For those who believe that building freeway lanes isnt cost effective, look what youre going to get with light rail!

Mark Stilson

Public Interest Transportation Forum - http://www.gt-wa.com/PITF



Note from editor: Emory Bundy, a Seattle policy analyst and civic activist with many interests including environmental protection and cost-effective government services, has in September 1999 chronicled numerous problems with the light rail transit line planned for Seattle. Because of new developments since the voter approval of the Sound Transit Plan, he recommends an outside professional review and reconsideration of the light rail component. Here is his report:
Sound Transit Reviewed
by Emory Bundy
September 29, 1999
Executive Summary: Alarm Bells
People are alarmed by the evolving contrast between what they expected from the Regional Transit Authority (RTA), and what they're getting. With the point-of-no-return at hand, Seattle stands at the edge of a precipice, about to take the plunge with the mid-November federal funding package.
Sound Transit's plan does not justify its price tag even if executed exactly as intended. The RTA maintained a contrary impression by evading expert, independent review of its costs and benefits. As new facts emerge, it is clear that costs were underestimated, probably by an enormous degree. More modeling of benefits has been done, and they are markedly less favorable than those claimed before the vote. Serious questions have arisen about the capacity of the downtown tunnel. The RTA's claim that trains could carry a larger number of passengers than buses may be false. The RTA's claim that it could accommodate both buses and trains in the tunnel definitely is false. That fact alone threatens a severe impact on the downtown community as hundreds of buses are returned to the streets, and raises questions of competence and credibility.
With so much at variance with pre-election representations, four basic, prudent measures are called for:
1. Pause, verify assumptions, review alternatives.
2. Commission a first-rate, independent economic analysis of the costs and benefits of Sound Transit's plans.
3. Commission a first-rate, independent review of the issues pertaining to tunnel capacity, and the effect on downtown Seattle of returning the buses to the streets.
4. Complete the necessary geotechnical studies for the First Hill/Capitol Hill/Portage Bay/ship canal/University District tunnel, and the Beacon Hill tunnel, and make them available for independent review.
Considering the stakes, these moderate, fact-seeking recommendations clearly are merited. With so much bad news accumulating, and so early, it is a matter of simple prudence to take a final, careful look at where we're going-before the federal funding package is submitted and the region steps into an abyss.
Sound Transit Reviewed
The transportation planning/RTA establishment set out to build a railroad, rather than explore the complexities of how best to address metropolitan Seattle's mounting problems of congestion and mobility. Its primary objective was to overcome the political challenges of getting the funding vote passed. At every stage, the most dramatic being the Capitol Hill tunnel, political considerations were paramount. Benefits were hyped, risks were downplayed, costs were understated, superior options were ignored. 
While rail is very popular, and politically correct, during the past quarter-century, every American city that introduced or expanded its rail system experienced burgeoning costs and falling market share for transit. It is abundantly clear that Sound Transit will not be an exception to the rule. For example, 
At the northern terminus of the Sound Transit's "starter rail," the University District, there is profound concern about the impacts on that severely congested sector from cars and buses seeking to deliver people to the trains. Either the congestion and air quality of the U District will be severely affected, or people simply won't use the trains in anything like the projected numbers, or both. These entirely predictable problems are the result of substituting political expediency for good planning.
The RTA spent $90 million planning the region's transit network. The primary focus was a light rail line. The pivotal component of that line is an exceedingly challenging tunnel under the University District, ship canal, Portage Bay, and Capitol Hill-and yet the RTA failed to take the soil samples that would verify its feasibility. There was a strong incentive not to gather the geotechnical information: Polling data told the RTA that the Capitol Hill tunnel would get more votes-so why jeopardize votes by risking unwelcome facts? Even at this relatively early stage major problems have surfaced, like the need to burrow much deeper under Portage Bay and the ship canal. Consequently the stations in the U District will be much deeper than planned, and far more costly. This is the first in what promises to be a sequence of expensive surprises.
