It will be a catastrophe if that happens! PLEASE READ this link: http://www.tmia.com/y2k.htm#worst and here are the complete list of nuclear reactors in the United States: http://www.nrc.gov/AEOD/pib/disclaimer.html Are they all y2k compliant? Do you live to one near you? Remember Chernobyl and Three-mile island? I hope you and your family and friends are prepared! Don't be very complacent!

-- Virgil Hawkins (abdullah_mohammad@excite.com), November 22, 1999

Answers

In Russia probably, in the US not likely and not much of a problem see comments on the movie. Take your Anti-nuke hysteria to the Sierra club.

-- squid (Itsdark@down.here), November 22, 1999.

Squid,

Why do you think the U.S. is not vulnerable? Please share your intelligent thoughts and insights..

-- Virgil Hawkins (abdullah_mohammad@excite.com), November 22, 1999.

Dear Mr. Hawkins

Please calm down sir. Our nuclear power plants may very well go off line. Indeed! They might very well be disabled! But a "Three Mile Islans" incident is unikely. Note sir, I did not say that we will not loose any of the nukes for a forseeable future. This we might well do. There are standard, three systems on all critical systems needed for a safe shut down. A primary and two back ups.

The word I received is that each plant is having portable generators trucked in (this just in case a problem occurs with the on site emergency generators). (as happened earlier this year in Scotland.)

There may be enough ailures in the embedded systems to take a power statio down, possiby for good, but the cntaiment dome should / will take cae of any radiation.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Shakey~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-- Shakey (in_a_bunker@forty.feet), November 22, 1999.

Because I have been INSIDE of a containment vessel to work. The problems are the design of the Soviet Reactors. They used designs that provided more power but are inherently unstable. So they fail in an unsafe condition (chernobyl). Whereas the US design is inherently stable and so TMI the worst accident that Jane Fonda knows of if your house was right outside the release sight (oohhhh, spoookky) you might have sucked in a couple of chest Xrays of rads. Big F&&cking Deal.

Just because you buy into the Anti-nuke propaganda and have read some pamphlets we should buy your stuff here? For the date roll over I would personally rather be getting my power from a nuclear plant than from a coal plant that needs lots and lots of train loads of coal to keep my Laser Jet printer working.

Let's stick to the real issues and the real dangers to J and J Q. Public.

-- squid (Itsdark@down.here), November 22, 1999.

I'm not anti-nuke and i'm definitely not pro- hanoi jane either, my only concern is y2k related nuclear power plant failures. Anyway, thanks for your comment!

-- Virgil Hawkins (abdullah_mohammad@excite.com), November 22, 1999.

Virgil, for what it's worth, our family takes the potential risk posed by Y2K seriously and have been actively preparing for mild-moderate disruptions in infrastructure.

For the past 12 years, we have lived about a mile from one of these facilities. After Y2K became an issue with us (16 months ago), we breifly considered moving but decided against it. First, we believe that the facilty is operated responsibly and currently, we have no evidence that suggests otherwise. Second, the utility claims to be ready and my research on the facilitate indicates that a serious remediation effort was made.

So as we move through the first few weeks of next year, our personal conclusion is that the most likely scenario is continued operation. Somewhat less likely but still a possibility - safe shutdown. Anything involving a containment breach would be less likely and could range from negligible to serious.

We keep a small amount of potassium iodide on hand, but if we really thought that we would need it because of the nuclear plant, we would move tommorow.

Your mileage may vary...

-- Arnie Rimmer (Arnie_Rimmer@usa.net), November 22, 1999.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2) reactor accident:

On March 28, 1979 at 4:00 AM, a minor malfunction occurred in the system which feeds water to the steam generators at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 Nuclear Generating Station. This event led eventually to the most serious commercial nuclear accident in US history and fundamental changes in the way nuclear power plants were operated and regulated.

The accident itself progressed to the point where over 90% of the reactor core was damaged. The containment building in which the reactor is located as well as several other locations around the plant were contaminated. The subsequent cleanup and recovery effort is documented in the collection associated with this Web page.

Unique amongst the items are the over 3600 video tapes which document the extensive effort to cleanup the plant and to understand exactly what happened. The technical reports summarize both the findings as well as provide an historical account of the recovery effort.

TMI Unit 2 is located outside of Harrisburg, PA along the Susquehanna River. The reactor system is a Babcock and Wilcox 900 MWe PWR. The system uses once through steam generators and has an unusually small primary coolant system volume.

During routine maintenance of the secondary side, feedwater to the steam generators was interrupted. The loss of feedwater caused the primary system to overheat causing the primary system pressure to increase. The reactor protective system scrammed the reactor but not before the system pressure caused one of the pressure regulating valves to open. This sequence of events was exactly what would be expected in such an event.

Unfortunately, when the pressure in the reactor decreased, the valve failed to completely close resulting in a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA). The emergency core cooling systems actuated as the system pressure continued to drop. Because of an incorrect interpretation of the instrument readings the operators terminated the operation of these systems. This caused the core to eventually overheat. The fuel cladding rapidly oxidized releasing hydrogen to the containment and further accelerating the process. Eventually, a significant portion of the fuel melted and flowed into the lower part of the core and lower reactor vessel head.

