Y2K and Energy Sector Problems

greenspun.com : LUSENET : Grassroots Information Coordination Center (GICC) : One Thread

Here is something I just posted on EZBoard. I thought it might be of interest.

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage?topicID=21038.topic&index=17

What I recall saying in 1999 and as late as April of 2000 is that it could take until the first quarter of 2001 before impacts might reach a level 3 or 4 on the impact scale. Whether or not this would happen would depend on how much was done by the public and private sectors to make sure that necessary remediation had been done. I would add that it would also depend on the success of those "fixing on failure".

Note: There are several versions of the impact scale. The one I was referring to is described in Part 1 of my White Paper at www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon

A few days ago I had drafted some of the following thoughts concerning what has happened and what is happening regarding the energy sector.

Most of what is happening was predicted. We may never know whether or not what is happening is a prediction being borne out or a coincidence.

I believe that in 1999 an International Energy Agency report included a statement that Y2K-related embedded systems problems affecting the energy sector could be expected and that there would be no way to trace these problems back to Y2K. The initial aberration or malfunction that can lead to a system breakdown can be impossible to trace.

In Part 3 of my White Paper, I urged that deregulation be put on hold so that problems likely to result from Y2K would not result in even greater negative impacts.

The embedded systems experts with whom I was in touch in the summer of 2000 felt that the electric power grid was under great strain owing to the buffer overflow problems that they were aware of. Evidently, the more a system has to be rebooted, the more the system is weakened. Eventually it fails. This makes it all the more important to try to understand and address the actual causes of embedded system and complex integrated system problems at as early a stage as possible. If the causes are not understood or identified, there is little or no chance that they can be effectively addressed before there is a failure.

It seems reasonable to assume that the cost of having a system fail is far greater than the cost of taking preventive action or taking remedial action as soon as you have acknowledged the fact that you have a problem and as soon as you have identified its source or likely source.

When plants have had to work "flat out", the likelihood of problems is increased. Increases in demand combined with an increase in the need for maintenance and repair have been some of the factors that are contributing to our present situation.

I think that what we have with the faltering of the energy sector reflects a confluence of interconnected problems affecting everything from production, distribution, and generation to transmission. If Y2K had not been a factor, I think that we would have a much less serious situation than the one we face right now.

The impact on banks, on businesses, on the national and global economy have begun and will continue so long as the eighth largest economy in the world (California) is in such dire straits. Ripple effects are beginning to be felt regionally within the US and as well as within Canada.

Perhaps the situation can be addressed and reversed without a mention of the role that Y2K-related problems involving embedded systems and complex integrated systems are playing. Perhaps all that matters is that those addressing the problems understand what has happened and gear their actions accordingly. If those on the front lines who have hands on responsibilities for addressing the problems fail to understand the causes and if they fail to address the causes, then they may run the risk of merely providing short term fixes that will have to be repaired again and again down the line.

Policymakers and regulators may never fully comprehend the extent to which Y2K has played and is playing a role in our current growing energy problems. As of March of 2000, I was able to identify no technical experts at the Department of Energy who were aware of the possible connection between Y2K-related embedded and complex integrated system problems and problems involving the oil and gas sector. There was also no one at DOE or in the rest of the Federal government tasked with monitoring or assessing Y2K-related problems involving the energy sector and taking action to see that these were acknowledged and addressed.

I saw Carl Sagan quoted on the GICC website yesterday. The quote was as follows:

"We've arranged a civilization in which most crucial elements profoundly depend on science and technology. We have also arranged things so that almost no one understands science and technology. This is a prescription for disaster. We might get away with it for a while, but sooner or later this combustible mixture of ignorance and power is going to blow up in our faces."

How things unfold from this point forward has much to do with the understanding and action of those in key roles of responsibility, including those on the frontlines. It is still possible to ameliorate present impacts and minimize those that we can otherwise expect in the future.

