Beijing and Washington might not be able to become friendly strategic partners, but neither is it written in stone that they should be bitter enemies

By Chris Wu 伍凡

Just two months after the Bush administration came into office, Washington is conspicuously turning to a more hardline position toward Beijing. The Bush government is trying to re-adjust the Clinton administration's accommodating policy toward China. From a wider perspective, the changes in the Bush administration's Beijing policy resulted from various factors -- ideological, political, trade and economic related, among others. These factors can in turn be divided into two categories -- Chinese and international factors First, I would like to discuss the Chinese factors that influence the Washington-Beijing relationship.

Economic factors

There are three driving forces behind China's economic development: foreign trade, government investment in national economic construction, and domestic purchasing power. These three forces serve very different functions in the economy. In recent years, foreign trade has been the main factor pushing the GDP up by seven to eight percent. China's foreign trade value has reached 40 percent of the GDP. Any fluctuation in foreign trade will inevitably affect every family's income in China.

The government relies on national debts and the private bank deposits of the citizenry to finance its investments on economic development. Also, many reasons in recent years have made the Chinese prefer saving their money in banks to spending it. The potential buying power being frozen or saved in the banks does no good to the nation's overall economy. Accurately identifying the decisive influence of international trade on China's economy, the US government demands considerable concessions from China in exchange for the US's agreement to China's entry into the WTO.

Last year alone, China enjoyed a US$60 billion trade surplus from the US last year, a figure that may rise to US$80 billion this year. In February, China surpassed Japan in terms of trade surplus from the US. Even though trade with China accounts for only three percent of the US' total foreign trade value, Washington does not want to see Beijing using the trade surplus to buy Russian-made weapons -- whether to prepare for an attack on Taiwan or to threaten the US.

Therefore, the US is also very unhappy about Beijing's unwillingness to join the WTO quickly and open the market fully to the US, even though China is already enjoying substantial trade surplus and foreign investments. If Beijing remains unwilling to join the WTO by June, the US Congress will review regulations pertaining to Beijing's Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status. At that time, relations between Washington and Beijing will go from bad to worse.

Missiles and anti-Jiang forces

The Taiwan issue carries considerable weight in Beijing-Washington relations. The People's Liberation Army (解放軍) has deployed as many as 300 M9 and M11 short-range missiles in Fujian and Jiangxi provinces. The threat to Taiwan is rising by the day. Taiwan wants to buy AEGIS-equipped warships, submarines, attack helicopters and early-warning radar systems. To maintain a military balance and stability across the Taiwan Strait, the US may agree to sell the above-mentioned weapons to Taiwan. The Beijing authorities have warned the US that such sales will aggravate the tensions between Beijing and Washington.

Some important factors that the Bush administration will have to consider in its Beijing strategy are: the "anti-Jiang [Zemin] (江澤民)" forces taking shape in China, the question of whether Chinese president Jiang Zemin will be able to stabilize his hold on power within the communist party, and the rumors that Jiang is stepping down as president and the Chinese Communist Party's secretary-general when the party central committee hold its sixth plenary session in September this year. Bush is facing uncertainty over Beijing's future leadership. The US government hopes that the Beijing government will be led by reformists in the Communist Party of China who will put China on the path of democratization and abide by international norms. In this regard, the only leverage the US has is to play the human rights card and try to push China into democratization. It was to the credit of the Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush that the US diplomacy toward the Soviet Union in the Cold-War era was successful.

Before Qian Qichen's (錢其琛) visit to the US, Beijing sent out three retired Chinese ambassadors to the US to meet with Bush's national security advisor Condoleezza Rice. The Chinese spent 20 minutes complaining about US support for the Falun Gong (法輪功) sect. The meeting ended unhappily -- which is quite an incredible turn of events for US-China relations. Obviously, Falun Gong has become a major issue in US-China diplomatic relations. What the US needs

From an international perspective, Beijing-Washington relations are influenced by these factors:

-- The Republican Party has a long history of anti-communist ideology and represents the interests of major arms dealers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has to use an enemy -- whose interests and ideology run counter to those of the US -- as a pretext for expanding its arms buildup. China, a newly rising power under the CCP's authoritarian rule, fits into that role. But should the Republican Party be blamed for that? It shouldn't. If the Beijing government were a democracy that abides by international norms, the US could not possibly use Beijing as a military target. Democracies around the world will certainly be alarmed by the rise of a country with a track record of oppression -- including the Tiananman massacre as well as suppression of the China Democracy Party and Falun Gong.