Large amounts of radioactive noble gasses were released to the containment atmosphere. Some of these were released to the environment resulting in <100 mrem maximum dose to those nearest TMI. There was no significant release of Cesium or Iodine to the environment.

Despite the severity of the damage, no injuries due to radiation occurred. There were however, significant health affects due to the psychological stress on the individuals living in the area. The defense in depth approach worked resulting in containment of the radioactivity in the containment building and enabling the operators to eventually cool the damaged core and regain control of the system.

The resulting contamination and state of the reactor core lead to the development of a ten year cleanup and scientific effort documented in this collection. The accident and subsequent analysis of it changed the way nuclear power is used and regulated both here and abroad.

-- Virgil Hawkins (abdullah_mohammad@excite.com), November 22, 1999.

Captain Kirk, the 20th century humans are beginning to react exactly as you predicted. They do not listen to logical explanations in advance, but they seem to prefer to wait until danger is imminent. Then, as they would say it in that time period, they begin to "freak out." Captain, humans are most illogical.

-- Spock (beam@me.up), November 22, 1999.

The article is pretty much sums up what happened but if you did not understand the technicals it looks scarier then it does to someone familiar to the technology.

1.) Most of the damage was to the core. The meltdown of TMI's core was contained. Where as Chernobyl's core is still hot and is in fact seeping into the area underneath the facility. A core requires very specific measurements. Excessive heat can "buckle" the cores thin outer skin and render the fuel cell damaged goods. This "damage" doesn't require a blobb of melted fuel cells at the bottom of the "pond."

2.) All the worst things happened, Instruments errors, Human errors and equipment malfunction and the damage was contained (see 3 below).

3. Was there a release yes but 100 mrem is not a substantial amount of radiation for a single dose. I hate to bring this up but uranium is a naturally ocurring element found in nature. Radiation is also recieved from the sun. In fact you might receive more radiation from the CME's and solar storms while living in a higher elevation like Denver than what you could have received worst case from TMI.

Again the danger from living in close proximity to a refinery or chemical plant may be much greater than living near a nuclear power plant. The dangers are in my opinion minimal.

Most fear from nuclear power stems as much from the lack of knowledge of the subject than any rational expectation. We in the US do not have the spare capacity in the Northeast and Midwest. You could even shutdown the nuclear power plants for rollover. I would not expect this to happen because of the danger of the grid if capacity is taken off-line during what could be one of the coldest times of the year. Part of what protects the power grid is the ability for small capacity disruptions to be picked up by excess capacity elsewhere. Remove the "excess" capacity and small disruptions could trigger large grid effects (oops ust got dark, hmmmm wonder why?)

No one could say there wouldn't be any problems after rollover but this is not a high risk (either in possibility or danger outside facility).

If you wish to be afraid of this that is your right but don't scare others, I see this in the same light as the system crashing on 9999. Wasn't a high risk for the macro view and not much to be concerned about.

-- squid (Itsdark@down.here), November 22, 1999.

I bought some potassium iodine in the event of any wind containing monstrous things blowing my way.

-- Paula (chowbabe@pacbell.net), November 22, 1999.

I simply moved to a small island in the middle of the Pacific...

-- Mad Monk (madmonk@hawaiian.net), November 22, 1999.

Yes. Human error is to blame, but technology will save us. Just like those containment walls at TMI. Found a cute article in the Washington Post. Blames the increase in cancer in the Middletown Pa. area since 1979 on STRESS form living near a reactor. http://stylelive.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/stress052791.htm Squid- You must have got your start on Boomers, so you might want to check out this site. http://thyroid.about.com/health/thyroid/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.tennessean.com/special/oakridge/part3/frame.shtml

-- Patiently Waiting and (ExiledAt@aol.com), November 22, 1999.

Anybody heard anything from the illustrious Gordon Dunning on this topic? I mean, he single-handedly stonewalled the US for the Atomic Energy Commission for years with regards to the poison fallout they were drenching us with in the fifties and sixties with all the Nevada testing....kinda like our fearless Y2K Czar is doing this year with regards to Y2K....

-- Jay Urban (Jayho99@aol.com), November 22, 1999.

Look, this is the U.S., ok??? Things like Three Mile Island CAN'T HAPPEN HERE! Russia, maybe, but NOT here!

Got potassium iodide?

-- King of Spain (madrid@aol.cum), November 22, 1999.

I know it's a big scary problem, but it's not one to lose any sleep over. I worked in nuke station process control for a while, and *I'm* not losing sleep over it. Reactors are incredibly robust things, the Y2K fix bucket (in the UK at least) is bottomless, and most importantly of all: nuke station accidents happen due to HUMAN ERROR, either complacency or willful stupidity. Chernobyl required technicians to sit with their fingers mashing override buttons until it got too hot to shut down. That's just NOT going to happen at Y2K, there will too much pressure to be safe rather than sorry.

