U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center
                              Event Reports For

                           03/08/1999 - 03/09/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35447  35448  35449  35450  35451  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35447       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: RIVER BEND               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:15[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        03/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:42[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GEORGE TURNER                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/08/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SANBORN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       82       Power Operation  |82       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF SINGLE OFFSITE SIREN DURING TESTING OF ACTUATION    |
| SYSTEM                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| During Y2K testing of the offsite siren actuation system, a single siren     |
| actuated for about 5 seconds.  The test was terminated and the system        |
| returned to pretest conditions.  The licensee notified the Louisiana Office  |
| of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and informed them of the actuation.  The    |
| LOEP decided not to make a public announcement on the emergency alert system |
| as the siren was only actuated for a short period of time.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the local parishes and the NRC Resident Inspector.     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

-- Anonymous, March 10, 1999

Answers

Good - they're testing - even the offsite alarm systems for year 2000 compliance. And, if something unexpected goes wrong, as here, they report it - like they are required to. They don't hide it, they don't trivialize it, they don't put a smiley face on for the next press conference.

The report goes to everybody else, who say "oh s**t" - and they fix/check/inspect their systems.

The system is working folks - good. Not finished yet, but it (overall) is in the integrated test phase. Further than, say, the FAA or DOD, or anybody else in government. (I'm a bit sceptical about the SS Office - they were not audited, nor have they "printed and electronically exchanged" bills with all suppliers and a sample of receivers.)

So, when is the rest of the industry going to do some serious testing, not one day of pre-staged "phone drills"?

-- Anonymous, March 10, 1999

Rick,

I'm sure we'll hear about Peach Bottom and this at EPRI in April. In the meantime, I'd be interested in knowing if discreet tests were performed on each component of the system (if this was possible) and whether the discreet tests indicated the potential of a problem for upcoming integrated tests.

I know you labor under the same (or similar) proprietary disclosure restrictions as I do, is there a way for you to check this out and report bacK?

-- Anonymous, March 10, 1999

I'm guessing - but I think that if earlier tests (or schematic diagram review) indicated that there were likely to have been a problem - that interface would have been identified and isolated or tagged as part of the lineup. On the other hand - they secured the siren so quickly that perhaps the interface was actually anticipated and an "operator was standing by" at the right place on headphones.

Or it could have been a goof. I just love startups after new construction .....

-- Anonymous, March 10, 1999