i read this today at gn's site. the three week claim has apparently been substantiated by rep. george grindley, grindley is also chairing georgia's task force 2000.

http://www.garynorth.com/y2k/detail_.cfm/4836

text from gn:

I wrote to Representative George Grindley, Jr. to verify that. Here's his reply...

I did indeed make the statement that you attributed to me. John is using three weeks as the outside possibilty, but I think things could get ugly. i wouldn't give you any odds that nuclear power will be working by then. the feds have said they must be compliant by july 1, or shut down. it takes about 4 months to totally shut down a plant. personally, i believe a serious concern is the cyber terrorism of the power grid. the department of defense is really concerned that this is being planned. this could last awhile under these conditions.

now, discounting the 4 months to close down a plant. this is a new twist from koskinen...but, maybe not, he said it to a state rep. not to the media nor for public consumption.

as if y2k wasn't enough to deal with, stir in the solar flares and add a pinch of cyber terrorism...voila, a nuclear flambeau.

for indigestion take two potassium iodide pills, drink plenty of water and get lot's of rest.

-- Anonymous, May 27, 1999

Answers

Yeah, I think Johnny K. is from the Slick Willey School of spin. I would like to see just one NY Times article with this story in it and Johnny saying "Yes, it's true, we really don't know how this whole thing we'll turn out, but we have to at least plan for the worst.". Bet me that it will never happen. Interesting thoughts on the Nukes. This is the third time I've heard the rumore that they're going to be shut down. All of them. Period. This time it's from someone who should know.

Anyway, you're iodine comment got me to thinking that I should determine the "safe distance" from my happy Nuke, which is the second largest in the country. I'm not sure I wanna be here if they plan to run it across the transition. I would much prefer they shut'em all down and subsequently weaken the grid, really I do.

So I went to the only example I know that's been studied well. Chernobyl. Did you know that Chernobyl was partially caused by operator error while testing to determine if backup diesel generators would work during a grid failure? Neither did I. Read on intrepid cyber warriors and take heart. The truth shall set you free. Knowledge is power...... Events leading to the accident (IA86, IA86a)

The Unit 4 reactor was to be shutdown for routine maintenance on 25 April 1986. It was decided to take advantage of this shutdown to determine whether, in the event of a loss of station power, the slowing turbine could provide enough electrical power to operate the emergency equipment and the core cooling water circulating pumps, until the diesel emergency power supply became operative. The aim of this test was to determine whether cooling of the core could continue to be ensured in the event of a loss of power.

This type of test had been run during a previous shut-down period, but the results had been inconclusive, so it was decided to repeat it. Unfortunately, this test, which was considered essentially to concern the non-nuclear part of the power plant, was carried out without a proper exchange of information and co-ordination between the team in charge of the test and the personnel in charge of the operation and safety of the nuclear reactor. Therefore, inadequate safety precautions were included in the test programme and the operating personnel were not alerted to the nuclear safety implications of the electrical test and its potential danger.

The planned programme called for shutting off the reactor's emergency core cooling system (ECCS), which provides water for cooling the core in an emergency. Although subsequent events were not greatly affected by this, the exclusion of this system for the whole duration of the test reflected a lax attitude towards the implementation of safety procedures.

As the shutdown proceeded, the reactor was operating at about half power when the electrical load dispatcher refused to allow further shutdown, as the power was needed for the grid. In accordance with the planned test programme, about an hour later the ECCS was switched off while the reactor continued to operate at half power. It was not until about 23:00 hr on 25 April that the grid controller agreed to a further reduction in power.

For this test, the reactor should have been stabilised at about 1,000 MW(t) prior to shut down, but due to operational error the power fell to about 30 MW(t), where the positive void coefficient became dominant. The operators then tried to raise the power to 700-1,000 MW (t) by switching off the automatic regulators and freeing all the control rods manually. It was only at about 01:00 hr on 26 April that the reactor was stabilised at about 200 MW(t).