Take a deep breath and try to concentrate on preparing for the little, boring problems that are more likely to happen, like (e.g.) problems sourcing adhesive gum (no adhesive = no labels = no tins = no food). The nuke plants aren't going to go kablooie, and yes, I WILL bet my life on that: I live in the "long lingering death" zone of a plant, I've considered the problems, and I'm not moving.

-- Colin MacDonald (roborogerborg@yahoo.com), November 22, 1999.

---FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH DEPARTMENT--- I get various intel from around the country, and i do a little personal ratings system. this intel I rate a 9.5+, the only reason i don't give it a 10 is cuz i wasn't there in person

few years ago there was a massive rad leak at ****stone reactor. 2 personnel died. not immediately, but within a coupla weeks. this same company has a history of lying and coverups and has been fined by the nrc. the circumstances were severely hushed up and the story was spiked. Same ole excuses about why the story wasn't leaked, i.e. "have to protect my job, I got a family and pension, yada, yada, yada" also, both the nrc and the nuke industry has a vested interest in minimizing the dangers, and the real expense of nuke heat generated power. nothing very worthwhile in having dangerous nukes, all they do is get hot-they create heat for steam turbines. there are PLENTY of viable other ways to generate heat and steam and electricity. we've barely scratched the surface with some tesla technology, at least what is reported on in not-secret labs.

nuke industry has simply GOT to never let out any story like that. public confidence has never been high. personally, the biggest disaster, IMO, was decades ago. Our country was well on the way to decentralized power, wind generators, passive solar, etc. Well, what big corporations would want to have energy independence for millions of potential customers? answer is zero. they bought, paid off, lobbyed, editorialized, etc, and promulgated the big lie that centralized power was "better', and the "only" way, ya, right, better so they can send you a bill FOREVER.

Right now I'm on the grid, but already setup so that within 15 minutes can be completely off, and still have adequate juice for lighting, run well pump, etc. it's quite possible to live fine off the grid without nukes or coal plants or whatever. Imagine if ONE single big factory- take a car factory someplace-was set up to mass produce PV panels, how incredibly cheap they'd be within a year? Now think if TWO different companies did that, and had done it 20 years ago? the start of real competition. right now the price is high, but the only reason for that is extremely low volume production, reluctance of lending institutions to include PV or other alternate energy sources in home owner mortgages, local governments extreme paper work inspection hassles because of complete lack of knowledge on these "inspectors' parts, and the propaganda war put on by the power companies and the folks who make their livings from pushing centralized power. I say, let the dang grid fall, enough of this too vulnerable electric "grid". My opinion, of course. wind, solar, hydro, and the coming fuel cell revolution. that's the future, not centralized power. get some while you still can!

zog the adviser

-- zog (zzoggy@yahoo.com), November 22, 1999.

Zog man you are correct that the FUTURE of electric power distribution is decentralization. There are already builders starting to add gas generators to houses with grid being a standby or backup source. This is not a practical choice for most people at this time. Heck if the idea of prepping a couple months of food is making your budget queezy where are you going to get the capital for investments like yours?

A big house builder for all those big brained Exec's is installing a lot of backup power generator's.

KOS I never stated that TMI did not happen. But PA did not have a mushroom cloud make that state unlivable, only the roads do that :-). There are those that think that any risk no matter how small is not acceptable, how in fact these same people get into their cars and drive to work. The logic seems selected.

Hoping the grid fails because you can easily survive seems as sad as those who occasionally hope that the cities fall into a dead zone. My child spent several months in a childrens hospital surviving thanks to technology and electricity. There is not the staffing to monitor all those children in ICU and NICU. Wishing for most or all those children to suffer or worse so you could be smug off grid is sick. This is not gratuitous but a deeply felt hope that the grid is indeed stable enough to survive the problems that will likely happen.

And to the second hand, heard from a realiable source that two workers died from exposure but "they" covered it up, three workers died from a scaffolding collapse on a local construction collapse. We have a cancer cluster near a local small town and there is no nuclear plant. I worked in a chemical plant for a short time and they mixed up all kinds of things including some that were absolutely unkown. Carcingenic who knows.

Glowing and loving it,

Squid

-- squid (Itsdark@down.here), November 22, 1999.

Some threads you might find interesting:

Interesting timeline of NRC activities latelyJune, 1999

Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues interim enforcement policy on Y2K July 1999

NRC Reported Diesel Generator Failures...Not Good! July 1999

US Nuclear Plants: The Weakest Link -- -- Emergency Diesel Generators

22 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WILL PUSH Y2K READINESS ENVELOPE August 1999

Power questions remain unanswered -- Senators cancel hearing on utilities August 1999

Potassium Iodide Pills Recommended... by the NRC. Oct. 1999

Government Urges More U.S. Nuclear Y2K Precautions Oct/Nov 1999

Hearing on Nukes Oct. 26

Nuclear power plants Y2k readiness questioned Nov. 1999

Y2K - KOSKINEN WARNING STATES TO PREPARE FOR POWER OUTAGES OF UP TO THREE WEEKS Nov. 1999

talk by Dr. Shirley Jackson"Exterminating the Bug:Governmental and Industrial Challenges in the Face of the Year 2000 Problem" by Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OECD/NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities International Workshop on the Impact of the Year 2000 on the Nuclear Industry - Ottawa, Canada, February 9, 1999. [note her comments about loss of offsite power]

Se lected Presentations, Quotes, and Comments from The George Washington University Conference on Y2K July 1999 [see section about nuclear plants]

Got KI?TACDA The American Civil Defense Association

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 22, 1999.