Downtown business interests were told that the anticipated six-minute schedule for the light rail trains would permit them to be integrated with bus travel in downtown's "bus tunnel." Thus the light rail would alleviate downtown congestion. What they were told was false. All the buses will be forced back onto the surface, exacerbating congestion.
From the outset the downtown bus tunnel was intended for rail, eventually. Railroad tracks were installed during construction, to save money. But incomprehensibly, the tunnel is not suited for trains-and the RTA seems not to have noticed! It will take two years of construction to make it so, and even the tracks have to be torn out and replaced.
In the industrial area just south of downtown Seattle, a coalition of Duwamish businesses complain that Sound Transit's alignment will impede freight mobility and impair Port of Seattle activities. Its proposed 25-acre maintenance facility may mean the loss of scores of businesses and jeopardize thousands of jobs.
The issues of whether the Rainier Valley portion would be above ground, below ground, or on the surface, and what the alignment might be, were finessed, in order to allay concerns and gain support for the vote. Now that the details are coming out, many residents think the deleterious impacts of the project on their community will far outweigh any conceivable benefits.
Representatives of the City of Bellevue point out that Sound Transit's action to close the downtown Seattle tunnel to buses will subvert its efforts to improve bus service and expand patronage. As in so many other areas of the region, they will be worse rather than better off, after a multi-billion dollar exhaustion of public resources.
The Seattle area's rail plan is modeled on that of Los Angeles. The tax formula is equivalent-but LA started more decisively, while the political judgment in Seattle was that a comparably ambitious plan, the $13 billion Joint Regional Policy Committee proposal, was too steep for taxpayers. So it will be phased in, beginning with a "starter rail," then expanded. LA's experience illuminates what the Puget Sound region should expect.
Since rail construction began in 1985, LA lost more than 25 percent of its transit patronage and 38 percent of its transit market share. Construction costs are consistently far over budget, and the underground projects have experienced prodigious overruns. Nine percent of transit patrons now ride trains and 91 percent still ride buses. Operating subsidies go 45 percent to train riders and 55 percent to bus riders-so the subsidy of an average train rider is eight-times greater than that of a bus rider. LA pays $360 million annually on $3.4 billion, 30-year bonds for its rail projects-a figure greater than the total salaries of all LA Metropolitan Transit Authority personnel. Its desperate finances compel a cessation of rail construction, but partially-constructed elements will be completed, adding an estimated $2.2 billion to the debt, or $5.6 billion total. That will entail an annual debt service around $600 million. In late September the court ordered LA MTA to move immediately to improve its bus service (248 more buses on the streets within 30 days!), having become frustrated with its continued victimization of its bus transit riders while it spends itself into oblivion on rail.
After 15 years of its rail-building experiment, LA is more congested, considerably fewer people ride transit, and bus riders pay considerably more to do so. Having squandered its treasure on rail dreams, LA's ability to effectively address its transportation crisis will be severely impaired until its rail bonds are paid off-sometime around 2030.
RTA estimates its commuter and light rail projects will recruit 37,000 "new riders"-- that is, people who are not already transit patrons. Since the RTA defines a "new rider" as a commuter taking a one-way trip, it really means that if the RTA is 100% successful 18,500 round-trip autos will be removed as a consequence of the trains, by 2010. That's a capital cost of $135,000 per auto removed from Seattle's travel mix-which joins the question of whether the region could apply money more effectively. Further, $135,000 per auto presumes that the projects meet ridership projections and are built within budget. But the budget overruns will be large and may be immense, and there is no reason to expect ridership numbers to measure up to RTA's projections.
From the date of the election (1996), to the scheduled completion and shake-down of the two rail systems (2010), the population of the metropolitan area is projected to increase by 600,000. Should the hoped-for 18,500 converts from auto to rail actually materialize, that number will equal a mere three percent (3%) of the population increase. Even if all goes entirely as well as hoped, severely deteriorating congestion will accompany the huge costs of rail development.
