there are indications that an understanding with the Alliance has been a major aim of Western policy for at least a week. We may shortly see the first military fruits of this co-operation.

All this was never going to be easy, though the first few days have not gone badly. There has been no further terrorism. In the Arab world, there has been less enthusiasm for Mr bin Laden than might have been expected. It was inevitable that young militants would take to the streets shouting anti-American slogans, but they have received less support than one might have feared. Even though the Saudis are clearly fearful of their own religious extremists – which has led them to vacillate and to talk out of all four corners of their mouths – none of the West's allies in the region has yet come under serious threat. If the campaign goes wrong, there will be drastic consequences in the region – and for the world economy, via the oil price. But so far, the West's diplomatic position is favourable.

We will have to go on holding our nerve – and disregarding the peace movement. Those who are urging restraint are doubly mistaken. In the first place, the Americans are already showing restraint. They have not rushed into action; they have waited to marshal their forces, their allies and their intelligence. Second, if restraint meant that Mr bin Laden survived, it would in no way diminish his hatred of the West or his ability to strike again and he would have learned that he has nothing to fear from retaliation.

This crisis has occurred because of America's weakness. By allowing Saddam Hussein to survive the Gulf War and by allowing Bin Laden to live on after murdering large numbers of Americans, the United States sent every wrong signal to its enemies, actual and potential.

President Bush is now sending different and stronger right signals. It only remains to turn the words into deeds.

-- Anonymous, September 23, 2001

Answers

Ahh, the Drums of War. What a sound they make. I can almost imagine us dancing around a fire and exclaiming that tommorow is good day to die. But then again, I always was mesmerized by Native American ways. Sure does look like we are making a lot of complex deals with a lot of other countries right now. Do you suppose they will ever tell us about the deep "deals" we are making with "friendly" nations in order to mount this long term campaign? Maybe I don't even want to know.

-- Anonymous, September 23, 2001

Afraid you're right Gordon. You (and I) may not WANT to know... we'll find out though, in a hurry methinks.

-- Anonymous, September 24, 2001