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), January 23, 2001

Answers

Thank you for your thoughts and help, Paula. We have all wondered about the dead silence and the immediate energy problems after the rollover. In reviewing our Y2Kids site recently http://www.y2kids.net, I looked at the great cartoons we created under the link "CoCo goes to the White House." In these cartoons former President Clinton shows concern for helping ordinary people, children and schools through the concerns around the Y2K rollover. I realized that on the surface he was very successful in handling the Y2K rollover. I wondered why there was no mention of this success in the year 2000 or as he was leaving office in 2001. It really was remarkable that such a smooth transition was accomplished. My conclusion is perhaps as Paula is saying it was not over and that was well known at the top. It was a matter of riding it out and keeping a low profile about it to prevent panic, lawsuits and particularly, political backfire. So the plug was pulled on Y2K in a most remarkable fashion the likes of which we may not see again in our lifetime.

-- Jeanette Thomas (y2kids@y2kids.net), January 23, 2001.

Archived story from 08/04/99 "Beyond the Hype:
likely Y2K Impacts on the U.S. Electricity Service"

Power engineer and Y2K analyst Dick Mills
makes the following predictions regarding the
availability in the United States of electrical
power in the year 2000:

  1. Prepare for blackouts in the first days of January
    2000, lasting up to 72 hours.
  2. Prepare for shortages of power in the warm summer
    months of 2000.

Mills predicts that carefully regulated power
shortages eventually affecting most U.S electricity
customers is much more likely in the year 2000 than
uncontrolled localized power blackouts.
The
odds of power shortages are particularly high during
the summer of 2000, especially if the summer is hot
in most areas of the United States. Power shortages
result when power generation "margins" dip below
0%. Margins of 15-30% are standard for the industry
in the United States, meaning that generation capacity
is usually 15-30% larger than demand.

The following is from a current article.

Experts set out to de-bug systems

``Most view reliability issues as dirty laundry,''
said Dale Way, who led Y2K research for the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
``A lot of organizations have methods of reacting
when things fail and keeping it in-house. . . .
It's serious and expensive, but it's buried inside
the cost structure of organizations.''

The Mercury News

-- spider (spider0@usa.net), January 23, 2001.


Great to hear from you, Paula. I was wondering what your thoughts were. How abour another brainstorming session? I miss them.

On ex-Pres Clinton... If he had done such a good job, the country would be much more prepared than it is. You would have had prepared households in the areas where ice storms took out power. You would have prepared businesses where they are having outages in California.

I don't think nearly enough was done to encourage the people of this country to a higher level of preparedness.

I said it before and I'll say it again. Being prepared is a really good thing!

Sally Strackbein www.Y2KKitchen.com

-- Sally Strackbein (sally@Y2KKitchen.com), January 23, 2001.


Jeanette,

You wrote that you conclude that what I said in my posting was that "...(Y2K) was not over and that was well known at the top. It was a matter of riding it out and keeping a low profile about it to prevent panic, lawsuits and particularly, political backfire..."

That is not really what I was saying. I think it is more complicated than that and that the Federal policymakers had exhibited and have continued to exhibit an absence of technical understanding of Y2K- related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. There was (and is) an "ignorance factor". Their efforts were not informed on a continuing basis by an understanding of the technical problems associated with embedded systems and complex integrated systems. Certainly, the Administration was concerned about negative political fallout if things went poorly, but so far as I have been able to determine, there was never adequate reliance on the technical expertise as it related to Y2K-connected embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems, so there was no way of their being fully informed concerning what happened. There is no way of their being fully informed concerning what is continuing to happen. There was only intermittently interest in such technical matters, mostly in late 1999. Based on what I know of what went on, Federal efforts appeared to be only intermittently informed by persons with an understanding of these technical matters. From what I have been able to determine, no one at the Department of Energy, the Information Coordination Center of the President's Council, the Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Chemical Safety and Hazards Investigation Board had or have both

~ the expertise in embedded system and complex integrated systems technology to adequately track or monitor problems that occurred before and after the rollover and extending through the present and

~ the task of doing so on a continuing basis.

I discuss various aspects of this in further detail in a presentation that I gave in April 2000. A summary of the presentation is available on my website along with a link to a realvideo version: http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon

Similar concerns are also discussed in the John Koskinen questions and answers piece that is also posted on my website. Background information is provided in the appendices to the Q&A piece.

