Crossposting of question on ezboard about the role of Y2K in the Energy Crisis

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage?topicID=21718.topic&index=15 To Rick Cowles: Do you think Y2K is involved? Posted By: Paula Gordon 2/1/2001 2:00:37 PM From IP: Has Rick Cowles expressed any recent concerns regarding the possible connection between Y2K-related problems and unfolding energy sector problems?

I have e-mailed him directly during the last week of January 2001, but have not heard back from him as yet.

Some current threads on GICC and on EZ Board related questions are being discussed:

http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q..._id=004Vzv

http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q..._id=004T3M

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage?topicID=21122.topic&index=15 http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage?topicID=22022.topic&index=15 http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage?topicID=22044.topic&index=15 ________________________________________________________________

Re: To Rick Cowles: Do you think Y2K is involved? Posted By: intothegoodnight (Registered User) Posted At: 2/1/01 3:02:09 pm From IP: Paula,

Reviewed your website whitepapers at www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon -- believe that you are on to something that was suspected within my IT engineering group -- after last summer's episodes, we collectively felt that energy and oil refining industries in particular were not Y2K compliant, and were suffering the fallout.

Although my experiences with Y2K involved large computer systems, a known bugaboo was the sheer number of non-compliant embedded systems -- many undocumented or unknown to the day-to-day operations folks -- cost to upgrade imbedded systems was prohibitive, and speculation was that many embedded systems were left in a non-Y2K compliant condition -- another issue that is well known in my circles -- management/leadership did not want a Y2K failure on "their watch" -- some were punching the clock until they could advance to the next pay grade/rank, and efforts to sweep Y2K compliance issues under the rug were rampant -- the "don't fail, pass go, get promoted" way of doing business.

intothegoodnight

Edited by: intothegoodnight at: 2/1/01 3:02:09 pm

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Subject: Response to "intothegoodnight" Posted By: Paula Gordon (Registered User) Posted At: 2/1/01 10:26:20 pm From IP: Dear ITGN

Thanks for posting and thanks for your very interesting comments.

On 1/26/2001 I posted the following on another thread on the Board. I copy the posting here because of its relevance to your comments.

To Senses On:

You wrote:

"One thing is for sure, no one in “authority” will *ever* use the term Y2K in explaining difficulties."

What you say may well prove true over time. But I think that you and I probably differ concerning the reasons why this might or might not turn out to be the case.

Earlier today I had an e-mail exchange concerning what the highest level officials in the Executive Branch understood (or currently understand) about Y2K-related embedded systems and complex embedded systems problems.

I was saying in that e-mail exchange that in my view the highest level officials did not understand the nature and scope of these problems. The other person involved in this discussion took issue saying that they were certain that these officials had the necessary intelligence to understand the technical issues and their implications. They thought that the failure of top level officials to address these problems had to do with "a lack of motivation to put the picture together for the common good of all."

The following is based on my response:

I know full well that it is difficult to believe that those in the highest roles of public responsibility failed to understand the technical issues involved with Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. There were moments in the last two months of 1999 when it seemed that Mr. Koskinen had begun to gain a deeper understanding of embedded systems-related concerns. What he learned, however, did not seem to have sticking power and he abandoned his new understanding in the first days after the rollover. By March 2000 (as per his statements in the Q&A piece on my website), he referred to the "fabled" existence of such problems.

Note: The Questions & Answers piece includes Mr. Koskinen's responses to many questions that I posed to him in March of 2000. The piece includes an extensive set of appendices and can be found at www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon

Mr. Koskinen's views and change in views are also chronicled in the transcripts of the press conferences held just before and during the first week following the rollover. They have been archived at www.y2k.gov

Some very intelligent persons have not understood the nature and scope of Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. One can have a genius IQ and still not have a rudimentary understanding of highly technical subject areas. Even individuals who have extensive technical training and professional experience in a technical field may reach different conclusions about the same issues and challenges. When it comes to Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems, I have found that differences in perspective can even be found amongst software engineers and others with embedded systems expertise. The basis for such differences can often be identified. For instance, the understanding of those whose specialty is in aeronautical engineering can be quite different from those whose area of specialty is oil refineries or gas or oil pipelines.

An emphasis on specialization has left society with few generalists and few who have broad ranging expertise that spans a range of sectors. Few specialists seem to be inclined or equipped to try to see the larger picture that includes many different sectors.

It is not surprising that any individual whose major training has been in law or business management or both, who does not have a technical background that includes expertise in engineering or a specialty in embedded systems and complex integrated systems would fail to comprehend the nature and scope of these problems. It is not surprising that a person who lacked a technical background would have difficulty in acquiring a working understanding of such a complicated subject in a short period of time especially if there were confusion over whose expertise to trust.

There is abundant evidence from the historical record that those in positions of greatest responsibility in the Federal government did not (and do not) comprehend the nature and scope of Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. The Department of Energy, for instance, did not have and does not to my knowledge have even one person on staff who has embedded expertise AND who made or is able to make the connection between refinery problems that have become evident since the rollover. Incredible to be sure if only in light of the 1999 report and predictions of the International Energy Administration and the IEE's case studies prior to the rollover. This situation is the same in almost every Executive Branch agency and entity that I know of.