Aside; If there is going to be controlled pre-rollover shutdowns then expect this start before the second week of December. If they do shutdown for the rollover the Northeast is hurting for electricity. Canada will be humming with plants supplying the American cities, oops whoturned the lights out those darn embedded chips. I expect localities will go off grid at least for the rollover and allow those without to suffer. Why should Detroit Edison go down because some rural electric co-op didn't start until this year. They will focus all attention and all resources on the cities.

-- squid (Itsdark@down.here), November 22, 1999.

Linda,

Be very careful of repeating the incorrect and highly biased opinions and scare tactics being pushed by the TMIA and NIRS and UCS cources. These groups are running an effective scare campaign against nuclear plants right to take advantage of the fears the media has against the nuclear technology.

As stated before, the US, Candian, French, and UK nuclear plants and hydro plants are those most likely to be able to continue generating power through the turnover. Those most threatened are the fossil-fueled plants, particularly natural gas and then oil fired.

US and Canadian nuclear plants are now remediated, tested, and verified. They are the ONLY plants running now that have been audited, and the only ones with complete backup systems, with good documentation and with complete operating instructions: in both routine and emergency operations. They are the power plants with the most highly trained operators, each that is regularly drilled in using the emergency and backup systems.

Formal systems and operations training is itself audited and monitored, and is required along with routine re-qualification procedures to keep people up to speed on changes and on the processes. Engineering changes are documented, and the venders are themselves required to keep doscuments and their certification - this makes remediation and replacement more reliable too, since parts are guaranteed to be available for the lifetime of the plant.

Fossil plants are not certified, and are merely self-reported to a voluntary industrial group. There is no penalty for failing to remediate a fossil plant, and in fact, the NERC - who control y2k issues for fossil plants - refuses to even release non-compliance data about the fossil plants. (It didn't want to discourage false reporting .. but by removing penalties and by encouraging positive results, that is what is actually does. Only "encourage" compliance.

The NRC forced all nuclear platns to exchange data and testing procedures, enforced compliance, and was able to actually get legal compliance.

Yes - the Russian plants, and Chinese too, are threatened. There is nothing we here can do about those now.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), November 22, 1999.

Another incorrect and highly biased opinion:

Electrical Grid Instability and Loss of Offsite Power

The Y2K problem has significant implications for the management of electrical distribution networks (grids). Individual susceptibilities may exist in software controlling a particular portion of the grid itself or telecommunications systems supporting grid management. Moving downward to the electrical generation level, Y2K problems can affect individual components involved in the production of electricity, such as digital process controllers. When one considers a nuclear power plant, a concern exists that not only power generation problems may arise, but that problems may extend to the safety systems of a facility and create challenges to these systems.

When one considers the myriad of possible situations in which the Y2K problem can manifest itself, it soon becomes obvious why the issue demands our prompt attention. In an admittedly pessimistic scenario, what starts as a Y2K-related electrical grid instability, for a particular nuclear plant, could cascade into a loss of offsite power which, in turn, would challenge plant safety systems. Can such a cascade occur? In 1996, two electrical disturbances (within a five- week period) on the Western U.S. Grid caused 190 plants to trip off- line, including several nuclear units. In particular, on July 2, 1996, a transmission line sagged into a tree in Idaho, creating a ground fault which progressed into a major fault on the Western Interconnection. The affected nuclear plants saw a frequency transient, but did not scram or lose offsite power. A similar event occurred the next day but did not propagate outside Idaho. On August 10, 1996, again a line sagged into a tree, this time in Oregon. The subsequent transient resulted in the loss of over 30,000 MW(e) of load, 25,000 MW(e) of generation, which is 17 percent of the total western U.S.-Canada generation. Among the 190 generating units that tripped were 4 nuclear units at Diablo Canyon in California and Palo Verde in Arizona.

Why are these events significant? Let me explain. First, such cascading transients, in causing reactor scrams, can challenge plant safety systems directly. Second, they can lead to Station Blackout events. In 1988, the NRC initiated Individual Plant Examinations to study the various initiators of reactor core damage events. All U.S. nuclear plants performed probabilistic risk assessments, with detailed modeling of their plant systems, to search for plant- specific vulnerabilities from severe accidents. At many of the nuclear plants these studies showed that a major contributor to core damage frequency was a Station Blackout event. Events of this type are defined as Loss-of-Offsite-Power events, coupled with the inability of the onsite emergency diesel generators to provide power to key plant safety equipment. If a cascading transient brought down multiple generating units at a time that onsite power sources did not exist, or were compromised, a nuclear plant could experience a Station Blackout event.

