The World After Chechnya
How the Wars Impact Will Be Felt Beyond the Battlefield27 January 2000
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SUMMARY
Far beyond the rubble of Grozny, the four-month war in Chechnya is a defining moment for both Russia and the West. Within Russia, the war will determine the unity of the federation and the leadership of the next government. On a global scale, the war will impact Moscows bid to return to superpower status. In order to win, Russia must choke off rebel supplies flowing through neighboring Georgia. This, in turn, sets up a confrontation with the West. Washington has spent a decade building ties with Georgia and must back its partners in Tbilisi or risk losing influence throughout the former Soviet Union.
ANALYSIS
In the West, Russias campaign against rebels in the Chechen republic has provoked an outcry over civilian casualties. Russias own official casualty figures now stand at more than 1,100 dead troops. But the wars significance transcends the conflict itself.
The war will have a powerful ripple effect that reaches not only to Moscow but ultimately to Washington. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caucasus has been the effective borderland between the West and Russia, a place where the interests of both collide. To Russia, the region is a backyard that must be secured. To the United States, the Caucasus is a firebreak, where American influence can prevent a resurgent Russian threat to Europe.
The political shock waves now impact the pro-Western government of Georgia. Moscow has accused the government of President Eduard Shevardnadze of allowing vital supplies to flow northward through Georgian territory into the hands of the Chechen rebels, keeping Moscows 140,000 troops from defeating an estimated 8,000 rebels. Although the Georgian government denies aiding the rebels, it has until lately refused to allow combat operations by Russian troops based in Georgia.
It is difficult to underestimate the increasing implication of the Georgian government in the Chechen war. Washington has cultivated close ties with Shevardnadze and sought to draw the Georgian military even closer by including it in NATOs Partnership for Peace program and planning some 30 exercises this year involving U.S. and Georgian troops. During the war, the United States has tried to reassure Shevardnadzes government by announcing aid to help secure Georgias borders.
As the pressure builds on Georgia, Washington faces three choices. It can choose to overlook the problem, abandon Georgia in the hope that a Russian victory will quell its belligerency or Washington can encourage Georgia to stand up to Russia.
The last choice will force the United States to make a much larger reckoning: Is a resurgent Russia a greater threat than a chaotic Russia? Is it financially and militarily possible to keep Russia in retreat? And, if possible, is it worthwhile? Is the likely loss of American influence in the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the Baltic states worth avoiding a confrontation? After all, pushing Russia back now could result in Russian pressure elsewhere or leadership even more aggressive than acting President Vladimir Putin.
) 1998, 1999 Stratfor, Inc. All rights reserved.
-- Possible Impact (posim@hotmail.com), January 28, 2000