Since the RTA would not commission an independent, economic analysis of its plan, private citizens retained the prestigious regional economic consulting firm, ECONorthwest, to perform such an analysis. The review applied the RTA's own assumptions and official cost and ridership numbers. It double-checked them with RTA staff to be certain they were understood and accurate. The methodology of the study was reviewed and unanimously vouched-for, in writing, by a national panel of experts from such institutions as University of Texas, Harvard University, and University of Michigan, including the chairman of the department of economics at Michigan. The study concluded that, over its lifetime, RTA's plan will have a net value to the region of minus $2.5 billion! 
An example of the extent to which the RTA is prepared to misrepresent the truth is illustrated by its oft-repeated statement: "Light rail can carry the same number of people as 12 freeway lanes." More than three pages of its Ten-Year Regional Plan is devoted to defending that statement. Yet there is not a light rail line in the US that carries as many passengers as a single, standard freeway couplet. It would be equally true to say "buses can carry 50-times more people than light rail," or "a freeway lane can carry more people than 12 light rail lines," simply by positing hypothetically conceivable, but as a practical matter utterly unachievable numbers. The veracity of RTA's claim rests on having maximum-size light rail trains (six cars), leaving the station every three minutes, with every car in every train containing 125 passengers (two-thirds more passengers than seats), contrasted with a sorely underutilized, single-occupancy freeway lane. The intent, carried out by public servants at public expense, is pernicious: to mislead, not inform.
A Tale of Two Tunnels
The First Tunnel: In 1983 Metro set out to build the 1.3 mile Downtown Seattle bus tunnel. While work in the downtown environment was challenging, the tunnel was a mostly straight-forward cut-and-cover job. It also was the harbinger of the region's future rail system; Jim Ellis described it as "the first step." The tunnel would have a capacity of 360 buses per hour. The planning for the rail future reached down to the smallest detail, even saving money by laying the train tracks because it was less expensive to do so while the tunnel was under construction. The projected cost of the tunnel was $376 million. At the end, Metro's leaders claimed it was completed within 15 percent of "original estimates." 
While cultivating public support for its 1996 ballot issue, the RTA said that conversion of the Downtown tunnel to rail could be done at modest cost, and much of it could be done in the evenings, to minimize any interruption of bus use. Plans were made for six-car trains which, it was claimed, could supplant the need for 12 freeway lanes. (Six car trains, every three minutes, 125 passengers per car.) Because in the early years trains will not run more frequently than every six minutes, buses and trains could share the tunnel. That's what the voters were told.
The Second Tunnel: The new five mile First Hill/Capitol Hill tunnel to the University District is budgeted at about $1 billion. Prior to the election, an RTA diagram showed it running 20 feet under the ship canal. Because of "limited geotechnical information," 25 percent was added to the budget. The RTA described the estimate as "very conservative." RTA also predicted the tunnel will serve 70,000 passengers per day, primarily former bus users.
That's what the voters were told.
The first tunnel project, results: The cost of the bus tunnel was $617 million, which, after allowing for inflation, is a great deal more than 15 percent beyond its original $376 million estimate. The plan to move 360 buses per hour proved wildly optimistic. The preparations for future rail conversion were grossly incompetent. The stations are too small for the touted six-car trains, the platforms too low, the tracks need to be torn out. Rather than convert the tunnel to rail during a brief closure and off-hours, a two-year closure is required. The buses cannot share the tunnel with trains, for a host of reasons-unspecified safety and reliability problems, travel times would be slowed for both buses and trains, bus capacity would be decreased, etc. So they will be returned to Seattle's congested downtown surface streets. 
The second tunnel project, in process: As early facts have emerged, news about train tunneling is alarming. The cost to convert the Downtown tunnel from bus to rail will be prodigious, not nominal. The elevation of the Downtown tunnel is too high to connect with the First Hill/Capitol Hill tunnel under Interstate 5. Massive excavation is required in the vicinity of the Convention Station, which will be lost to future service. The depth of the tunnel under Portage Bay/ship canal must be lowered from 20 feet to 200 feet, due to soil conditions. University District stations will be so deep underground that patrons will be compelled to use elevators instead of escalators. The myriad challenges that lie ahead between the Portage Bay and Capitol Hill, due to the ominous "limited geotechnical information," are yet to be discovered.