Depending upon the degree of Y2K readiness in safety systems, the result of a Loss of Offsite Power or Station Blackout could range from an analyzed, expected, plant response to a more significant event. Moreover, if emergency response is required offsite, the degree to which the telecommunications infrastructure is Y2K compliant would dictate the effectiveness of that response. To be sure, we at the NRC do not deem such an outbreak of failures to be probable based upon what we currently know about Y2K. Rather, it is the possibility of such events that motivates our actions.

Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman (at the time) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 22, 1999.

Linda - You're exactly right....

This is exactly WHY the NRC required their remediation and repair program at the nuclear plants we have here in the US. It's why they audited and tested them, and documented the results, and retested each of the 103-odd installations.

I'd be much less concerned if any of the 4000-odd non-nuclear plants faced an equal level of scrutiny and testing. Some did, most did not, and remain merely "self-reported" and "self-tested" .... kind of like giving your icome tax return to the IRS knowing they were not going to do any checks, but rather congratulate you for telling them you are paying your taxes.

Please re-read her statement carefully; what is alarming or shows a crisic about it? It merely and correctly states the impact of remote failures on the grid, and if the problems were uncorrected or if the nuclear plants were forced to shut down (scram), states that the nuclear plants would do so automatically. Further, it maintains that the shutdown circuitry needs to be/was/has been re-certified to operate correctly post-2000.

... and the national grid itself remains virtually untested, unaudtied, and untrained.....

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), November 22, 1999.

What is alarming... even if, you assume that the NRC has fully tested amd independently verified and audited every single nuclear plant, and they are totally compliant as of now... is that those OTHER... NON-nuclear plants could put the "grid" or the nuclear plants they provide power for, at risk of "loss of off-site power". Which could be a "bad thing".

----

Another "incorrect and highly biased opinions and scare tactics":

On October 26, representatives of the federal General Accounting Offices Y2K Computing Challenge office offered testimony before Congress that casts doubt on the NRC assurances.

The General Accounting Office is the investigative arm of Congress. Charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds, GAO performs audits and evaluations of government programs and activities.

Joel Willemssen and Keith Rhodes, directors of the accounting and information management division of the GAO, detailed weaknesses in the NRC reporting process to subcommittees of the House Committee on Science and the House Committee on Government Reform.

The GAO spokesmen pointed out that the NRC has not required that its licensees perform an independent verification and validation (IV&V) of their Y2K remediation programs.

"Although we were told by NRC that some licensees obtained independent technical reviews of each facility's Y2K system test plans and results, NRC did not have specific, current information identifying the types of Y2K IV&V reviews performed at nuclear power facilities," Willemssen and Rhodes said.

Last month, the Nuclear Energy Institute reported that the Farley Unit 2 nuclear power plant in Alabama would not be Y2K ready until December 16

"NRC noted that the industry had reported in April 1999 that multiple audits were completed. ... However, neither NRC nor the industry issued guidelines establishing criteria to ensure consistency of reviews," they testified.

Without an IV&V, the NRC cannot know which plants might need additional work, due to inadequate Y2K testing and preparation programs, the GAO testimony concluded.

All NRC licensees, including nuclear power plants, are required to have contingency plans in place in case unforeseen problems do arise from the Y2K bug. The GAO says these plans, like the actual Y2K remediation, have not been adequately verified.

"While the nuclear power plants have reportedly completed Y2K contingency plans, it is unclear as to whether these facilities have validated their plans," Willemssen and Rhodes testified. "While NRC's assessment ... included questions on whether the facility validated contingency plans, NRC has not summarized the results of each question from all plants and therefore does not know how many plants responded affirmatively that they had indeed tested their plans. Further, NRC did not assess how the plans were being validated."

In December 1998, the Washington, DC based nuclear watchdog group Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) petitioned the NRC to perform emergency planning exercises to confirm that nuclear plants are prepared for the possible failure of their computer systems due to Y2K. The NRC denied this petition, saying that nuclear power plants are already required to conduct exercises covering scenarios like a Y2K related computer failure.

The GAO acknowledged the NRCs position, but noted, "It is unknown whether or not each plant has recently tested, through normal emergency exercises, scenarios addressing potential Y2K induced failures. Therefore, given the known Y2K threat to nuclear facilities, we believe that NRC should obtain information on the scope and extent of nuclear power plants' emergency exercises, and whether these exercises have incorporated Y2K scenarios."

In addition, Willemssen and Rhodes pointed out that the NRC has not required nuclear fuel facilities or decommissioned nuclear power plants to develop specific Y2K contingency plans. Eight of 10 fuel facilities plan to be in safe shutdown mode during the Y2K changeover. The remaining two facilities - the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Paducah, Kentucky, and the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio - have contingency plans that are acceptable to the NRC.

"NRC could not say how many of the decommissioned plants completed contingency plans," noted the GAO experts, "as the agency had not reviewed them because NRC staff concluded that Y2K issues were highly unlikely to cause a potential threat to public health and safety at such plants."

In early 1999, some of the nations 14 decommissioned nuclear power plants that store spent fuel onsite reported they were not yet Y2K ready. Willemssen and Rhodes observed that the NRC has not reviewed their status since. "Because of the risk posed by the spent fuel facilities at these sites, we believe that NRC should evaluate and report on the current Y2K status of these plants," they recommend.