The failure of top Federal policymakers in the Executive Branch to comprehend the importance of Y2K-related embedded system and complex integrated systems problem seems to me to be owing to a complex of factors. These seem to me to include a lack of technical background and a lack of interest and motivation and the absence of a perceived mandate to focus more fully on these problems. There have certainly been disincentives for those few who do have some understanding of the problems to come forward or to act on their understanding. But the larger problem is that those at the top never understood the most daunting aspects of the problem.

My perspective concerning what key Executive Branch officials knew and what they know is based on the public record and on what I have been able to glean from the exchanges that I had with them and/or with those who consulted with them and those who worked in their offices.

I believe that we have reached a point in our history when technology has succeeded in "snookering" us. We have reached a point in our history when those in key roles of responsibility need to comprehend as fully as possible the technical aspects of the threats and challenges that we face. They need to know when it is necessary to call upon and rely on individuals with technical expertise. They need to be able to incorporate such technical understanding in the policies they evolve and implement.

A lesson of the Challenger Disaster is that it is possible for those at the top (in that case, NASA) to fail to know about the importance of certain technical aspects of a situation. In the case of the Challenger, those at the top did not even know that there were engineers from Morton Thiokol urging a delay of the launch owing to weather conditions and the effect that low temperatures would be apt to have on the O-rings. (Irving Janis' book Groupthink also includes a discussion of what went wrong in the group decisionmaking process that resulted in the Challenger disaster. There may also be something on MSNBC's website on the Challenger Disaster owing to a program aired on 1-25-2001.)

I don't blame anyone for being skeptical concerning the validity of my reading of embedded systems and related challenges. It is asking alot for people to believe that decisions about highly complex national and global challenges were made by people who did not place adequate reliance on the technical expertise of those who understood the technical aspects of the challenges and the threats.

I have long had a fascination with major debacles, fiascoes, and catastrophes that affect or threaten to affect the public. It seems to me that the approach that the Federal government has taken to Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems has been tantamount to public policy Russian Roulette. They never fully knew, nor do they seem to have any inkling now, of the role that Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems had and are having in any of a number of sectors, including most notably the energy sector. Most of those remaining in positions of Executive Branch responsibility have no basis for even raising basic questions. They believe as the media appears to believe that problem is over. Neither they or the media fully understood the problem. If the complexity of the problem could be explained in sound bites, there might be a chance of raising the level of understanding concerning the problems that we are seeing. However, because of the mind boggling dimensions of the subject, sound bites will not work. The truth in this case strains credulity. It may be that most people will have neither the patience not the interest to wade through longer explanations, explanations that they are disinclined to believe in the first place. Perhaps someone will eventually be successful in figuring out a way to simplify the explanations. Perhaps, eventually, some of those in the highest roles of public responsibility will have their eyes opened by such explanations

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Re: To Rick Cowles: Do you think Y2K is involved? Posted By: bigwavedave (Registered User) Posted At: 2/1/01 5:31:20 pm From IP: intothegoodnight, what you are describing was a known going in to '00 - speculation and suspicion. has anybody followed up with their suspicions to pin down problems in embeddeds to date processing errors? or is the whole ball of wax too complicated for everybody?

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Subject: Re: To Rick Cowles: Do you think Y2K is involved? Posted By: Moe and Curly (Registered User) Posted At: 2/1/01 7:35:17 pm From IP: Where was the Clinton Department of Energy when all of this natural gas shortage was developing? Asleep, clueless and unknowing? It would appear that if there is already a severe shortage of natural gas that is causing prices to quadruple or more, and if numerous additional natural gas power plants are planned and under construction there will not be an adequate supply of natural gas at reasonable prices for the next several years. At least the current administration has some people that understand energy issues.

When the proposed natural gas powerplants come on line, the natural gas for these plants will be even more expensive than current prices, so that electricity costs will be high too. Is there not a permitting process required before permission is granted to build new power plants? Perhaps some plants should be permitted only on the condition that they agree to use coal. There are ample supplies of clean burning coal in Utah if that dumb national monument designation can be reversed. The irritating part is that this undue reliance on natural gas has caused huge increases in electricity prices across the entire United States and the reliance on clean energy has priced electricity so high that many people can no longer afford it. It used to be that old people had to decide whether to spend the money on food or prescriptions. Now they have a third choice. ENERGY. Which do they give up? Not a happy choice.

Why should the Federal Government provide heavy subsidies to the Northwest States. If electricity is 10 cents per kilowatt hour or more in Boston, why should it be one half that or less in Oregon or Tennessee where the TVA is still operating? Less natural gas also means less fertilizer or higher fertilizer prices for farmers, lower crop yields, more farm bankruptcies, and finally higher food prices. And we still have no inflation? Give me a break. The "investors" in the stock market are dumb, deluded or hopeful. They are not informed. _____________________________________________________________

End of quoted postings from ezboard

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), February 01, 2001

Answers

Couple thoughts. Ignorance may well be key factor, but don't rule out the motivation to socialize. The recent entry of the state in CA energy mess is case in point. It's like letting the camel's nose under the tent. Good points Moe & Curly. Coal and nuclear can't even be discussed in polite society anymore.

-- Warren Ketler (wrkttl@earthlink.net), February 02, 2001.