BEIJING - Events are beginning to snowball. In the same week that American President George W Bush said he would defend Taiwan at all costs, new Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said he was considering revising his country's constitution by reforming the current self-defense force into a real army, preparing it for possible offensive projections, actions forbidden under the present constitution

Furthermore, Koizumi indicated he would like to visit the Yasukuni shrine, where some Japanese war criminals are buried and which many in Asia consider an altar to Japan's militaristic past.

Beijing did not react to Koizumi's statements, but postponed a visit to Japan by the chairman of the Chinese Parliament, Li Peng, ostensibly because Tokyo had granted a visa to Taiwan's former president Lee Teng-hui.

To cap it all off, Bush is expected to announce within a few weeks the deployment of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system, which China considers a threat to the present balance of power in the world.

But in reality, all these facts indicate that the issue is not only the NMD. The whole security web that China has enjoyed since the times of then US president Richard Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972, and even more since the normalization of ties with the United States 22 years ago, is crumbling, and Beijing appears unprepared for this and for the speed at which it is occurring.

We should first start with Bush's statement on Taiwan last week. It certainly did not change the US's real policy, as after the normalization of ties with China the US passed the Taiwan Act which obliges the administration to de facto guarantee Taiwan's security. Both sides were clear about it, yet there was a veil of something untold and officially Washington admitted it didn't have to interfere on the Taiwan issue. This veil was broken last week when Bush said he would defend Taiwan "whatever it took". In the eyes of many Chinese officials, the US was thus forfeiting the long-standing compromise.

In a way, Bush's gesture could be contrived as an effort to backpedal from the damage done to Taiwan during the EP-3 incident. The whole management of the event was for Beijing an occasion to show that it would not buckle under American pressure on an issue of sovereignty, such as that of Taiwan's. In other words, through the detention of the American crew Beijing was saying to Taiwan that it was not afraid of the US and would do "whatever it took" to defend its national integrity. It was a major victory for the cause of China's unification and a new blow for President Chen Shui-bian.

After the release of the crew, Bush may have wished to recover from that blow and lend a hand to Chen, whose popularity was waning. Yet, perhaps there is more than that. Koizumi's commitment to expand the role of the Japanese army is in full agreement with the US effort to encourage a larger role for Tokyo in the defense strategy of the region. This larger role would enhance the 1996 US-Japanese alliance, which is already cause for concern in Beijing. The alliance includes the vague definition of the security of the region, something that could cover also Taiwan, which Beijing considers its internal affair.

This stronger bond between Japan and the US inherently centers around Taiwan, which is certainly the most pro-American government in the region, as even South Korea, for decades a staunch ally, has appeared recently quite sympathetic to Beijing and prone to a softer approach with the North.

In this light, Bush's rebuttal of President Kim Dae-jung's appeasement policy with the North in March could be more than just an "accident".

Nixon's openings to China and the normalization of ties in the 1970s were necessary moves in a complex anti-Soviet strategy. America wanted to isolate the USSR and this isolation could overlook the, temporary, abandonment of Taiwan. However, some 10 years after the fall of Soviet Union, that Chinese role vis-a-vis Moscow has vanished into thin air, and the new American administration had already expressed its concern over a rising China, which could be a threat both if it grows too big or if it falls apart. This approach needs a solid safety net around China to guarantee the region against possible future hegemonic ambitions, something Japan dreads, or to check a horrible Chinese domestic crisis.

This complex strategy demands both good business relations with China and tough bargaining on a number of security issues, while making sure the US support for Japan - the largest economy in the area and which will remain so for many years to come.

This American strategy can't necessarily be construed as anti-Chinese, as it is not aimed at containing China or hampering its economic development. It certainly wants to keep in check China's military development, which unlike that of Japan, Taiwan or Europe, is completely independent from the US.

This military independence is dear to the Chinese, who proudly followed Mao Zedong when he cut his bridges with the Soviet Union in 1960, despite China's dire straits and the abysmal domestic difficulties due to the Great Leap Forward.

At present, foreign trade with the US and Japan makes up about half of China's total imports and exports and some 20 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Economic relations with the USSR were never that important, and most of Chinese society didn't benefit from trade with the Soviets. Conversely now China, and especially coastal China (which produces more than half of the country's GDP) is permeated and sustained by foreign trade.

Moreover, any decrease of trade with the US would have a major impact on Chinese trade with the rest of Asia and could bring about a major outflow of capital.

In other words, China is weak because its economy is about just 10 percent that of America's and thus the simplest course would be to accept - or if one wishes to say, swallow - American actions until the time, say after some 50 years, when the Chinese economy could overcome that of the United States. But by then, the world will be completely different.

This swallowing could put the Chinese leadership on the spot and force the country to take actions it would never have wished necessary.

The other choice would be to rethink its foreign and domestic politics to keep its military independence, but assuage American worries and thus put off its attention, while strengthening its internal consent.

This could well be the only sensible path Beijing could follow, and was indeed going to follow, but not at the pace the new US administration intends to impose now.

The next few weeks will be the tough test to see whether Beijing is prepared to go ahead with what amounts to a fast overhaul of its whole structure.

http://www.atimes.com/china/CD01Ad01.html

-- Anonymous, May 01, 2001

Answers

Response to China Beijing's security web untangling

Howard tries to ease tension as warships clash

CANBERRA - Just days after Australian Premier John Howard was rapped by China for "meddling" after supporting US President George W Bush's stance on Taiwan, it has been revealed that a Chinese warship challenged three ships from the Australian navy in the sensitive Taiwan Strait last week.

The confrontation occurred on April 25, Anzac Day, when the Australian warships HMAS Newcastle, HMAS Arunta and HMAS Success were challenged and accused of breaching the Chinese territorial zone, and has led to a formal complaint from China lodged to the Australian embassy in Beijing.

Prime Minister John Howard moved quickly to dispel further tensions on Sunday, but was insistent that "the Australian naval vessels were acting entirely in accordance with our understanding - very long- standing understanding - of international law". He added that there was a "long-standing" difference between China and other nations in the interpretation of international maritime law relating to territorial waters

While under the law territorial waters extend almost 20 kilometers out to sea, nations have economic rights up to more than 300 km. Beijing has clearly been more assertive about its economic zone since April's US spy plane incident.

The two Australian frigates and a supply ship were reportedly heading from exercises in South Korea to Hong Kong. As they sailed through the Taiwan Strait, a Chinese naval vessel radioed a challenge that they were in China's territorial waters. The Australian navy responded that its ships were exercising their rights to free navigation under international law and refused to change course

http://www.atimes.com/oceania/CD01Ah01.html

-- Anonymous, May 02, 2001

Response to China Beijing's security web untangling

Boycott Chinese products! If all of the US citizens would do this, we wouldn't be taking this crap from the Chinese. I am 100% behind Bush and his talk tough policy. Its a breath of fresh air compared to the Sleaze that we had before who would give China anything they wanted... or at least make sure the situation was such that they could come in and steal it. No one, no nation, has stood up to China in decades. Its time we did. Give them something to chew on and ruminate over for awhile. Boycott China! Taz

-- Anonymous, May 02, 2001