Finally, the GAO questioned whether nuclear facilities are adequately prepared for potential power outages, supply shortages, and other external problems that could occur on or after January 1, 2000.

According to Willemssen and Rhodes' testimony, "Probably the most serious external risks faced by a nuclear power plant are the potential instability of the electric power grid and the loss of offsite electric power. ... NRC studies show that a major contributor to reactor core damage is a station blackout event."

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 22, 1999.

oops. Sorry about the all bold. Hope it's off now.

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 22, 1999.

But that's why they have the backup systems and redundant systems (including power supplies) there....and those ar ethe systems (because they are so expensive) that are not at the non-nuclear plants.

The nuclear plants are designed to shutdown and stabilze if grid connections are lost suddenly - it's to prevent turbine-genreator overspeed and damage, not nuclear damage. The transient afterwards is specifically included as design criteria (size of pies, systems, pumps, tanks, water volumes, etc.) to manage that kind of event.

Nobody likes the unplanned shutdowns caused by grid instabilities - they are an expensive waste of time and resources; but are they a danger to the plant?

Absolutely not.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), November 22, 1999.

Robert - "Nobody likes the unplanned shutdowns caused by grid instabilities - they are an expensive waste of time and resources; but are they a danger to the plant? Absolutely not."

Your statement seems at odds with those of Dr. Shirley Jackson and Joel Willemssen (and others), but personally I'm hoping YOU are right.

And here's some reassuring words from the NRC weekly information report- Nov. 5th:

"There is general consensus that nearly all entities are Y2K ready and there is a high confidence in grid stability and reliability."

Ahhhhh... don't we feel better now?

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 22, 1999.

I've heard from at least three sources Nuke Plants would be shut down by middle of December. Because of what a shut-down would do to the north-east I really questioned if they where right. No single or group of individials would want that decision on their heads, political suicide. That stupid movie might be the key to it, IMHO I see a media induced flood of mail to congress, the NRC, and the white house to shut the plants down before the rollover. Saves face for the government, they're just responding to public pressure.

-- 39 days (to-go@...), November 22, 1999.

39 days to go - - are your sources close enough to you that you can question them (and knowledgeable enough that you would bother?)? If so, I have a question about the proposed shutdown. How many of the nukes could shut down (given the lower winter demands) before the "grid" was at risk of shutdown? This seems especially important in the northeast where I hear 40% of the power comes from nukes. And since nukes depend on "offsite power" to keep the cores cooled, this may be a "Catch 22" situation where the nuclear plants don't DARE shut down for fear that they may put their own power source at risk.

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 22, 1999.

See this thread:

PG&E Calls Nuke Worker/Whistleblower Mentally Ill

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 23, 1999.

No, Linda - they DO NOT require off-site power for cooldown.

The (already installed) emergency generators are sized to each carry more than the full cooldown loads required for a shutdown. Typically, there are two generators per plant, some have three or four.

Ccomplete cooldown to room temperature takes between 36 and 48 hours, although I've done it on smaller lants in as little as 12 hours. My brother's plant uses about 30 hours. After this point, you usually begin to remove the core pressure vessel head, and the core can be uncovered and left open.

If it is uncovered and open - inside the containment - which the Russian military-style, plutonium-producing nuclear plants do not have - then core water temperature cannot exceed 212 degrees - the boiling point of water. Usually, you need to run smaller pumps and small heat exchangers for a few more days to try to keep water temperature uner 100 degrees since it is more comfortable to work around temperatures that low.

The core heat load (after a few days of shutdown) is less than 0.02 percent of core power. Since these little coolers are much smaller than what is needed immediately after shutdown, you can realistically use ANY 440 volt ac generator available, but you always would use the emergency generator since it is already hooked up and available.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), November 23, 1999.

Robert... please clarify for me. "If it is uncovered and open - inside the containment...then core water temperature cannot exceed 212 degrees - the boiling point of water."

Do you mean it is not POSSIBLE for the temp. to exceed the boiling point? Or that the temp. SHOULD NOT exceed the boiling point? And if it DOES exceed the boiling point? What happens?

I found this which may be applicable. Exerpt:

The primary concern raised by the two individuals was a postulated failure to cool the spent fuel storage pool following a design- basis LOCA (loss-of-coolant accident) or a LOCA with a loss of offsite power (LOOP). They posited that a design-basis LOCA would result in the failure of the nonsafety-related spent fuel pool cooling system. They further posited that a design-basis LOCA results in the development of a TID 14844-like radiological source term inside the reactor building that would prevent operators from entering the building and restoring cooling to the spent fuel pool. The individuals further postulated that, upon boiling in the pool, vapor would be transported throughout the reactor building by the ventilation systems and would eventually cause the failure of safety-related systems needed to mitigate the LOCA. The ultimate consequences of these boiling scenarios include severe core damage, failure of the stored spent fuel, and loss of primary and secondary containment.

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Sounds rather like a "bad thing".