-- Unlike the Clinton administration, which took Beijing as a strategic partner, the Bush administration is currently adjusting the US foreign policy towards Asia by shifting the focus from China to Japan. There are two major reasons for Bush to adjust his Asian foreign policy:

-- First, together, the US and Japanese economies account for 40 percent of the total global GNP. Given its economic downturn, the US must closely cooperate with Japan in Asia in order to stimulate the US economy. In 1997, China's GNP accounted only for 3.5 percent of the global GNP. The figure is expected to rise to four percent in 2000. Such an economic scale is still not large enough to be of significant help in boosting the US economy. Second, the US needs a strong Asian partner in order to militarily and economically restrain the strong and authoritarian Asian power -- China. Japan serves as such a partner. Plus, historically Japan has always been China's enemy. China can easily arouse the Japanese people's fears and dissatisfaction. Hence, while the Bush administration is adjusting its foreign policy towards Asia, relations between Beijing and Washington seem to be cold and tense.

Moscow flirtation

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia has lost its influence in Eastern Europe while the US and NATO have seized the chance and constantly expanded their power toward the region. Russia, for its own security, is turning back to Beijing again and hopes to restrain the US-NATO camp by a China-Russia alliance. Such an international situation would certainly affect Sino-US relations. Beijing and Moscow, however, can hardly be friends forever. Russia is in fact the country which had bullied and harmed China the most in history. Thus, Beijing and Moscow are just temporarily using each other. For example, initially both Beijing and Moscow were strongly opposed to the the US National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Later, after Washington invited Moscow to build an NMD system in Europe jointly, the Russian government accepted the suggestion and kicked Beijing away immediately, making it even more difficult for Beijing to negotiate with Washington on the NMD issue.

The US is now trying to unite with Japan and South Korea to oppose China while alluring Vietnam and India to restrain Beijing at the same time. Thus, the US is quietly laying a siege on China from the east, south and west. China's continued deployment of more ballistic missiles and fighter jets is sure to trigger an arms race, giving shape to a cold war centered around the Taiwan Strait, or even the whole Asia-Pacific region. This will be extremely disadvantageous to China's economic development.

Beijing's military strategy was accidentally revealed a few years ago by People's Liberation Army Deputy Chief of Staff Xiong Guangkai (熊光楷), who threatened to launch nuclear missiles at Los Angeles if the US supports Taiwan to resist a Chinese attack. Xiong's remarks alarmed the US, which later proposed the establishment of an NMD system. Beijing can blame on no one but itself for the CCP leaders' blind and arrogant remarks.

The fight for oil

In its "10th Five-year Plan" (十五計劃), China has specified the family-use automobile industry as a priority in developing its economy. So far, however, China has found no major oil deposits that can be exploited at low costs. To provide the fuel necessary for automobiles, the Chinese government will have to import a great amount of petroleum. Possible oil providers include Iran, Iraq, Russia, Kazakhstan, and some other oil producing nations. Among them, both Iran and Iraq are China's partners and the US' enemies. The US has always wanted to influence the world's oil market and prices as well. China is gradually joining the world's consumer market for oil, and will soon become the largest oil consumer in the market, leading to an inevitable fight over the world's oil and oil-producing areas. The fight for control of the global oil resources has been the most significant factor in international conflicts, both economic and military, in the 20th Century. From this perspective, conflicts over global oil resources will have a long-term affect on Sino-US relations. Not long ago, the Iranian president visited Moscow -- an indication of further cooperation between Iran and Russia. To oppose the US, Beijing might also join their camp, leading to an economic war between the pro-China and the pro-US camp.

Last year, North and South Korea landed on the path of dialogue and reconciliation. Following South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's (金大中) visit to Pyongyang, political developments in the Korean peninsula have greatly reduced Beijing's influence on North Korea. After Bush took office, however, tensions between the US and North Korea has risen again. To seize the opportunity, not only Zeng Qinghong (曾慶紅), chief of the CCP's Organization Department, recently visited Pyongyang, but also Chinese President Jiang Zemin is also scheduled to visit North Korea soon. Meanwhile, Beijing has also continued to provide aid to North Korea. This is Beijing's move to support Pyongyang's resistance against Washington. Thus, a diplomatic and military power struggle is taking place among Beijing, Washington, Pyongyang and Seoul.

World War III from Asia?

