.The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Ass.)asked each member country what their contingency plans were for Y2k and nuclear plants. The answers here are not very encouraging. You would think with only 8 months left that worldwide nuclear plant contingency plans would be in place by now, but they certainly are NOT.Does anyone know what these contingency plans would be or should be?

Answers to the IAEA's Y2K Questionnaire: Re: contingency plans

• BULGARIA Yes, there is a schedule for developing the contingency plans. The planning has to be finished till the end of September.
• CZECH REPUBLIC The plan of emergency measures during unexpected and unpredictable events will be drawn up.
• FINLAND Contingency plans are under preparation. For the year shift 98/99 there was established preparedness to some extend.
• FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY Despite the induced steps to remedy any Year-2000 incompatibilities, contingency planning is needed on plant level as well as externally. Here, the aspects of nuclear safety only form a small part of the overall problem. At the centre of interest are rather more the issues relating to the assurance of the general electricity supply to the population. Nationally as well as internationally, protection measures for the case of an assumed large-area failure of the power grid are also discussed and corresponding plans prepared. Under the aspect of internal emergency preparedness planning, the NPP operators are also taking supplementary measures additional to the Year-2000 conformity examinations. For example, personnel awareness of the problem is increased in special training courses, computer-independent substitute measures are provided for problematic plant organisation systems, accessories and machinery materials are stocked up in time, and additional personnel is to be deployed in the plants and also in other key positions (e.g. grid systems switchgear) at the times of problematic date changes.

  The influence of external factors, e.g. of the supply and communication networks as well as the grid systems, are also subject of the analyses. The assured electricity supply by the national grid is of fundamental importance since a failure can have effects on the safety of the nuclear power plants. The power utilities are also checking the plant-specific switching instructions (emergency instructions) for their Year-2000 conformity . These instructions were already drawn up 10 years ago as a precaution against large-area grid failures. They provide that -should the need arise - connections are to be established within a maximum period of two hours by specifically allocated conventional power plants (coal, hydro-power, oil, gas) to the nuclear power plant sites. All the additional measures provided will also be checked by the competent authorities under the aspect of the assurance of plant safety.

• HUNGARY The planned countermeasures do not contain yet contingency considerations.
• INDIA All nuclear installations have been asked to prepare plant specific contingency plans which include system level plans as well as integrated contingency plans. These plans will be reviewed by AERB. AERB is also considering general contingency measures against external events such as keeping the emergency diesel generators in operation and presence of extra staff in the plant during the roll over of the critical dates.
• INDONESIA Yes, contingency plans are being developed by the competent institution.
• JAPAN Research Reactors & Nuclear Fuel Facilities Although the regulatory body has not developed a contingency plan yet, the research institutes, the national laboratories and the public service corporations which are supervised by the regulatory body are developing their own contingency plans. Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) The electric utility companies are now under way to prepare overall contingency plans including the ones for nuclear power plants and fossil power plants in order to maintain stable electricity supply. The MITI is also preparing an internal contingency plan within itself.
• MEXICO Until now, no contingency plans have been developed to guarantee the safe operation of the Laguna Verde NPP on 1 January 2000 and beyond this date because it is considered that all the detected problems belong to SW applied in non-safety related systems, which will be fixed on time. In addition, during the next two months an independent assessment of Y2K concern will be performed by an American contractor, so in the case that some problem is detected, the Laguna Verde NPP will prepare a contingency plan. In any case, during the critical dates a special team will be available in CNSNS and in the Laguna Verde NPP in order to affront any problem.
• NETHERLANDS Plans are developed on this matter. NPP Borssele is intended to continue operation. Nevertheless operational and organisational measures are discussed by licensees now. One of the discussion topics is having no import or export of electrical power from or to neighbour countries, minimising the probability of an initiating event induced by any domino effect in the external grid. Operator crews have been trained specifically on loss of offsite power. Emergency preparedness of authorities during critical hours is one of the topics.
• PAKISTAN Regarding preparation of contingency plans to cope with the worst case scenario, that may arise due to this problem, the management of nuclear installations have been asked to prepare procedures for handling such anticipated situations. This will also include revision of training programme for operators.
• SPAIN Contingency plans possibility is contemplated on the Methodology (see 3 above).
• UKRAINE Each energy block has its own instruction, developed by its NPP, on how to prevent an emergency situation. Until now, no changes have been included in these instructions in connection with the Y2K problem.
• UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND Each licensee has been asked to consider contingency arrangements to secure the safety of his operations against the possibilities that he may have: missed some important equipment, incorrectly assessed or modified equipment or against failures of external services including, but not limited to essential utilities. However Y2K programmes to date have confirmed a high degree of confidence in the continued safe operation of all facilities. A separate government programme is being conducted to monitor readiness in key areas of national infrastructure and utilities.
• UNITED STATES OF AMERICA All operating nuclear power plants have started developing plant-specific contingency plans as required by GL 98-01. The plans are based on the guidance in NEI/NUSMG 98-07 "Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," dated August 1998