-- Mark Stilson (mark842@hotmail.com), May 12, 2000

Answers

Sorry. Obviously some carriage returns got lost in the process.

For those who believe that building freeway lanes isnt cost effective, look what youre going to get with light rail!

Mark Stilson

Public Interest Transportation Forum - http://www.gt-wa.com/PITF



Note from editor: Emory Bundy, a Seattle policy analyst and civic 
activist with many interests including environmental protection and 
cost-effective government services, has in September 1999 chronicled 
numerous problems with the light rail transit line planned for 
Seattle. Because of new developments since the voter approval of the 
Sound Transit Plan, he recommends an outside professional review and 
reconsideration of the light rail component. Here is his report:
Sound Transit Reviewed
by Emory Bundy
September 29, 1999
Executive Summary: Alarm Bells
People are alarmed by the evolving contrast between what they 
expected from the Regional Transit Authority (RTA), and what they're 
getting. With the point-of-no-return at hand, Seattle stands at the 
edge of a precipice, about to take the plunge with the mid-November 
federal funding package.
Sound Transit's plan does not justify its price tag even if executed 
exactly as intended. The RTA maintained a contrary impression by 
evading expert, independent review of its costs and benefits. As new 
facts emerge, it is clear that costs were underestimated, probably by 
an enormous degree. More modeling of benefits has been done, and they 
are markedly less favorable than those claimed before the vote. 
Serious questions have arisen about the capacity of the downtown 
tunnel. The RTA's claim that trains could carry a larger number of 
passengers than buses may be false. The RTA's claim that it could 
accommodate both buses and trains in the tunnel definitely is false. 
That fact alone threatens a severe impact on the downtown community 
as hundreds of buses are returned to the streets, and raises 
questions of competence and credibility.
With so much at variance with pre-election representations, four 
basic, prudent measures are called for:
1. Pause, verify assumptions, review alternatives.
2. Commission a first-rate, independent economic analysis of the 
costs and benefits of Sound Transit's plans.
3. Commission a first-rate, independent review of the issues 
pertaining to tunnel capacity, and the effect on downtown Seattle of 
returning the buses to the streets.
4. Complete the necessary geotechnical studies for the First 
Hill/Capitol Hill/Portage Bay/ship canal/University District tunnel, 
and the Beacon Hill tunnel, and make them available for independent 
review.
Considering the stakes, these moderate, fact-seeking recommendations 
clearly are merited. With so much bad news accumulating, and so 
early, it is a matter of simple prudence to take a final, careful 
look at where we're going-before the federal funding package is 
submitted and the region steps into an abyss.
Sound Transit Reviewed
The transportation planning/RTA establishment set out to build a 
railroad, rather than explore the complexities of how best to address 
metropolitan Seattle's mounting problems of congestion and mobility. 
Its primary objective was to overcome the political challenges of 
getting the funding vote passed. At every stage, the most dramatic 
being the Capitol Hill tunnel, political considerations were 
paramount. Benefits were hyped, risks were downplayed, costs were 
understated, superior options were ignored. 
While rail is very popular, and politically correct, during the past 
quarter-century, every American city that introduced or expanded its 
rail system experienced burgeoning costs and falling market share for 
transit. It is abundantly clear that Sound Transit will not be an 
exception to the rule. For example, 
At the northern terminus of the Sound Transit's "starter rail," the 
University District, there is profound concern about the impacts on 
that severely congested sector from cars and buses seeking to deliver 
people to the trains. Either the congestion and air quality of the U 
District will be severely affected, or people simply won't use the 
trains in anything like the projected numbers, or both. These 
entirely predictable problems are the result of substituting 
political expediency for good planning.
The RTA spent $90 million planning the region's transit network. The 
primary focus was a light rail line. The pivotal component of that 
line is an exceedingly challenging tunnel under the University 
District, ship canal, Portage Bay, and Capitol Hill-and yet the RTA 
failed to take the soil samples that would verify its feasibility. 
There was a strong incentive not to gather the geotechnical 
information: Polling data told the RTA that the Capitol Hill tunnel 
would get more votes-so why jeopardize votes by risking unwelcome 
facts? Even at this relatively early stage major problems have 
surfaced, like the need to burrow much deeper under Portage Bay and 
the ship canal. Consequently the stations in the U District will be 
much deeper than planned, and far more costly. This is the first in 