After nearly a half-century of readjustments, the EU has already become a peaceful force capable of controlling continental Europe. Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia's national might was drastically reduced, and thus the possibility of a major war breaking out in Europe -- or a world war -- was significantly reduced. Of the four sole remaining communist countries left in the world -- China, North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba -- three are in Asia, with both China and North Korea capable of instigating a regional war. Of these, the only country which has publicly called for a World War III with the US is the CCP-controlled China. Another potential origin for regional war is Central Asia, in Iran and Iraq, and in South Asia, between India and Pakistan. Of this group, the nations able to launch a war are also neighbors of China, and for the most part enjoy close military and economic relations with China. Thus, the chances of regional or world war erupting are highest in Asia. China, moreover, will definitely participate at some level in any regional conflict, and ultimately China will go to war with the Western, democratic nations. Soon after he came to office, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld publicly stated the necessity of moving the focus of the US' global strategy from Europe to Asia. Such a strategic move is aimed at containing Beijing. Deep down, Beijing and Washington know this, even though they do not talk about it explicitly. Both Jiang Zemin and Zhang Wannian (張萬年) both very clear on the point. Thus, Jiang, Zhang, and others in the CCP, government, and military have stated the need to prepare for war, to strike early, to wage a large-scale war -- even to wage WWIII. On March 9, at a meeting of PLA representatives during the 9th National People's Congress (NPC, 人民代表大會), Jiang said that a strategy of "using soft to overcome hard" would be incorporated in response to Bush's policy. Externally, China should maintain peaceful relations with the US, while internally, the Chinese people should be made to fully understand the hegemonist nature of the US. Technology and the military must be strengthened, and China must possess deterrent might in the form of arms and strategic nuclear weapons. The duality inherent in Jiang's talk was thus laid bare -- on the surface China should give the impression it wants a peaceful relationship with the US, while secretly it should be preparing for nuclear war. These words and actions have given the Bush government some facts to work with as it formulates its China policy. The US must fully prepare itself against an insane attack by China.

US nuclear submarines and B2 bombers are stationed near Guam, and the US and Japan have stepped-up implementation of the US-Japan Security Treaty. US warships visited Singapore, and negotiations may resume with regard to the long-term stationing of US troops in the Philippines. The US is also currently in talks with Vietnam about the possibility of using its harbors, and with Kazakhstan, where it would like to conduct military exercises. And it is possible that the US will form a substantial military alliance with Taiwan. These constitute long-term military deployments by the US, intended to contain the expansion of Beijing's military might.

Beijing's options

Beijing-Washington relations are presently at a turning point. The Bush government has quietly adopted a policy of "engagement and encirclement" towards Beijing. The US uses "engagement" in situations favoring US interests, and "encirclement" for those unfavorable to US interests. The ultimate aim is to force authoritarian China to delay development -- buying some time while democratic forces within China begin to rise up -- so as to wait for a transformation to democratization.

Keeping in mind all the factors involved, such as geo-politics, regional power balance, control of resources, and market controls -- as well as history, culture, religion, and ideological background -- there will inevitably be conflicts of interests between the US and China. The key is how to handle these conflicts. If China wasn't ruled by the authoritarian CCP, but rather by a democratic government, it would be easier for Beijing and Washington to resolve their differences. Conflicts of interests could be addressed through negotiations -- it wouldn't be necessary for the two to engage in a military duel to the death. Beijing and Washington might not be able to become friendly strategic partners, but neither is it written in stone that they should be bitter enemies.

Ever since the end of the 19th Century, a few superpowers such as the US, Britain, Russia, and Japan, have all had an enormous effect on China. Of these countries, whether in terms of offering training, financial assistance, providing technology, uniting to resist Japan, or refraining from invading Chinese territory -- the US was the friendliest. The US helped the Chinese people resist the Japanese invasion, and following victory in the war, never took so much as an inch of Chinese territory. Thus, from the angle of its long-term development interests, China should strive to establish friendly relations with the US. It shouldn't -- just for the sake of short-term gains, ideology, or the Taiwan question -- cause a war and lose its longtime friend.

Bearing in mind the aforesaid, does the current CCP leadership have any big cards that it can play to force Washington to make major concessions to Beijing? The answer is: "no." In terms of talent, capital, skills, resources, scale of economic development, and military strength, the CCP leadership is still at a disadvantage. Yet, Beijing, in the weaker position, continues to bluster about waging war on the US -- if this isn't insanity, then what is? Pragmatic economic construction, promoting political reform, resolutely establishing a democratic government, maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait while conditions ripen for eventual peaceful unification, fostering culture, education, science and technology, and preparing to spend 50 to 100 years cultivating national might so that the Chinese people can truly join the global democratic family -- this is the path that China should take.

Several decades ago, the USSR developed nuclear weapons and strategic missiles. The people were destitute, yet the government nonetheless amassed more than 10,000 nuclear weapons -- prepared to bomb Western countries at a moment's notice.

Still, the authoritarian communist party never fired a single nuclear warhead. In the end, longstanding political authoritarianism and economic decline caused the USSR's thunderous collapse, whereupon the people won democracy and freedom. In China, the war-crazy CCP blindly worships arms and violence, instead of putting its faith in democracy and freedom. If the CCP continues on its present line, it will follow the USSR's road to ruin -- gradually dragged down during its extreme arms race with the US. Will Jiang Zemin and other CCP leaders be able to learn a lesson from the collapse of the USSR? It seems unlikely. If they don't, however, the CCP will only succeed in destroying itself.

http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/04/12/story/0000081397

-- Anonymous, April 12, 2001