The following story, entitled Optimism, not deceit, beset F-22, appeared in the Sunday edition of the Baltimore Sun. The parallels with y2k status reporting should be obvious.

In the case of the F-22, the Air Force promised "Congress as late as 1988 that it was "committed to adhering to" the cost goal of $35 million per plane. In truth, an Air Force study from 1985 showed that a tough but realistic goal would be $45 million per plane, and some program officials believed $50 million could be a stretch, given all the technology being piled into the effort.

Nonetheless, Air Force program managers marched under what Martin called the "party line" of $35 million. Because officers are assigned to such programs and then move on, a succession of aggressive, driven personalities did their best to follow orders. When mistakes were made or problems arose, he said, such people downplayed any glitches out of faith in themselves that things would work out.

"In the end, I would hope that we would not find somebody that would say, `I was directed to lie' or `I was directed to be deceitful.' But having said what I just said, I will also tell you that it's human nature to try and figure out a way to please your bosses," Martin said.

At various points, despite glowing reports to Congress, it became undeniable that the program could not achieve certain cost or technical goals. "Somewhere along the way, somebody has to say `Wait a minute, we're too optimistic here, we're way too optimistic there. We've got to come clean,' " Martin said.

"Well, when somebody says, `Come clean,' it makes it sound like everybody else has been lying. But in fact what they've done is they've cut corners, they've pulled money, they've done everything possible to do what they thought their bosses meant," he said.

-- a (a@a.a), August 17, 1999