why should we doubt the good news coming from the pr flaks for the electrical industry?

to those who accuse others of paranoia...read on.

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/1999/04/01/MN73911.DTL

-- Anonymous, April 06, 1999

Answers

To consider:

"It's currently in the process of disciplining 13 workers." - http:/ /www.sfgate.com/cgi- bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/1999/04/01/MN73911.DTL

Are the workers at fault here? Is the managment capable of punishing the right people? It doesn't smell good. I am concerned for the 13.

-- Anonymous, April 06, 1999

Hoo boy, "blasts" is certainly the correct word. Thanks, Marianne, for posting the results of the PUC investigation.

I just finished reading the NRC Event Reports for the first week in April. Since part of the PUC report on PG&E involves pre-existing problems they were not aware of, I'll add an excerpt from the April 1, Seabrook, NH, Event Report to this thread. It seems it was just discovered that an Emergency Diesel Generator was inoperable and they don't know how long since June, 1997 it's been that way. At least they did find the problem. However, it didn't give me a warm feeling when I read, "Notwithstanding, the potential unavailability of the B EDG, during the past operating cycle offsite power was available." Very lucky there wasn't an offsite power loss and they didn't find out the hard way that that emergency generator wasn't working.

Event Text

"B" Train Emergency Diesel Generator may not have been operable during portions or all of the previous operating cycle due to a defective AR relay. "On March 31, 1999 at 1100, during the current refueling outage, North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (North Atlantic) determined that the B Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) may not have been operable during portions or all of the previous operating cycle. Specifically, during 18 month EDG testing on March 29, 1999, it was determined that an AR relay associated with the B Train EDG Emergency Power Sequencer (EPS) was incapable of opening the breaker to the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT). This would have prevented the EDG from powering the emergency bus if called upon to do so.

"Additional testing on March 30, 1999, revealed that another AR relay associated with the B Train EDG EPS was incapable of starting a Containment Building Spray (CBS) pump. This would have prevented the B Train CBS pump from automatically starting if called upon to do so.

"Norh Atlantic is currently investigating this issue and has not been able to determine the definitive cause of the relay failures or when the failures occurred, however, the B Train AR relays were replaced during the last refueling outage which was completed in June 1997. The B Train EDG successfully passed its surveillance testing during that outage after the relays were replaced. North Atlantic is currently investigating the potential for similar issues with the A Train AR relays.

"North Atlantic has concluded that during the prior operating cycle, it is possible that there were times when the A Train EDG was operable for maintenance or testing concurrent with the B Train EDG being inoperable due to the aforementioned AR relay failures. This constitutes a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures, systems, or components that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 5 0.72(b)(2)(iii). Notwithstanding, the potential unavailability of the B EDG, during the past operating cycle offsite power was available. The AR relays in the B Train EDG EPS have been replaced and EDG testing has been satisfactorily completed."

-- Anonymous, April 06, 1999