This appeared in today's (10/23) Garden State Environews:

[BEGIN QUOTE]

Y2K: NUKE PLANTS AND WEAPONS ALERT

Date: 23 Oct 1999

From: earthhelp@juno.com

The New Jersey Hiroshima Remembrance Day Committee is calling attention to important information in Friday's New York Times (October 22). This is a full page ad (A25) by Helen Caldicott, Sir Joseph Rotlatt, Philip Morrison, Ted Taylor and others regarding "The Deadliest Gamble in History".

These are Y2K glitches and the need to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.

There is also the parallel need to mobilize the deployment of the required number of reliable emergency back-up electrical generators at every nuclear reactor in the world. "While Y2K can pose a danger to routine reactor control systems, the major risk involves a power blackout engulfing the plant, failure of back-up generating systems, loss of cooling and meltdown--the consequences of which, within the space of one or two hrs, could match the Chernobyl disaster."

Call, fax and email Pres Clinton - Phone: 202-456-1414, Fax: 202-456-2461, Email: president@whitehouse.gov .

1. Negotiate an agreement with President Yeltsin that all 2,400 U.S. and 2000 Russian nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert be "de-alerted" before January 1, 2000.

2. Mobilize the deployment of the required number of reliable emergency back-up electrical generators at every nuclear reactor in the world.

(signed) along with those mentioned: Sylvia Zisman, Co-Chair NJ Hiroshima Day Remembrance Committee POB 934 Springfield NJ 07081 973-376-5629

[END QUOTE]

The second part of this, at least, relates to the electric industry, and I wondered what y'all think about it. Does the recommendation to "mobilize the deployment" of reliable generators for every nuclear reactor in the world make sense to you? Thanks. - Judy

-- Anonymous, October 24, 1999

Answers

Complete sense!

-- Anonymous, October 24, 1999

I thought so, too, Middleman. Here's a copy of the e-mail I just sent, with some supporting data on documented generator problems at nuclear facilities. - Judy

Dear President Clinton,

I am writing to support the 2nd item in the petition advertised in the October 22nd issue of the New York Times (p. A25), calling on our federal government to "mobilize the deployment of the required number of reliable emergency back-up electrical generators" for nuclear power plants throughout the world. This humanitarian gesture would benefit all, at a very small cost in comparison to the great damage it could prevent. In addition to preventing nuclear accidents, it could help nuclear plants remain more stable during any Y2K uncertainties, contributing to the overall resilience of the power grid.

Below I've attached an item about this petition, and below that, a report on documented problems with emergency back-up generators at nuclear plants this year.

Thanks for your consideration of this important issue.

Judy Hoskins

- - - - - - - - - - - -

The New Jersey Hiroshima Remembrance Day Committee is calling attention to important information in Friday's NYT (October 22). This is a full page ad (A25) by Helen Caldicott, Sir Joseph Rotlatt, Philip Morrison, Ted Taylor and others regarding "The Deadliest Gamble in History".

These are Y2K glitches and the need to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.

There is also the parallel need to mobilize the deployment of the required number of reliable emergency back-up electrical generators at every nuclear reactor in the world. "While Y2K can pose a danger to routine reactor control systems, the major risk involves a power blackout engulfing the plant, failure of back-up generating systems, loss of cooling and meltdown--the consequences of which, within the space of one or two hrs, could match the Chernobyl disaster."

Call, fax and email Pres Clinton - Phone: 202-456-1414, Fax: 202-456-2461, Email: president@whitehouse.gov .

1. Negotiate an agreement with President Yeltsin that all 2,400 U.S. and 2000 Russian nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert be "de-alerted" before January 1, 2000.

2. Mobilize the deployment of the required number of reliable emergency back-up electrical generators at every nuclear reactor in the world.

(signed) along with those mentioned: Sylvia Zisman, Co-Chair NJ Hiroshima Day Remembrance Committee POB 934 Springfield NJ 07081 973-376-5629

- - - - - - - - - - - -

http://www.tmia.com/EDGs.html

Emergency Diesel Generator Defects at US Nuclear Plants as reported by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

This database includes incidents and reports from January 1, 1999 to the present [accessed October 24, 1999]. It shows that defects and problems occur on a weekly basis. There are 39 reports affecting more than half (53%) of all US commercial nuclear plants so far this year.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission denied a petition for rule-making regarding additional backup power supplies on August 12, 1999. The NRC was three months late on making its decision and claims a 98% reliabilty rate for emergency diesel generators.

