New Narrows bridge cost revised upward

Tuesday, May 23, 2000

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

TACOMA -- The projected cost of a second Tacoma Narrows Bridge has been revised upward again, this time to $700 million, according to a newly released draft financial plan.

According to the plan released Thursday by United Infrastructure Washington Inc., the total cost of the bridge will be $2.2 billion with interest payments added in.

The new estimate is significantly higher than the $350 million price tag bridge planners were advertising as recently as March. That figure was revised to $650 million by the state Department of Transportation in April.

Bridge tolls will probably be $3 for three years after the new bridge opens in 2005, the company said.

"We want to keep tolls as low as possible for as long as possible," said Larry O'Bryon, vice president of United Infrastructure.

Bridge opponents feared the $3 initial toll prescribed by the contract would be raised months after the May 2005 opening.

-- (mark842@hotmail.com), May 23, 2000

Answers

The following is cut from an article entitled :

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
What Went Wrong?
How to Fix It

While it addresses primarily problems in defense procurement, the argument really generalizes to all large government procurement projects, including light rail and the new Narrows Bridge.

http://www.d-n-i.net/FCS_Folder/QDR_Report_Master_doc.pdf

\

The structural bias to understate future costs is the first 
step in a systematic
political effort to suck money out of Congress. It reflects the well-
known bureaucratic
power game of front-loading or buying-in. The scam is to deliberately 
low-ball future cost estimates in order to obtain a commitment to 
begin concurrent engineering and manufacturing development (known as 
EMD). Once this commitment is approved by the government, the defense 
company can expend contract dollars (i.e., tax dollars) on 
investments in establishing a production base and a nationwide 
network of suppliers.
The EMD decision, in effect, gives the contractor permission to use 
public money to
build his political protection network by systematically spreading 
subcontracts and
production facilities to as many congressional districts as possible. 
The spreading
operation is known as political engineering.
When the true costs of a politically-engineered program eventually 
emerge, as they
clearly did in the case of the F-18, the political stakes have become 
so high, neither
Congress nor the Pentagon can muster the will to cancel the program. 
Instead, decision
makers on both sides of the Potomac cut back production rates to 
reduce total costs in
order to protect the jobs and profits of their constituents. Viewed 
in the context of the
defense power games, the production stretch-outs of the QDR are a 
predictable, indeed
inevitable, consequence of business as usual in the military-
industrial-congressional

While it is difficult to cut back the production rates of a bridge, this bait and switch tactic can result in higher than advertised tolls. For the light rail, it will be manifested in such things as Minimal Operable Segments, calls for increased taxes because weve got to make up for all the buses that used to be in the bus tunnel, and the classic all the money weve spent to far is wasted if we dont spend more.

Im not asking anyone to agree, just remember this a few years from now, when you see it happen.

The craigster

-- (craigcar@crosswinds.net), May 23, 2000.

to Craig: I'm not sure what is your point, since it holds true for building roads, as well.

It seems to me, the only government program which is well-understood in terms of budget projections; is more cost-effective than rail or buses; is more timely than roads and affords an incremental approach to mitigating congestionl; is vanpooling.

Our community will expend over 2 billion dollars for a bridge which the DOT admits will not mitigate congestion, particularly in the eastbound direction. The mitigation of traffic in the westbound direction depends on what happens to the ferry system. If the fares for ferries increase, and the quality of the ferries decrease, then more people may opt to "drive around". Hence, there would little, if any, mitigation of congestion in the westbound direction.

For that amount of money, society could signifcantly mitigate congestion with vanpooling. True, after 40 years, society would have nothing to show for it. But, in the case of the new Narrows Bridge, society will have to build yet another new Narrows Bridge, after 40 years, and at a cost of TENS OF BILLIONS of dollars.

Most of us aren't as farsighted as you, Craig. We want congestion relief and we want it now. We want it at the lowest cost possible. So far, the only answer is vanpooling.

-- Matthew M. Warren (mattinsky@msn.com), May 24, 2000.

"Most of us aren't as farsighted as you, Craig. We want congestion relief and we want it now. "

And that's why the politicians and the special interest groups will always be able to do their thing while holding the things that you want hostage.

As I have REPEATEDLY said, I have nothing against vanpools, and in their niche they can be effective. But you continue to use "n" of one examples, rather than looking at the ABUNDANT demographic studies that demonstrate that this niche is not big enough to make a big difference with congestion. For MOST people, vanpools just aren't a good option. For those individuals whose situations make it an acceptable option (I'd say like you, but you've repeatedly said how marginal YOUR case is, and how little it would take to stop you from vanpooling) that's great. Some people can bicycle or walk to work too, even in the Wet Northwest, but the percentage of people who can readily vanpool from a pure demographic perspective like the percentage who can walk and bicycle, are simply too few to seriously affect the overall congestion. Just cause something works well in its niche, doesn't mean it can be infinitely generalized.

the craigster

-- (craigcar@crosswinds.net), May 24, 2000.