Although there was a standard operating order that a minimum of 30 control rods was necessary to retain reactor control, in the test only 6-8 control rods were actually used. Many of the control rods were withdrawn to compensate for the build up of xenon which acted as an absorber of neutrons and reduced power. This meant that if there were a power surge, about 20 seconds would be required to lower the control rods and shut the reactor down. In spite of this, it was decided to continue the test programme.

There was an increase in coolant flow and a resulting drop in steam pressure. The automatic trip which would have shut down the reactor when the steam pressure was low, had been circumvented. In order to maintain power the operators had to withdraw nearly all the remaining control rods. The reactor became very unstable and the operators had to make adjustments every few seconds trying to maintain constant power.

At about this time, the operators reduced the flow of feedwater, presumably to maintain the steam pressure. Simultaneously, the pumps that were powered by the slowing turbine were providing less cooling water to the reactor. The loss of cooling water exaggerated the unstable condition of the reactor by increasing steam production in the cooling channels (positive void coefficient), and the operators could not prevent an overwhelming power surge, estimated to be 100 times the nominal power output.

The sudden increase in heat production ruptured part of the fuel and small hot fuel particles, reacting with water, caused a steam explosion, which destroyed the reactor core. A second explosion added to the destruction two to three seconds later. While it is not known for certain what caused the explosions, it is postulated that the first was a steam/hot fuel explosion, and that hydrogen may have played a role in the second.

The accident

The accident occurred at 01:23 hr on Saturday, 26 April 1986, when the two explosions destroyed the core of Unit 4 and the roof of the reactor building.

In the IAEA Post-Accident Assessment Meeting in August 1986 (IA86), much was made of the operators' responsibility for the accident, and not much emphasis was placed on the design faults of the reactor. Later assessments (IA86a) suggest that the event was due to a combination of the two, with a little more emphasis on the design deficiencies and a little less on the operator actions.

The two explosions sent a shower of hot and highly radioactive debris and graphite into the air and exposed the destroyed core to the atmosphere. The plume of smoke, radioactive fission products and debris from the core and the building rose up to about 1 km into the air. The heavier debris in the plume was deposited close to the site, but lighter components, including fission products and virtually all of the noble gas inventory were blown by the prevailing wind to the North-west of the plant.

Fires started in what remained of the Unit 4 building, giving rise to clouds of steam and dust, and fires also broke out on the adjacent turbine hall roof and in various stores of diesel fuel and inflammable materials. Over 100 fire-fighters from the site and called in from Pripyat were needed, and it was this group that received the highest radiation exposures and suffered the greatest losses in personnel. These fires were put out by 05:00 hr of the same day, but by then the graphite fire had started. Many firemen added to their considerable doses by staying on call on site. The intense graphite fire was responsible for the dispersion of radionuclides and fission fragments high into the atmosphere. The emissions continued for about twenty days , but were much lower after the tenth day when the graphite fire was finally extinguished.

The graphite fire

While the conventional fires at the site posed no special firefighting problems, very high radiation doses were incurred by the firemen. However, the graphite moderator fire was a special problem. Very little national or international expertise on fighting graphite fires existed, and there was a very real fear that any attempt to put it out might well result in further dispersion of radionuclides, perhaps by steam production, or it might even provoke a criticality excursion in the nuclear fuel.

A decision was made to layer the graphite fire with large amounts of different materials, each one designed to combat a different feature of the fire and the radioactive release. Boron carbide was dumped in large quantities from helicopters to act as a neutron absorber and prevent any renewed chain reaction. Dolomite was also added to act as heat sink and a source of carbon dioxide to smother the fire. Lead was included as a radiation absorber, as well as sand and clay which it was hoped would prevent the release of particulates. While it was later discovered that many of these compounds were not actually dropped on the target, they may have acted as thermal insulators and precipitated an increase in the temperature of the damaged core leading to a further release of radionuclides a week later.

By May 9, the graphite fire had been extinguished, and work began on a massive reinforced concrete slab with a built-in cooling system beneath the reactor. This involved digging a tunnel from underneath Unit 3. About four hundred people worked on this tunnel which was completed in 15 days, allowing the installation of the concrete slab. This slab would not only be of use to cool the core if necessary, it would also act as a barrier to prevent penetration of melted radioactive material into the groundwater.