what promises to be a sequence of expensive surprises.
Downtown business interests were told that the anticipated six-minute 
schedule for the light rail trains would permit them to be integrated 
with bus travel in downtown's "bus tunnel." Thus the light rail would 
alleviate downtown congestion. What they were told was false. All the 
buses will be forced back onto the surface, exacerbating congestion.
From the outset the downtown bus tunnel was intended for rail, 
eventually. Railroad tracks were installed during construction, to 
save money. But incomprehensibly, the tunnel is not suited for trains-
and the RTA seems not to have noticed! It will take two years of 
construction to make it so, and even the tracks have to be torn out 
and replaced.
In the industrial area just south of downtown Seattle, a coalition of 
Duwamish businesses complain that Sound Transit's alignment will 
impede freight mobility and impair Port of Seattle activities. Its 
proposed 25-acre maintenance facility may mean the loss of scores of 
businesses and jeopardize thousands of jobs.
The issues of whether the Rainier Valley portion would be above 
ground, below ground, or on the surface, and what the alignment might 
be, were finessed, in order to allay concerns and gain support for 
the vote. Now that the details are coming out, many residents think 
the deleterious impacts of the project on their community will far 
outweigh any conceivable benefits.
Representatives of the City of Bellevue point out that Sound 
Transit's action to close the downtown Seattle tunnel to buses will 
subvert its efforts to improve bus service and expand patronage. As 
in so many other areas of the region, they will be worse rather than 
better off, after a multi-billion dollar exhaustion of public 
resources.
The Seattle area's rail plan is modeled on that of Los Angeles. The 
tax formula is equivalent-but LA started more decisively, while the 
political judgment in Seattle was that a comparably ambitious plan, 
the $13 billion Joint Regional Policy Committee proposal, was too 
steep for taxpayers. So it will be phased in, beginning with a 
"starter rail," then expanded. LA's experience illuminates what the 
Puget Sound region should expect.
Since rail construction began in 1985, LA lost more than 25 percent 
of its transit patronage and 38 percent of its transit market share. 
Construction costs are consistently far over budget, and the 
underground projects have experienced prodigious overruns. Nine 
percent of transit patrons now ride trains and 91 percent still ride 
buses. Operating subsidies go 45 percent to train riders and 55 
percent to bus riders-so the subsidy of an average train rider is 
eight-times greater than that of a bus rider. LA pays $360 million 
annually on $3.4 billion, 30-year bonds for its rail projects-a 
figure greater than the total salaries of all LA Metropolitan Transit 
Authority personnel. Its desperate finances compel a cessation of 
rail construction, but partially-constructed elements will be 
completed, adding an estimated $2.2 billion to the debt, or $5.6 
billion total. That will entail an annual debt service around $600 
million. In late September the court ordered LA MTA to move 
immediately to improve its bus service (248 more buses on the streets 
within 30 days!), having become frustrated with its continued 
victimization of its bus transit riders while it spends itself into 
oblivion on rail.
After 15 years of its rail-building experiment, LA is more congested, 
considerably fewer people ride transit, and bus riders pay 
considerably more to do so. Having squandered its treasure on rail 
dreams, LA's ability to effectively address its transportation crisis 
will be severely impaired until its rail bonds are paid off-sometime 
around 2030.
RTA estimates its commuter and light rail projects will recruit 
37,000 "new riders"-- that is, people who are not already transit 
patrons. Since the RTA defines a "new rider" as a commuter taking a 
one-way trip, it really means that if the RTA is 100% successful 
18,500 round-trip autos will be removed as a consequence of the 
trains, by 2010. That's a capital cost of $135,000 per auto removed 
from Seattle's travel mix-which joins the question of whether the 
region could apply money more effectively. Further, $135,000 per auto 
presumes that the projects meet ridership projections and are built 
within budget. But the budget overruns will be large and may be 
immense, and there is no reason to expect ridership numbers to 
measure up to RTA's projections.
From the date of the election (1996), to the scheduled completion and 
shake-down of the two rail systems (2010), the population of the 
metropolitan area is projected to increase by 600,000. Should the 
hoped-for 18,500 converts from auto to rail actually materialize, 
that number will equal a mere three percent (3%) of the population 
increase. Even if all goes entirely as well as hoped, severely 
deteriorating congestion will accompany the huge costs of rail 
development.
Since the RTA would not commission an independent, economic analysis 
of its plan, private citizens retained the prestigious regional 