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), January 23, 2001.


Remember caiosystems time-line chart. only the begining

-- Lee Blocher (cblocher@northernway.net), January 23, 2001.


The last updated day of Glitch Central (June 15, 2000) is still posted at::

http://www.ciaosystems.com/GlitchCentralGuts.htm

-- PHO (owennos@bigfoot.com), January 23, 2001.


Sorry, Paula. When I referred to you in my answer to your posting I should have put a period after over and "I think" at the beginning of the next sentence.

I find it hard to believe that no one at the very top of the Y2K decision making process understood what might happen with embedded systems. The experts did speak up and were heard. We do know that somewhere along the way a decision was made to project that the year 2000 U.S. image of Y2K would be that the threat of Y2K related problems was over after the smooth rollover period. We have all been kept in the dark even though the lights remained on after the rollover.

-- Jeanette Thomas (y2kids@y2kids.net), January 24, 2001.


Still chasing phantoms I see.

Carry on.

-- Buddy (buddydc@go.com), January 24, 2001.


Buddy, you wouldn't see a Y2K problem
if it hit you smack in the face :-§

-- spider (spider0@usa.net), January 25, 2001.

No spider, I wouldn't, since it would only be a phantom. Maybe I would get slimed and have to call GhostBusters.

-- Buddy (buddydc@go.com), January 25, 2001.


Well Buddy, we stand on the brink of an economic recession, the excess 30 to 40% power generating capacity has disappeared, potable water supplies seem to be a concern nation wide and the old and poor are suffering like never before, but things are just cruising in the fast lane for you? I wonder what it will take to drop you to your knees in an act of contrition.

-- Phil Maley (maley@cnw.com), January 25, 2001.

Ever the optimist, huh Mr. Phil Maley?

And what, pray tell, does any of that (not that I agree with your "facts") have to do with Y2K-related problems?

-- Buddy (.@...), January 29, 2001.


Buddy, you still talkin' about Y2K.
This is 2001. Nothing happened and
nothing will happen that's Y2K related.
I was all a hoax, so just move on with
your life.

Oh, I agree with you that global warming
is just somethings the liberals made up
to restrict business from making a profit.
The melting ice cap and weather changes are
all part of a natural change that has been
going on for millions of years.

Hey Buddy, how come all I see is sand no matter
which way I look? Couldn't be that I have my
head in a hole in the ground? ::::-§

-- spider (spider0@usa.net), January 29, 2001.


Gee Spider, do you have your head in the sand? Come on out, the sun shining.

You can carry on with your fantasies about Y2K. As for global warming, your explanation was not far off the mark. It IS a theory manufactured by folks with an extreme environmentalist agenda. It's theories like that one that got California into this energy crisis in the first place.

What else do you believe in? Colloidal silver therapy? Chemical contrails?

As I said before, carry on.

-- Buddy (t.t@f.n), January 29, 2001.


Do you pray Buddy? That would be a good starting point. Then read something that gives you a sweeping view of human history such as; A Study of History: Volumes I-X by Toynbee or an even a better choice, the New American Standard Bible. Five pages a day and you can finish it in a year. Then we can talk.

-- Phil Maley (maley@cnw.com), January 30, 2001.


The following is a 1/26/2001 cross-posting of mine posted at http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=21122.topic&index=55