Pilgrim, Massachusetts: September 23, 1999

Emergency diesel generator (EDG) alternate shutdown panels were declared inoperable.

Lasalle, Illinois: September 23, 1999

Emergency diesel generator automatically tripped off by overspeed signal.

Grand Gulf, Mississippi: September 9, 1999

Emergency diesel generator failed as indicated by high bearing temperature and sparks from the generator area just prior to emergency stopping.

Indian Point, New York: August 31, 1999

Reactor scram with complications. One complication was the failure of an emergency diesel generator circuit. Auxiliary feedwater pumps had no electricity and switched over to steam turbine pumps for feedwater.

Cooper, Nebraska: August 31, 1999

Emergency diesel generator declared inoperable due to service water flow problem.

Yankee, Vermont: August 25, 1999

During an emergency diesel generator test, three unexpected valve actuations of the high pressure coolant injection system ocurred.

Hope Creek, New Jersey: August 18, 1999

Emergency diesel generator inoperable due to fuel oil storage tank being cleaned.

South Texas, Texas: August 12, 1999

Emergency diesel generator inoperable for 3 days in July 1999.

Cooper, Nebraska: August 12, 1999

Degraded backup power supply batteries.

Millstone, Connecticut: August 11, 1999

Diesel generator degraded for 32 days. Company was aware of suspected low voltage problem but mistakenly believed it was acceptable. Then, on 8/17/99 the company retracts the event once again saying the voltage was set high enough.

Nine Mile Point, New York: August 11, 1999

During troubleshooting of a speed control problem the diesel generator experienced an inadvertent start-up .

Nine Nuclear Plants: August 5, 1999

Manufacturer reports a premature overvoltage protection actuation during diesel generator loading which could affect 9 plants.

Cook, Michigan: July 27, 1999

All four diesel generators are declared inoperable but still functional. Discovery of condition which could leave EGDs inoperable following a tornado.

Beaver Valley, Pennsylvania: July 16 - 17, 1999

Diesel Generator fails during test due to voltage and current problems. Battery chargers become inoperable. Generator restart faulty. Batteries are inoperable. Plant shutting down. Pumps inoperable briefly.

Pilgrim, Massachusetts: July 16, 1999

An existing modification of the circuit logic would prevent bus from energizing properly from diesel generators.

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho: July 12, 1999

(not a commercial power reactor) Two diesel generators fails following a fire at substation. No fuel from Three Mile Island remains onsite.

Pilgrim, Massachusetts: July 5, 1999

Both diesel generators for Unit 1 outside design basis due to high room temperature..

Cook, Michigan: June 25, 1999

Diesel generator oil lubrication valve installed backwards. Uncertainty about the ability to operate for 7 days has caused the EDG to be declared inoperable

Kewaunee Wisconsin: June 14, 1999

Diesel generator declared inoperable due to misadjusted speed sensor. This event report was later retracted.

Ginna, New York: June 10, 1999

Both diesel generators inoperable. There would have been an inability to automatically respond to an event coincident with a loss of offsite power.

Summer, South Carolina: May 5, 1999

Faulty circuit breaker identified as substantial safety hazard used with diesel generators.

Six Nuclear Plants: April 28, 1999

Manufacturer reports a potential defect in connecting rod assemblies, which are components of diesel generator systems.

Nine Mile Point, New York: April 24, 1999

Reactor scram. Diesel Generator starts but fails to load. Partial loss of lighting in the control room. Loss of lighting in turbine building. Loss of site perimeter lighting. Natural circulation of coolant.

Arkansas Nuclear, Arkansas: April 23, 1999

During Y2K testing, would not properly load. Only 500 Kw, instead of its expected load of 4400 Kw.

Point Beach, Michigan: April 20, 1999

Design defect could have disabled diesel generators.

Susquehanna, Pennsylvania: April 17, 1999

Operator switching error causes diesel generator to be inoperable.

Beaver Valley, Pennsylvania: April 9, 1999

Following instructions in operator's manual could have caused diesel generators to fail.