economic consulting firm, ECONorthwest, to perform such an analysis. 
The review applied the RTA's own assumptions and official cost and 
ridership numbers. It double-checked them with RTA staff to be 
certain they were understood and accurate. The methodology of the 
study was reviewed and unanimously vouched-for, in writing, by a 
national panel of experts from such institutions as University of 
Texas, Harvard University, and University of Michigan, including the 
chairman of the department of economics at Michigan. The study 
concluded that, over its lifetime, RTA's plan will have a net value 
to the region of minus $2.5 billion! 
An example of the extent to which the RTA is prepared to misrepresent 
the truth is illustrated by its oft-repeated statement: "Light rail 
can carry the same number of people as 12 freeway lanes." More than 
three pages of its Ten-Year Regional Plan is devoted to defending 
that statement. Yet there is not a light rail line in the US that 
carries as many passengers as a single, standard freeway couplet. It 
would be equally true to say "buses can carry 50-times more people 
than light rail," or "a freeway lane can carry more people than 12 
light rail lines," simply by positing hypothetically conceivable, but 
as a practical matter utterly unachievable numbers. The veracity of 
RTA's claim rests on having maximum-size light rail trains (six 
cars), leaving the station every three minutes, with every car in 
every train containing 125 passengers (two-thirds more passengers 
than seats), contrasted with a sorely underutilized, single-occupancy 
freeway lane. The intent, carried out by public servants at public 
expense, is pernicious: to mislead, not inform.
A Tale of Two Tunnels
The First Tunnel: In 1983 Metro set out to build the 1.3 mile 
Downtown Seattle bus tunnel. While work in the downtown environment 
was challenging, the tunnel was a mostly straight-forward cut-and-
cover job. It also was the harbinger of the region's future rail 
system; Jim Ellis described it as "the first step." The tunnel would 
have a capacity of 360 buses per hour. The planning for the rail 
future reached down to the smallest detail, even saving money by 
laying the train tracks because it was less expensive to do so while 
the tunnel was under construction. The projected cost of the tunnel 
was $376 million. At the end, Metro's leaders claimed it was 
completed within 15 percent of "original estimates." 
While cultivating public support for its 1996 ballot issue, the RTA 
said that conversion of the Downtown tunnel to rail could be done at 
modest cost, and much of it could be done in the evenings, to 
minimize any interruption of bus use. Plans were made for six-car 
trains which, it was claimed, could supplant the need for 12 freeway 
lanes. (Six car trains, every three minutes, 125 passengers per car.) 
Because in the early years trains will not run more frequently than 
every six minutes, buses and trains could share the tunnel. That's 
what the voters were told.
The Second Tunnel: The new five mile First Hill/Capitol Hill tunnel 
to the University District is budgeted at about $1 billion. Prior to 
the election, an RTA diagram showed it running 20 feet under the ship 
canal. Because of "limited geotechnical information," 25 percent was 
added to the budget. The RTA described the estimate as "very 
conservative." RTA also predicted the tunnel will serve 70,000 
passengers per day, primarily former bus users.
That's what the voters were told.
The first tunnel project, results: The cost of the bus tunnel was 
$617 million, which, after allowing for inflation, is a great deal 
more than 15 percent beyond its original $376 million estimate. The 
plan to move 360 buses per hour proved wildly optimistic. The 
preparations for future rail conversion were grossly incompetent. The 
stations are too small for the touted six-car trains, the platforms 
too low, the tracks need to be torn out. Rather than convert the 
tunnel to rail during a brief closure and off-hours, a two-year 
closure is required. The buses cannot share the tunnel with trains, 
for a host of reasons-unspecified safety and reliability problems, 
travel times would be slowed for both buses and trains, bus capacity 
would be decreased, etc. So they will be returned to Seattle's 
congested downtown surface streets. 
The second tunnel project, in process: As early facts have emerged, 
news about train tunneling is alarming. The cost to convert the 
Downtown tunnel from bus to rail will be prodigious, not nominal. The 
elevation of the Downtown tunnel is too high to connect with the 
First Hill/Capitol Hill tunnel under Interstate 5. Massive excavation 
is required in the vicinity of the Convention Station, which will be 
lost to future service. The depth of the tunnel under Portage 
Bay/ship canal must be lowered from 20 feet to 200 feet, due to soil 
conditions. University District stations will be so deep underground 
that patrons will be compelled to use elevators instead of 
escalators. The myriad challenges that lie ahead between the Portage 
Bay and Capitol Hill, due to the ominous "limited geotechnical 
information," are yet to be discovered.