It is addressed to "Senses On" who had written the following: "One thing is for sure, no one in “authority” will *ever* use the term Y2K in explaining difficulties." What you say may well prove true over time. But I think that you and I probably differ concerning the reasons why this might or might not turn out to be the case. Earlier today I had an e-mail exchange concerning what the highest level officials in the Executive Branch understood (or currently understand) about Y2K-related embedded systems and complex embedded systems problems. I was saying in that e-mail exchange that in my view the highest level officials did not understand the nature and scope of these problems. The other person involved in this discussion took issue saying that they were certain that these officials had the necessary intelligence to understand the technical issues and their implications. They thought that the failure of top level officials to address these problems had to do with "a lack of motivation to put the picture together for the common good of all." The following is based on my response: I know full well that it is difficult to believe that those in the highest roles of public responsibility failed to understand the technical issues involved with Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. There were moments in the last two months of 1999 when it seemed that Mr. Koskinen had begun to gain a deeper understanding of embedded systems-related concerns. What he learned, however, did not seem to have sticking power and he abandoned his new understanding in the first days after the rollover. By March 2000 (as per his statements in the Q&A piece on my website), he referred to the "fabled" existence of such problems. Note: The Questions & Answers piece includes Mr. Koskinen's responses to many questions that I posed to him in March of 2000. The piece includes an extensive set of appendices and can be found at http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon Mr. Koskinen's views and change in views are also chronicled in the transcripts of the press conferences held just before and during the first week following the rollover. They have been archived at http://www.y2k.gov Some very intelligent persons have not understood the nature and scope of Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. One can have a genius IQ and still not have a rudimentary understanding of highly technical subject areas. Even individuals who have extensive technical training and professional experience in a technical field may reach different conclusions about the same issues and challenges. When it comes to Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems, I have found that differences in perspective can even be found amongst software engineers and others with embedded systems expertise. The basis for such differences can often be identified. For instance, the understanding of those whose specialty is in aeronautical engineering can be quite different from those whose area of specialty is oil refineries or gas or oil pipelines. An emphasis on specialization has left society with few generalists and few who have broad ranging expertise that spans a range of sectors. Few specialists seem to be inclined or equipped to try to see the larger picture that includes many different sectors. It is not surprising that any individual whose major training has been in law or business management or both, who does not have a technical background that includes expertise in engineering or a specialty in embedded systems and complex integrated systems would fail to comprehend the nature and scope of these problems. It is not surprising that a person who lacked a technical background would have difficulty in acquiring a working understanding of such a complicated subject in a short period of time especially if there were confusion over whose expertise to trust. There is abundant evidence from the historical record that those in positions of greatest responsibility in the Federal government did not (and do not) comprehend the nature and scope of Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. The Department of Energy, for instance, did not have and does not to my knowledge have even one person on staff who has embedded expertise AND who made or is able to make the connection between refinery problems that have become evident since the rollover. Incredible to be sure if only in light of the 1999 report and predictions of the International Energy Administration and the IEE's case studies prior to the rollover. This situation is the same in almost every Executive Branch agency and entity that I know of. The failure of top Federal policymakers in the Executive Branch to comprehend the importance of Y2K-related embedded system and complex integrated systems problem seems to me to be owing to a complex of factors. These seem to me to include a lack of technical background and a lack of interest and motivation and the absence of a perceived mandate to focus more fully on these problems. There have certainly been disincentives for those few who do have some understanding of the problems to come forward or to act on their understanding. But the larger problem is that those at the top never understood the most daunting aspects of the problem. My perspective concerning what key Executive Branch officials knew and what they know is based on the public record and on what I have been able to glean from the exchanges that I had with them and/or with those who consulted with them and those who worked in their offices. I believe that we have reached a point in our history when technology has succeeded in "snookering" us. We have reached a point in our history when those in key roles of responsibility need to comprehend as fully as possible the technical aspects of the threats and challenges that we face. They need to know when it is necessary to call upon and rely on individuals with technical expertise. They need to be able to incorporate such technical understanding in the policies they evolve and implement. A lesson of the Challenger Disaster is that it is possible for those at the top (in that case, NASA) to fail to know about the importance of certain technical aspects of a situation. In the case of the Challenger, those at the top did not even know that there were engineers from Morton Thiokol urging a delay of the launch owing to weather conditions and the effect that low temperatures would be apt to have on the O-rings. (Irving Janis' book Groupthink also includes a discussion of what went wrong in the group decisionmaking process that resulted in the Challenger disaster. There may also be something on MSNBC's website on the Challenger Disaster owing to a program aired on 1-25-2001.) I don't blame anyone for being skeptical concerning the validity of my reading of embedded systems and related challenges. It is asking alot for people to believe that decisions about highly complex national and global challenges were made by people who did not place adequate reliance on the technical expertise of those who understood the technical aspects of the challenges and the threats. I have long had a fascination with major debacles, fiascoes, and catastrophes that affect or threaten to affect the public. It seems to me that the approach that the Federal government has taken to Y2K- related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems has been tantamount to public policy Russian Roulette. They never fully knew, nor do they seem to have any inkling now, of the role that Y2K- related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems had and are having in any of a number of sectors, including most notably the energy sector. Most of those remaining in positions of Executive Branch responsibility have no basis for even raising basic questions. They believe as the media appears to believe that problem is over. Neither they or the media fully understood the problem. If the complexity of the problem could be explained in sound bites, there might be a chance of raising the level of understanding concerning the problems that we are seeing. However, because of the mind boggling dimensions of the subject, sound bites will not work. The truth in this case strains credulity. It may be that most people will have neither the patience not the interest to wade through longer explanations, explanations that they are disinclined to believe in the first place. Perhaps someone will eventually be successful in figuring out a way to simplify the explanations. Perhaps, eventually, some of those in the highest roles of public responsibility will have their eyes opened by such explanations.