Ginna, New York: April 9, 1999

Missing oil drain port could have caused serious diesel generator damage.

Cook, Michigan: April 7, 1999

Design defect could cause long-term operational failure of diesel generator following a seismic event.

Seabrook, New Hampshire: March 31, 1999

Defective relay might not have allowed bus to load to diesel generator.

Grand Gulf, Mississippi: March 25, 1999

Diesel Generator declared inoperable due to leaking oil. The event was later retracted when it was discovered that it was not necessary to declare it inoperable

South Texas, Texas: March 12, 1999

Diesel Generator output circuit breaker failed to close.

Pilgrim, Massachusetts: February 25, 1999

Temperature of diesel generator building fell below design due to winter storm.

Wolf Creek, Kansas: February 18,1999

Improper switching could have caused fire and loss of diesel generators

River Bend, Louisiana: February 2, 1999

The NRC proposes a $55,000 fine for the company's failure to correct deficiencies in the compressed air system that controls the emergency diesel generators.

San Onofre, California: February 1, 1999

Diesel generator started but did not complete circuit due to relay lockout

Fitzpatrick, New York: January 21,1999

Emergency diesel generators may have failed to energize emergency buses.

Hope Creek, New Jersey: January 20, 1999

Incorrect resistor could effect speed switch on diesel generators. This manufacturer defects also could effect 8 other US nuclear plants at Hatch, Fermi, Millstone, Beaver Valley, Limerick, Callaway and Wolf Creek which might have the same defect.

Duane Arnold, Iowa: January, 20 1999

Forced reactor shutdown after both standby diesel generators failed test to reach required voltage and frequency within the required time.

Grand Gulf, Mississippi: January 13, 1999

Diesel generator degradred due to output transformer leaking.

North Anna, Virginia: January 5,1999

Spillway emergency diesel generator declared inoperable during test. This was done in error as it was not necessary to declare it inoperable. The event notification was retracted.

The Weakest Link -- -- Emergency Diesel Generators

by Scott D. Portzline - Three Mile Island Alert

The most worrisome defect is the emergency diesel generators(EDGs). During a "station blackout" (loss of offsite power) these generators supply the electricity needed to bring the plant to a safe shutdown. If they fail, the chance of an accident approaches certainty. Former NRC Chairman Dr. Shirley Jackson said, "NRC reviews in recent years have left no doubt that a station blackout at a nuclear power station is a major contributor to reactor core damage frequency." The NRC claims a 97.5 reliability rate but watchdogs say it is lower. Nearly every month, the EDGs fail at a nuclear plant; fortunately not during a station blackout.

When a tornado struck the Davis Besse plant (same design as TMI) in Ohio in June 1998, for 41 nervous hours an array of equipment problems complicated efforts to keep the reactor under control. One of the two EDGs overheated and the other failed briefly due to a faulty relay switch. It was a close call which caused the plant's emergency director to say, "For a few minutes your heart goes up into your throat.''

This station blackout also caused the temperature of the spent fuel pool to increase to the point where water would be lost. Nuclear plants currently don't have an emergency power supply for these pools. A petition has been filed by the Nuclear Information and Resource Services (NIRS) to add this safety feature.

Fires have temporarily knocked out the EDGs at the Limerick and Crystal River nuclear plants in recent years. Six years ago, TMI's EDGs were inoperable for one month before the problem was discovered. Last year, TMI's EDGs were labeled a "fire hazard" by an NRC administrator who said they were as "ugly as I have ever seen" because of leaking oil. TMI has since "cleaned up" that situation.

At a June 15, 1999 Y2K meeting between the NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), I recounted what the administrator said about TMI. The vice-president of NEI answered, "So what? As long as they are up to regulations." This is the same kind of arrogance that led to the TMI accident.

The NRC does not draw a clear line for Y2K safety. The General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that despite six major reviews over two decades of NRC regulatory oversight, the NRC still does not adequately define safety. For example: the very same valve which caused the loss-of-coolant accident at TMI 20 years ago is still not rated as a safety component.

The NRC's assurances that all safety systems are Y2K ready does not rest well with TMIA. When Peach Bottom lost its safety parameter display for seven hours during a Y2K test, the NRC claimed that safety wasn't compromised. This system was added to every plant as a result of the TMI accident. Sometimes the NRC's judgment defies common sense. The GAO is now recommending that state public utility commissions publicize descriptions of the probable and worst case Y2K scenarios.