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And there seem to be other official NRC documents that imply that off-site power is needed for cooling pools available by searching here for "spent fuel" and "cooling".

Given the poor test results (here or here) on generators the nukes are depending on in case of a "LOOP" event, and the REFUSAL to stockpile more than 7 days of fuel for the generators, and the questionable compliance or readiness level of off-site power supplied by the "grid"... I am just not as confident as you are that all will go well and that there is no need for worry. But I will grant that you are the insider and I am not, and I remain hopeful that you are right. Not much I can do about it in any case... and I already have my KIO3. Got yours?

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 23, 1999.

Simple: Water, at atmospheric pressure, boils at 212 degrees at nominal sea level.

The reactors are designed to run at around 480 degrees at (usually 2000 psig-2500 psig.) At that temperature of the coolant, the center of the fuel rods goes up to about 550 degrees at worse case conditions under the highest possible heat flux in the middle of the core. The fuel rod itself is designed to withstand around 900-1050 degrees without damaging breaks or swelling under these conditions, SO, as long as the center of the rod stays below 900 degrees, NO RADIATION BYPRODUCTS CAN ESCAPE.

Okay, so let's look at what happens when the fuel pool (an open swimming pool array of the spent fuel rods about 60 feet deep by 100 feet across) looses all cooling somehow for a time. (This is the accident condition you brought up in your posting above.)

The spent fuel pool water is open to the atmosphere, so it will boil at 212 degrees - slightly lower in Colorado at lower atmospheric pressure. The is very little heat being generated from the fuel after shutdown, but residual decay heat is being generated - and has to be removed. This heat will raise the middle of the fuel rods to about 225- 220 degrees, and the surface of the fuel rod will reach about 218-216 degrees as long as water covers the fuel rods.

So, will you agree with me that - as long as the fuel rods remain covered with water, the middle of the fuel can't get hot enough to be damaged?

It simply isn't possible. (Under the accident conditons discussed, these critics are assuming that hte fuel rods are uncovered by water, and so heat up past the 1050 degree point, melt the fuel rod covers, and allow the internals to escape into the atmosphere.)

HOWEVER these critics are forgetting several things: boiling off the 20 plus feet of water needed to uncover the fuel rods takes about a week. A week of absolutely action by anybody........further, there are mutilple and redundant ways of cooling the fuel pool and core - none of which rely on outside power. IF ANY OF THESE ARE STARTED, there is no way a problem can begin.

Further, if needed, all you actually have to do is add more water to the fuel pool. Any kind of water will do. There are several ways of doing this too - including gravity drains from emergency tanks, fire trucks, and even tanker trucks from off-site.

As long as the fuel rods in a shutdown plant remain covered with water - there is no danger. And keeping them covered is easy.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), November 23, 1999.

To illustrate - take a deep pot - perhaps 6-8" deep, and put it on the stove. Put a nut or bolt in the bottom: your job is to keep the bolt covered with water.

The water will gradually heat to 2121 degrees - then stabilize at 2121 degrees - no hotter - as it boils. The bolt will be at 212 also.

After a long while, as the pot continues to boil, the water level will obviously begin to go down. The bolt will stay at 212 degrees though - no hotter.

After a long time - remember, we're talking several days here in a real fuel pool, the bolt will start to get near the surface.

Add more water - the overall temperature will return to 60 degrees, tehn start heating up again.

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The "accident conditions" mentioned would NOT prevent operators from getting access to the fuel pool or core and laying water hoses to refill the pool. Those two critics are making up conditions that would NOT prevent corrective action to be taken, in a deliberate attempt to scare you.

Radiation hazards? Yes - but they can be overcome easily for the short period required - even under the conditions they mentioned.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), November 23, 1999.

Thanks Robert for explaining all of this. The time to boil off all the cooling water IS reassuring. However I wonder if the estimate of a week to do so is based on just the spent fuel pools, and would the time be much shorter in the case of active rods after a "safe shut down"?

You say: "Those two critics are making up conditions that would NOT prevent corrective action to be taken, in a deliberate attempt to scare you." - which made me wonder just who ARE these critics. On the chance that anyone else is listening (which I doubt), here's what I found. They are Lochbaum and Prevatte - David Lochbaum and Donald Prevatte. In addition to the petition quoted about about the Susquehanna plant, they also petitioned the NRC about safety concerns about the Oyster Creek plant and other boiling water reactors. So who ARE these guys?

David Lockhbaum is a nuclear safety engineer. "For 17 years, he worked in nuclear power plants, amassing experience in design, operations, licensing, and training. He liked the work and felt that what he did made a difference. During several bad winters, coal piles froze and coal plants operated at low power, but the nuclear plants continued to keep people warm.

Then, in 1992, things changed. He and a colleague identified a safety problem in a plant where they were working, raised the issue with the plant manager, then with the utility, and finally with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. No one paid attention. They went to Congress. Finally, three years after they first sounded the alarm, the problem was corrected at the original plant and at plants across the country."

Donald Prevatte, I couldn't find much info about, except that he is a Mechanical Engineer and NRCContractor. link

But while they ARE critics, they don't seem like crackpots. Also, it seems like the NRC stonewalled on their complaints about safety issues for as long as possible. Kinda like in the PG&E case, dontcha think?

