March 8, 2001 New York Times

Taking Sides in Afghanistan

By REUEL MARC GERECHT

RUSSELS — In Islamic history, the time before the coming of the Prophet Muhammad is the jahiliyya, the Age of Ignorance. For Muslim fundamentalists, like the Taliban of Afghanistan, the jahiliyya didn't end in the seventh century. They see modern times as a constant affront to the purist principles that God ordained. The tolerance of traditional Islam, which in Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent even made its peace with polytheists and idol worshipers, is as foreign to them as the secular principles of Western civilization.

The destruction of Afghanistan's statues — including, it appears, the Great Buddhas of Bamiyan, two huge and ancient sculptures — is of a kind with the extreme, sometimes nihilistic, violence of militant Islamic movements in Algeria, Egypt and Sudan.

The anti-idol declaration by Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's chieftain, ought to be seen for what it is above all else: a crystal-clear signal that Osama bin Laden, the Saudi terrorist who has lived in Afghanistan since 1996, has found a true spiritual brother in the Taliban movement. The Taliban's six-year war of conquest — to which Mr. bin Laden contributes a small but not insignificant Arab force — has developed into a brutal fight where no quarter is given to Afghans who oppose Mullah Omar's prophet- like pretensions.

Indeed, in a country demarcated by land mines, burned-out tanks, and blown-up roads, bridges, dams, schools and power grids, Mullah Omar and Mr. bin Laden have become mythical figures. Among the front-line soldiers and prisoners of war I have interviewed over the last two years, they are seen as prophets.

America has been very slow to appreciate the international dimension to the Afghan mess. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, we ran away from the country, abandoning the people who, more than any other, had frayed the Soviet empire's will. After the rise of the Taliban in 1994, the Clinton administration toyed with the idea that the Taliban would be no worse than its Saudi backers, conservative Muslims who tolerate America and fear and hate Iran. Moreover, the administration became focused on other priorities. In 1996, it seemed possible that American-built gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia could run through an Afghanistan ruled by one leader. Cruelty to women aside, we did not condemn the Taliban juggernaut rolling across the country.

Even after the arrival of Mr. bin Laden, the Clinton administration held out hope that a modus vivendi could be reached, with the assistance of the Saudis and Pakistanis. Mr. bin Laden would be contained, perhaps even booted out of the country.

That hope is gone, but no sensible policy has yet followed. To really put Mr. bin Laden out of business, America must shut down his operations inside Afghanistan. Pretending that we have a robust counterterrorist program picking apart Mr. bin Laden's organization — while he and his followers nearly sink an American destroyer in Yemen — is delusional and dangerous. The October strike against the American destroyer Cole in the port of Aden will long be remembered by Muslims who still believe that jihad is the sixth pillar of the faith.

Since America's counterterrorist forces cannot unilaterally reach inside Afghanistan, we have only one option. Play realpolitik the old-fashioned way.

Taliban leaders truly fear only one thing: the possibility that Afghanistan's many tribes will put aside their differences and unite to topple them from power. They've launched numerous offensives against Ahmed Shah Massoud, the strongest of the anti- Soviet Afghan commanders. His troops are the only ones still seriously contesting Taliban rule. As long as Mr. Massoud survives, he is a threat.

Mr. Massoud, a devout Muslim, is unquestionably one of the greatest guerrilla commanders of our era. He detests the Taliban's treatment of women; he has no truck with Mr. bin Laden. A literate man, he is no doubt horrified by the most recent attack on Afghanistan's Buddhist patrimony.

Yet, the Clinton administration kept its distance from Mr. Massoud. Why? Pakistan has long loathed him and supported the Taliban, ethnic and increasingly ideological cousins of the Pathan, the dominant tribe of Pakistan's northwest frontier. The administration, which was reluctant to re- engage in Afghan affairs or to oppose Pakistan's preferences, advocated a "negotiated settlement between all parties" — diplomatic shorthand for American abstention and de facto neutrality. But no one can negotiate with Mullah Omar. Like Mr. bin Laden, he seriously believes he has received his marching orders from a non-negotiating authority.

It is too late to save Bamiyan's treasures, but it is not too late for the United States to play hardball. The Bush administration could give a small slice of the multibillion-dollar counterterrorist budget to Mr. Massoud. That might bring Mullah Omar down to earth. He and his supporters, particularly the Pakistanis, might reconsider the unthinkable — shutting down Mr. bin Laden's operations — if the alternative were the dissipation, and perhaps the destruction, of Taliban rule.

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Reuel Marc Gerecht, a fellow at the Project for the New American Century, is a former Middle East specialist in the Central Intelligence Agency.

-- (Paracelsus@Pb.Au), March 08, 2001

Answers

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-- Rich (howe9@shentel.net), March 08, 2001.

This is a scary crew. They seem to hate us, not because of economic imperialism, but simply because we are us. The fact that the US helped Afghanistan fight against USSR doesn't mean squat. In their eyes, our culture is decadent. They are absolutists who are willing to kill and to die for an abstraction. We ignore them at our peril.

-- Lars (larsguy@yahoo.com), March 08, 2001.

Floating a nuke aboard a ship into NYC harbor would be a sure ticket to heaven for them. These guys are more scary than N. Korea and China combined, because they have nothing to but their sins...

-- Bemused (and_amazed@you.people), March 08, 2001.