In summary, the Chernobyl accident was the product of a lack of "safety culture". The reactor design was poor from the point of view of safety and unforgiving for the operators, both of which provoked a dangerous operating state. The operators were not informed of this and were not aware that the test performed could have brought the reactor into explosive conditions. In addition, they did not comply with established operational procedures. The combination of these factors provoked a nuclear accident of maximum severity in which the reactor was totally destroyed within a few seconds.

-- Anonymous, May 27, 1999

The time to shutdown and adequately cool down a nuclear power facility has been discussed here ad infinitum. Please do a search of the threads, and I think you'll get a bit better clarification on timeframes. It does not take 4 months (or 6 or 8, pick a number that's being thrown randomly about) to do this.

Also, once again for clarification, the NRC will not be making any "shutdown decisions" in July. They will not be making even tentative decisions on which (if any) until September, and I would not expect any shutdown orders (if even issued) to be let until December at the earliest.

The subject of nuclear energy and Y2k is a very emotional issue for some people. We need to understand the subject and implications from a standpoint of knowledge rather than fear. I would suggest that anyone new to the topic start with the "nuclear energy" page on euy2k.com, then do some research in the archives of this disussion forum.

Dr. North has consistently gotten this one wrong, and I think it started with an email that he received from an anonymous source last year. This is a case where a little knowledge of a subject can indeed lead folks unfamiliar with the subject (or technology) to the wrong conclusions and needlessly worry and scare people. I'll write more about this topic a bit later.

NOTE: I'm not saying there's no issues! There certainly are. However, too many people seem to be chasing the "red herring" issues with respect to nuclear power and Y2k.

-- Anonymous, May 28, 1999

Rick,

Is this the message from Gary North's site that you're referring to? If so, can you comment on Mr. Nicholas Vrettos assessment.

Thanks.

Leo MacDougall

Subject: Why Nuclear plants MUST Shut Down By July 99

As a nuclear engineer, I read with great interest the article about the NRC mandate for all nuke plants to be compliant or else shut-down. I was discussing the article with a couple of friends of mine who are also nuclear engineers. We were musing about the NRC's deadline---July 1, 1999.

At first we could not understand why the plants needed to be shut-down six months in advance. Then it hit us. A 1000 electric megawatt nuclear plant generates about 3000 megawatts of heat energy. That is 3 BILLION watts of heat energy. When a plant is scramed, the nuclear fission stops almost instantaneously, however the core still generates a tremendous amount of heat. This heat is called residual heat and is a result of the natural cooling-off of the core. under normal circumstances, special pumps called Residual Heat Removal pumps circulate water through the core to keep it cool and remove excess heat. Emergency diesel generators can supply power to these RHR pumps whenever power to the plant is lost. Also under normal circumstances, it takes approximately 4 months (depending on the operating power of the core) to cool a core to the point that loss of cooling will not damage the core. In other words, nuclear plants need six months to ensure their cores are cool enough and won't melt if power to the plant is permanently lost.

Imagine the ensuing mess if nukes can't cool their cores.

Nicholas Vrettos

http://www.garynorth.com/y2k/detail_.cfm/2863

-- Anonymous, May 30, 1999

Cyber Terrorism - Business systems maybe. Control systems not very likely. Plant control systems networks are local to the plant and most SCADA/EMS systems ride over private utility owned networks. This stuff is not hanging off the Internet or the PSTN.

Jim

-- Anonymous, June 02, 1999

I recollect a joint NSA/DoD/FBI extensive exercise a year or two ago on countering cyberterrorism: 10 "cells" of cyberterrorists were set up, some here at home, some abroad. The FBI could locate only two of them (both at home). According to published reports, NSA and DoD concluded that cyberterrorists indeed had the potential to take down U.S. power grids. As I recall, the exercise also showed how relatively easy it would be to disrupt command of the Pacific Fleet (another target included).

-- Anonymous, June 04, 1999