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), January 30, 2001.


The formatting did not hold. Here is a second try:

The following is a 1/26/2001 cross-posting of mine posted at http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=21122.topic&index=55

It is addressed to "Senses On" who had written the following:

"One thing is for sure, no one in “authority” will *ever* use the term Y2K in explaining difficulties."

What you say may well prove true over time. But I think that you and I probably differ concerning the reasons why this might or might not turn out to be the case.

Earlier today I had an e-mail exchange concerning what the highest level officials in the Executive Branch understood (or currently understand) about Y2K-related embedded systems and complex embedded systems problems.

I was saying in that e-mail exchange that in my view the highest level officials did not understand the nature and scope of these problems. The other person involved in this discussion took issue saying that they were certain that these officials had the necessary intelligence to understand the technical issues and their implications. They thought that the failure of top level officials to address these problems had to do with "a lack of motivation to put the picture together for the common good of all."

The following is based on my response:

I know full well that it is difficult to believe that those in the highest roles of public responsibility failed to understand the technical issues involved with Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. There were moments in the last two months of 1999 when it seemed that Mr. Koskinen had begun to gain a deeper understanding of embedded systems-related concerns. What he learned, however, did not seem to have sticking power and he abandoned his new understanding in the first days after the rollover. By March 2000 (as per his statements in the Q&A piece on my website), he referred to the "fabled" existence of such problems.

Note: The Questions & Answers piece includes Mr. Koskinen's responses to many questions that I posed to him in March of 2000. The piece includes an extensive set of appendices and can be found at http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon

Mr. Koskinen's views and change in views are also chronicled in the transcripts of the press conferences held just before and during the first week following the rollover. They have been archived at http://www.y2k.gov

Some very intelligent persons have not understood the nature and scope of Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. One can have a genius IQ and still not have a rudimentary understanding of highly technical subject areas. Even individuals who have extensive technical training and professional experience in a technical field may reach different conclusions about the same issues and challenges. When it comes to Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems, I have found that differences in perspective can even be found amongst software engineers and others with embedded systems expertise. The basis for such differences can often be identified. For instance, the understanding of those whose specialty is in aeronautical engineering can be quite different from those whose area of specialty is oil refineries or gas or oil pipelines.

An emphasis on specialization has left society with few generalists and few who have broad ranging expertise that spans a range of sectors. Few specialists seem to be inclined or equipped to try to see the larger picture that includes many different sectors.

It is not surprising that any individual whose major training has been in law or business management or both, who does not have a technical background that includes expertise in engineering or a specialty in embedded systems and complex integrated systems would fail to comprehend the nature and scope of these problems. It is not surprising that a person who lacked a technical background would have difficulty in acquiring a working understanding of such a complicated subject in a short period of time especially if there were confusion over whose expertise to trust.