-- (mark842@hotmail.com), May 12, 2000.

Wow! A Greenspun forum on my favorite obsessional topic of 8 years ago, transportation idiocy!

I went to an RTA planning meeting chaired by Norm Rice way back when, and asked why they couldn't just make the bus system free for a tiny fraction of what they wanted to spend on rail.

I showed from their own figures that the train fares would have to be $5 and the actual unsubsidized cost would be about $20 per ride.

The RTA career-resume-builders looked daggers at me, answered not a word, and grunted "thanks, NEXT!"

I moved out of the city two years ago.

Free buses still sounds like the best way, but I'm not sticking around to argue it.

-- joel (joelccc@msn.com), May 15, 2000.

to Mark: So, I should conclude you support HOV lanes over light rail? If not, which do you prefer: HOV lanes or light rail?

-- Matthew M. Warren (mattinsky@msn.com), May 15, 2000.

"to Mark: So, I should conclude you support HOV lanes over light rail? If not, which do you prefer: HOV lanes or light rail? "

This is the equivalent of asking me if I would rather walk to school or carry my lunch.

My point was that light rail is expensive, technically risky when it comes to cost estimates, and even if it meets it's design goals will have a trivial effect on congestion.

It does not address HOV lanes at all, and nothing about my posting above either supports or criticizes HOV lanes.

If you want my opinion about HOV lanes, start a thread about HOV lanes and ask me. I'm discussing light rail here.

-- Mark Stilson (mark842@hotmail.com), May 15, 2000.

From todays Seattle times, an interesting article about proposed zoning changes to encourage transit oriented development. It reinforces something that I have stated repeatedly in the past. A quarter mile is about all that you can expect average people to walk to get to a transit stop (and that in good weather). Im not claiming ownership of that number, it appears in all the studies that US DOT has done for years. But while every one acknowledges it, no one wants to consider the implications of it to fixed linear distribution systems like light rail. This zoning change predicts 2000 new housing units and 20,000 new jobs to be added to these quarter mile radius circles. When completed, there will be about 20 stops on LINK. Not all are suitable for TOD, the UW comes to mind for one. But lets say that 20 stops would be available. How much land area is that? Thats easy. Its 20*pi(1/4 mile)²= 3.95 square miles. I am not sure if Seattle is really going to be able to put an additional 500 housing units in per square mile, in areas that are already pretty built up, particularly in area where the light rail will be above ground and (along with roads, sidewalks, etc) taking up a lot of the area itself. The 5063 new jobs per square mile also seems a trifle unlikely. But time will tell.

But what is clear from the article is that only about 4 square miles of the land area of the Seattle Metropolitan area which is 588 square miles. About 2/3rds of 1% of the urban area (Not the RTA area, which is bigger, but the urban area) is accessible by Link. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/local/html98/zone17m_20000517.ht ml "Our challenge is to introduce rail into a built city and to improve, in a lot of ways, functional neighborhood commercial centers and let transit be an asset there," said Steven Antupit, co-manager of station-area planning for the city. The proposed land-use codes, which could be adopted in late summer, are directed at quarter-mile circles, called overlay zones, drawn around the stations. Within those zones, the city expects 2,000 new housing units and 20,000 jobs to be added over the next 20 years. To encourage growth in the zones, the proposed codes would make it easier to rezone land for multistory apartments, remove density limits for residential structures and reduce the required setbacks from property lines. They also could reduce the amount of parking that developers must provide, because residents could use rail instead of cars. A quarter-mile radius is commonly used by cities to plan around stations because it's considered a convenient walking distance. the craigster

-- (craigcar@crosswinds.net), May 17, 2000.

Light-rail stations might spur urban hubs City envisions homes, shops near Link stops

Thursday, May 18, 2000

By PHUONG LE SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER

When the Sound Transit light-rail system starts rolling in 2006, city officials hope the stations will become more than places to catch a ride.

They envision lively urban hubs where people live, shop, play and use services such as libraries and day care centers.

Bike paths, tree-lined streets, wider sidewalks and pedestrian- friendly businesses are on the drawing board.

The stations would also highlight features in the neighborhood, such as Asian restaurants in the Chinatown/International District or thriving small retail shops in Columbia City.

Compiled after 18 months of community meetings and public workshops, the city's plan calls for development aimed at getting people out of cars and onto the train.

Although short on specifics, the concept-level plans provide an initial peek at what the stations and surrounding neighborhoods may become. It also forms the guidelines for subsequent actions, such as re-zoning.

"It lays out a vision," said Councilman Richard Conlin, who chairs the neighborhoods committee. "Change is going to be scary. . . . We're trying to work on it and do it systemically. We've got time to do it right."

City officials see Sound Transit's plans as a chance to develop neighborhoods while encouraging more transit use.

The theory goes that as people change their lifestyles and learn to commute by train or bus, they'll want to live, work and do business within walking distance of transit stations.

Growth and density will center around a quarter-mile radius from the station because studies show people are most likely to walk that far -- about five minutes -- from a station.

-- (craigcar@crosswinds.net), May 18, 2000.