The NRC will permit plants to violate their licenses to keep them online come January 1, 2000. This situation is reminiscent of the Challenger explosion where rocket engineers were literally told to "remove your engineering hats and put on your management hats" to get the "green light" for the mission.

Resident inspectors at each plant will grant safety exemptions to plants in an effort to protect grid stability rather than public health and safety from radioactivity which is the NRC's statutory mandate. With millions of lives at stake, the NRC would do well to strengthen the emergency diesel generators by thorough testing and requiring an additional backup power source as petitioned by NIRS. The NRC denied all three NIRS petitions.

Nuclear Information and Resource Services Y2K Site

Three Mile Island Alert Control Room

-- Anonymous, October 24, 1999

Judith, Thanks for the enlightening post. A few weeks ago while hurricane Floyd was chewing up the East coast, I happened to catch a report from a Rhode Island news program about two local hospitals that were without electricity for two hours the previous night. It seems that a transformer blew somewhere in the vicinity of the hospitals and somehow affected the emergency back up generators at the hospitals. They didn't work. One patient died in one of the hospitals and nurses and doctors frantically ran around in the dark giving resuscitation to patients that had been on life support and other critical operations. Scary stuff! I'm sure if you had asked the hospitals, the day before, how they would handle a power blackout, they would have confidently said, "We have emergency generators that will automatically kick in if we lose power". How fragile our systems are! How arrogant the powers that be have become!

-- Anonymous, October 26, 1999

I have stated many times that EDGs, while redundant and about 99% reliable on start testing, simply aren't reliable enough. I have advocated additional emergency power sources - but not for Y2K, there just isn't a significant threat there. But for year after year operation, the potential for a loss of offsite power events due to non-y2k causes is just too high not to have extremely high reliable EDGs.

"2. Mobilize the deployment of the required number of reliable emergency back-up electrical generators at every nuclear reactor in the world."

The above is simply NOT realistic nor needed in the Y2K timeframe. There is no way that you could get 3-6 MW alternate power supplies in place in the next two months, you would need at least two years minimum.

Also, regarding credibility, Caldicott has an anti-nuke agenda, not a Y2K agenda, Y2K merely serves her purpose. And wasn't she one of the ones involved in that "buck naked" rally a few weeks ago with Patch Adams????

Regards,

-- Anonymous, October 30, 1999

As to your assertion FF, I don't know, but I'm sure she just wanted to show the naked truth ;) Seriously, though, I heard Larry Gershwin (CIA) on C-span, he's a bit concerned about foreign nuclear reactors. Its a shame it can't be done more quickly, If I were of your mind I would still think a joint effort between the two Army Corps of engineers would be valuable if only for long term safety. In my thinking, I would not wish this upcoming Russian winter on an enemy let alone our Corp of engineers. Hope you're right.

-- Anonymous, October 30, 1999

Thanks, everyone, for your replies.

I'd like to respond to yours, FactFinder, with some questions. I respect your experience in this field, and admit I have none (which always makes it easier to express an opinion!). But there are a couple things I don't understand.

First, although my interpretation might be wrong, I took the statement about mobilizing the deployment of the "required number" of reliable emergency back-up generators to mean that existing emergency generators would be tested, and only those found deficient would be replaced or supplemented. I didn't think it meant that additional generators would have to be installed at every nuclear plant. Was your estimate of 2 years based on getting "alternate power supplies" installed in just those locations where testing revealed problems? Or in ALL locations?

Second, it seems to me that whether or not a thing is possible often depends on whether we view it as necessary. So looking at your statement that Caldicott's proposition is not realistic "nor needed," I'm confused about that, since you say you've felt the need for greater reliability for these backup generators all along. Why, then, do you not support someone else's efforts to push for that now?

If Caldicott saw Y2K as an opportunity to advance her "anti-nuke agenda," why don't you, too, see it as an opportunity to advance your own view that the existing EDG's "simply aren't reliable enough"? You are both concerned about public safety, and to me that makes this opportunity seem well worth seizing.

Respectfully,

Judy

-- Anonymous, October 31, 1999