There is abundant evidence from the historical record that those in positions of greatest responsibility in the Federal government did not (and do not) comprehend the nature and scope of Y2K-related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. The Department of Energy, for instance, did not have and does not to my knowledge have even one person on staff who has embedded expertise AND who made or is able to make the connection between refinery problems that have become evident since the rollover. Incredible to be sure if only in light of the 1999 report and predictions of the International Energy Administration and the IEE's case studies prior to the rollover. This situation is the same in almost every Executive Branch agency and entity that I know of.

The failure of top Federal policymakers in the Executive Branch to comprehend the importance of Y2K-related embedded system and complex integrated systems problem seems to me to be owing to a complex of factors. These seem to me to include a lack of technical background and a lack of interest and motivation and the absence of a perceived mandate to focus more fully on these problems. There have certainly been disincentives for those few who do have some understanding of the problems to come forward or to act on their understanding. But the larger problem is that those at the top never understood the most daunting aspects of the problem.

My perspective concerning what key Executive Branch officials knew and what they know is based on the public record and on what I have been able to glean from the exchanges that I had with them and/or with those who consulted with them and those who worked in their offices.

I believe that we have reached a point in our history when technology has succeeded in "snookering" us. We have reached a point in our history when those in key roles of responsibility need to comprehend as fully as possible the technical aspects of the threats and challenges that we face. They need to know when it is necessary to call upon and rely on individuals with technical expertise. They need to be able to incorporate such technical understanding in the policies they evolve and implement.

A lesson of the Challenger Disaster is that it is possible for those at the top (in that case, NASA) to fail to know about the importance of certain technical aspects of a situation. In the case of the Challenger, those at the top did not even know that there were engineers from Morton Thiokol urging a delay of the launch owing to weather conditions and the effect that low temperatures would be apt to have on the O-rings. (Irving Janis' book Groupthink also includes a discussion of what went wrong in the group decisionmaking process that resulted in the Challenger disaster. There may also be something on MSNBC's website on the Challenger Disaster owing to a program aired on 1-25-2001.)

I don't blame anyone for being skeptical concerning the validity of my reading of embedded systems and related challenges. It is asking alot for people to believe that decisions about highly complex national and global challenges were made by people who did not place adequate reliance on the technical expertise of those who understood the technical aspects of the challenges and the threats.

I have long had a fascination with major debacles, fiascoes, and catastrophes that affect or threaten to affect the public. It seems to me that the approach that the Federal government has taken to Y2K- related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems has been tantamount to public policy Russian Roulette. They never fully knew, nor do they seem to have any inkling now, of the role that Y2K- related embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems had and are having in any of a number of sectors, including most notably the energy sector. Most of those remaining in positions of Executive Branch responsibility have no basis for even raising basic questions. They believe as the media appears to believe that problem is over. Neither they or the media fully understood the problem. If the complexity of the problem could be explained in sound bites, there might be a chance of raising the level of understanding concerning the problems that we are seeing. However, because of the mind boggling dimensions of the subject, sound bites will not work. The truth in this case strains credulity. It may be that most people will have neither the patience not the interest to wade through longer explanations, explanations that they are disinclined to believe in the first place. Perhaps someone will eventually be successful in figuring out a way to simplify the explanations. Perhaps, eventually, some of those in the highest roles of public responsibility will have their eyes opened by such explanations.

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), January 30, 2001.


Do you pray Buddy? That would be a good starting point. Then read something that gives you a sweeping view of human history such as; A Study of History: Volumes I-X by Toynbee or an even a better choice, the New American Standard Bible. Five pages a day and you can finish it in a year. Then we can talk.

-- Phil Maley (maley@cnw.com), January 30, 2001.

I've read plenty of history, and have read the bible cover to cover (Catholic version). Frankly, that and whether or not I pray or none of your business and irrelevant to this discussion. Your emphasis on such makes me think that your approach to this whole situation is partly based on faith, which in the case of a technical subject that is based purely on logic and reasoning tends to distort your view.

I am simply tired of seeing people who have absolutely no technical expertise continue to spout off allegations of technical breakdowns and coverups of same such as Paula Gordon continues to do. Let's see some proof. Continuing to post articles with generalizations from anonymous "engineers" just doesn't cut it.