-- Anonymous, May 13, 1999

Answers

Well, for one thing, they should definitely include generators that work without a hitch. Cooling the core of a reactor is kind of important. Below, Representative Ed Markey D. MA, communicates with NRC officials regarding just such contingencies. Kudo's to you Ed. We need more elected officials to put these people to the fire and get real answers.

April 5, 1999

Shirley Ann Jackson Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Ms. Jackson:

This letter is a followup to my March 10, 1999 letter to you regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) oversight of nuclear plants' response to the "Y2K" bug. Although I realize you have not had time to prepare a detailed response to that letter, I think it important to highlight the issue of emergency diesel generator (EDG) reliability in light of a recent discovery at the Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire. In the March 10, 1999 letter I pointed out that, "Y2K problems in electricity grids that provide outside power would force plant shutdowns and force plants to rely on backup diesel generators to keep coolant flowing around the fuel rods in the reactor and in the spent fuel pools. At least 46 generator problems were reported by NRC licensees in 1997-1998." In response to such concerns an Associated Press wire story on March 10, 1999 described Seabrook Station spokesman David Barr's reassurance about the power backup: "Barr said Seabrook tests its two back-up diesel generators, each the size of a school bus, about once a month. He said they have never failed."

So I find it rather interesting and disturbing that one of the two backup diesel generators at Seabrook likely was inoperable at that time. According to a March 31, 1999 Daily Event Report (DER 35535) from Seabrook's owner to the NRC, the "`B' Train Emergency Diesel Generator may not have been operable during portions or all of the previous operating cycle due to a defective AR relay." The DER states that one AR relay "would have prevented the EDG from powering the emergency bus." A second AR relay "was incapable of starting a Containment Building Spray (CBS) pump." The relay failures apparently could have occurred at any time since they were replaced during the last refueling outage, which ended in June 1997. Indeed, it is quite possible that this backup generator has not been operable for the last twenty-one months.

The DER also notes that "it is possible that there were times when the A Train EDG was inoperable for maintenance or testing concurrent with the B Train EDG being inoperable." At such times the plant would have had no backup power source. Had there been a blackout of offsite power (which fortunately did not occur), and had the problem not been corrected, there could have been a meltdown within hours.

I believe this incident highlights the potential threat to nuclear power plants from power blackouts due to Y2K problems with the electricity grid. It also highlights an apparent lack of attention from nuclear utilities to problems with the backup generators that are supposed to prevent such blackouts from causing meltdowns. I would like to reaffirm the second recommendation I made in the March 10 letter: "The NRC should include backup diesel generator reliability in Y2K inspections and in periodic Y2K reports, require all licensees to have all backup electricity sources available at the turn of the year and other key Y2K dates, and ensure adequate fuel supply."

In addition, I request your assistance in answering the following questions:

If Seabrook tests its generators once a month, why did they not discover the generator was inoperable until the refueling outage? Does the NRC need to require licensees to test not only that the generators work but also that they are able to provide emergency power to the plants? On what dates since June 1997 is it possible that neither of the two generators were operable at Seabrook, and hence that the plant had access to no backup power? Please inform me of the results of the licensee's ongoing investigations into the failure of the B Train relays and into "the potential for similar issues with the A Train AR relays." Thank you for your assistance. If you have questions concerning this letter please feel free to contact Mr. Lowell Ungar or Mr. Jeffrey Duncan on my staff at (202)225-2836.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey Member of Congress

-- Anonymous, May 13, 1999

Jim, thanks so much for posting Congressman's Markey's letter. Back on April 6 of this year I posted that event report from Seabrook to this forum. See: http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=000gp6

I was rather surprised that it didn't seem to raise any questions here at the time. Perhaps I should have made a separate thread of it instead of putting it as a response. Whatever, hats off to Congressman Markey for catching the contradictions between testing assurances and this event report. I'm glad he has asked for some answers.

While I continue to believe that safety levels at U.S. nuclear plants are high, it would be very nice to KNOW that this type of "event" will not be repeated *anywhere*, especially with the unknown variables of the Year 2000 approaching.

-- Anonymous, May 14, 1999