GAO is concerned the progress of the NRC on Y2K I just can't be completely confident that all will go well. But then, considering the dangers of nuclear power... no one should be.

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 24, 1999.

Oops on the links:

PG&E Calls Nuke Worker/Whistleblower Mentally Ill

GAO questions NRC progress on Y2K

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), November 24, 1999.

<<. The time to boil off all the cooling water IS reassuring. However I wonder if the estimate of a week to do so is based on just the spent fuel pools, and would the time be much shorter in the case of active rods after a "safe shut down"?

You say: "Those two critics are making up conditions that would NOT prevent corrective action to be taken, in a deliberate attempt to scare you." - which made me wonder just who ARE these critics. >>

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That's exactly why I said "critics", thay are very definitely NOT crackpots. I do disagree with their premis and their actions.

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With respect to active (in the reactor) fuel rods in the refueling pool, as opposed to stored (spent fuel pool) rods; the answers are yes/no/maybe/certainly - depending on all sorts of factors.

Actual values are going to depend on core power history, relative size of the core and how many of the core rods are "fresh" - recently refueled - and how many are "older" from previous reloading cycles.

There is more water around the reactor in the refueling pool and core internals storage spots next to the reactor - so it obviously takes longer to heat up this greater amount of water up to 212 degrees. Also, there are fewer rods in the core itself than in the spent fuel pool: the fuel pool may have 5-8 "core loads" in it - obviously the reactor has room for only "one" core load. (On the other hand, the reactor is more recently been shutdown, and so each rod in the reactor generates more heat than each rod in the spent fuel pool - for a few days.) A few days after shutdown - the heat rates are more nearly equal as the radiation decays away expontentially.

We are assuming shutdown conditions here, and that makes a difference. The reactor is designed to remove tens of millions of BTU's of energy every second during operation through the regular cooling path to the steam generator. So, after shutdown, all these cooling methods are still available for use as required. (The heat load in the reactor a few minutes after shutdown is about 1% original heat rate. After a few more minutes - it goes down to about 0.05 percent of the original heat rate.)

In fact, the emergency core cooling systems are sized meet this heat load without outside power or without spilling coolant. So the much lower heat loads after shutdown are easily managed if the core is left filled and pressurized.

Power history and core age, and number of rods, etc. also apply to the fuel pool - but the rapid decay of heat generation after shutdown, and the much larger number of fuel rods in the fuel pool, generally mean that the fuel pool tends to generate more heat (on average) after a few days after shutdown than the reactor....

So the design of the normal and bakup fuel pool heat exchangers are set up to manage this expected load of a full fuel pool under worse possible conditions. Usually, you actually have many fewer rods with much less heat load from each rod than design conditions. Even so, that "highest possible" design heat load is much, much less than the normal reactor operation conditions.

I don't remember the specific values, but after a couple of months, the reactor heat load from decay is actually less than the heat coming from the solar radiation hitting the containment dome in the summer time. If you wait just a couple of weeks, the energy coming into the water from the reactor pumps "stirring" the water as they move it through the pipes is more than the heat from radioactive decay.

You actually cool down more if you shut off the pumps and let the heat just naturally go out through the insulation than if you leave the pumps running.....

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), November 24, 1999.

Ahhh... Robert, it is a joy to watch you work. But I wouldn't waste any more time on Linda/Scott Portzline. She/he already knows the correct answers from the EUY2K board. Strange how she/he keeps up the same rhetoric... Ladies and Gentlemen: as I've said, before I gave up explaining, do your own research; don't let Linda/Scott convince you, don't let Robert convince you. Squid- give me a yell, delete the spambuster and the e-mail is real.

-- nucpwr (nucpwr@hotmailcan't spam me.com), November 26, 1999.

A couple of individuals (especially Robert Cook) have done a very good job explaining why they feel nuclear plants are safe. I am among those who hope he/they are correct.

What no one addresses as if it is not an issue, is nuclear waste. Has this problem been solved? Where are the tons and tons of radioactive waste being stored? They will be deadly for thousands of years. Can you or anyone else guarantee that earthquakes, normal containment deterioration etc. won't expose the generations that follow us to unnecessary, life-threatening danger?

If not, why would you or anyone else suggest that human societies use an energy source that:

1) is incredibly complex; 2) requires very sophisticated upkeep and industrial infrastructure to build and maintain; 3) has not solved one of it's most basic problems (disposing of radioactive waste safely); 4) does not produce the inexpensive electricity it was so highly touted to do (remember the phrase "too cheap to meter"?) 5) has not been able to build a new plant in this country since Three Mile Island (1978-1979)

Why? We don't need the implied threat of nuclear disaster in our nation. And it's not implied elsewhere. The Chernobl nuclear disaster is now conservatively estimated to have killed 8,000 people in Europe and contaminated hundreds of square miles of the Ukraine.

Why? We have other power sources available to us. Why not use them?

-- Ray Kosanke (raywk@aol.com), November 30, 1999.