-- Buddy (buddydc@go.com), January 31, 2001.


An April 2000 presentation that discussed the reasons why so few people are willing to talk about Y2K problems on or off the record, can be found at http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon

One of the major concerns keeping people from talking about what is happening is fear of losing their jobs. This just seems to be a fact of life right now.

On 1/30/2001 I posted a summary of one engineer's take on ongoing Y2K- related problems. This was also crossposted on GICC. The summary and/or discussions mentioning the summary can be found at

http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=004Vzv

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=21122.topic

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=22044.topic

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=22022.topic

http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=004W2T

Only a very few of the postings mention by name those experiencing problems, but a few are mentioned.

Of particular interest is the following posting by Redeye In Ohio in which he critiques the summary of the engineer's observations. R posted these comments at 1/31/01 12:18:51 am at http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=22022.topic

Posting by Redeye in Ohio: Like StillPrepping, I can think of some consulting engineers who get assignments across a companies in a few industries where their expertise can be commonly applied.

I re-read that leadoff posting with deliberate skepticism. My own experience leads me to place some credibility in its contents.

One point, about the rough correlation between solar activity and systems problems. As far as I know, Sun is still very quietly fixing (replacing) certain cache boards on certain high end boxes (all the while denying to the world that they have any problem whatsoever). What has been happening is that those systems would suddenly hang or crash for no apparent reason. After months of engineering man-hours, Sun's engineers decided that those cache boards were functioning so fast and with such sensitivity that solar radiation was a likely culprit.

Do I have a link to substantiate that Sun observation? No. I can tell you that I remember reading about it in one of the major print business management publications.

As I read that leadoff post, I was looking for specific items that either tended to confirm or deny it. The solar connection, imho, passes that smell test.

Another statement certainly passing my smell test is "...of the persons he comes across, less than 20% of those who work with complex systems understand the systems and keep up with changes and that only a small percent is able to address problems effectively.". Got that darn right...

This whole paragraph passes my smell test: He said that manual override and date resetting have been used when automated production systems and SCADA systems have failed. He said that it is not uncommon when he is replacing a system to be told by the client that he has to put in an old date or the application will not run. He added that many of these applications are old and that large networks over the past decade can be composed of a mix of upgrades, networks, and applications that are out of sync. Owing to these problems, he estimates that the country is running at 65% to 70% of last year's production rates on the average.

I can't pass on his 65% to 70% number, but I sure can pass on the "mix of upgrades..." situations.

We saw information allegedly coming from inside of, if memory serves, PG&E last week or so, to the extent that part of the cash flow problems were in the billing and accounting systems -- that they were having serious and recurrent problems generating bills and getting invoices in to the point of being able to cut checks to suppliers.

Ed's right in one sense, and that is that it really doesn't matter whether or not we are seeing y2k-related problems finally gathering enough mass to not be so thoroughly concealable. What does matter is that in some of these industries, such as power generation and distribution, we are dealing with an aging and very stressed infrastructure, and seeing these problems layered on top of running nearly at, or above, capacity.

It does matter in one sense, and that is that, as we remember, many of the, e.g., controllers, are long out of manufacture, and furthermore, some can be reached and replaced only with extreme difficulty.

I am glad this thread got started. It's been one well worth thinking carefully about, especially in terms of implications.

R

End of quoted material. No material was deleted.

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), January 31, 2001.


Regarding the 1/30/2001 Summary of an Engineer's Observations Regarding the Status of Ongoing Y2K-Related Embedded Systems and Complex Integrated Systems Problems referred to in the above posting: The Summary has been edited by the addition of one word. The edited version can be found on GICC at

http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=004Vzv

The edited version can also be found on several current Y2K-related threads on EZ Board at

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=21122.topic

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=22022.topic

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdontimebomb2000.showMessage? topicID=22044.topic

These EZ Board threads include some interesting discussions concerning this Summary of an Engineer's Observations.

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), February 01, 2001.


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