Is this a first "whisp of smoke" that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission recognizes that, within current regulations and license boundaries, that the nuclear industry will have much difficulty in certifying Y2k readiness?

The NRC issued their draft contingency plan the other day. On page 18, just before the references, there is a paragraph that sent chills up my spine:

"The NRC has determined that if the agency were to address Y2K issues affecting plant operability within the existing regulatory framework and procedures, continued safe operation of the facility could be unnecessarily adversely impacted, thereby potentially resulting in adverse impact on public health and safety by forcing an unnecessary plant shutdown. NRC approval for relief from a technical specification or license condition under current practices for notification of enforcement discretion would be too cumbersome and unworkable given the desire for prompt action if the licensee determines that continued safe plant operation is possible."

I don't expect that anyone who hasn't dealt in depth with nuclear industry licensing, regulation, and technical specifications to understand all of the 'governmenteese' in the above statement - but suffice it to say that the above statement, if adopted as an official position of the NRC, would allow both the NRC and plant operators to sidestep the regulations and operating requirements that are already in place.

What this tells me is that the NRC has recognized or fears that under current regulations and license conditions, very few nuclear plants would be able to certify, even in a best case, Y2k readiness. It would appear, from the above paragraph, that the NRC's concern now extends beyond the bounds of their jurisdiction - their concern is becoming focused on maintaining an adequate supply of power rather than the safe operation of nuclear facilities.

If my interpretation is correct, this is a completely unacceptable strategy, and again, totally outside of the boundaries of NRC jurisdiction. While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may have emergency rulemaking authority to compel the NRC to issue such guidelines, a unilateral decision such as this by the NRC (for their stated reason in the draft contingency plan) is clearly not within the scope of NRC's authority.

I've said it many times:

The NRC's charter and mission is to keep the plants safe, not to keep them operating.

Contrary opinions (or interpretations of the above) are welcomed! :-)

-- Anonymous, December 11, 1998

Answers

Perhaps I'm not reading this accurately, but this seems to say that the NRC will "not" allow the plant to sidestep it's (NRC's) charter.

Here's my "layman's" interpretation of this graph.

"The NRC has determined that if the agency were to address Y2K issues affecting plant operability within the existing regulatory framework and procedures, continued safe operation of the facility could be unnecessarily adversely impacted thereby potentially resulting in adverse impact on public health and safety by forcing an unnecessary plant shutdown....",

NRC recognizes that the utility that owns nuclear reactor "x" isn't going to finish remediating the nuke by our deadline of July 1999 and will be shut down, just like our rules say it should be. This is gonna cause a blackout and a whole lot of problems. ( I love the "unnecessarily adversely impacted" in place of "shut down")

NRC approval for relief from a technical specification or license condition under current practices for notification of enforcement discretion would be too cumbersome and unworkable given the desire for prompt action if the licensee determines that continued safe plant operation is possible."

NRC will not approve your request to sidestep our current laws on a "technicality" because of the inherent "sluggish" nature of beauracracy, even though you say your plant won't be affected by the y2k bug.

That's how that paragraph seems to read to me but maybe I'm wrong, and I have not read the "draft contingency plan." I wouldn't be surprised if NRC begins to receive pressure to back down from their charter because utility owners were either too cheap or shortsighted or plain irresponsible in taking action to fix this problem earlier. I hope NRC sticks to their guns. Who would get the blame for a Chernobyl here in the U.S.?

Jeff

-- Anonymous, December 11, 1998

In response to Jeff:

I think you missed it, Jeff. I see the basic sentence as:

NRC approval... would be to cumbersome.

In other words, normally the agency (the power plant) is required to request and obtain approval from the NRC before doing anything other than or less than required by the NRC. There are procedures (red tape) for making said requests. In this sentence the NRC is saying that this red tape "would be too cumbersome and unworkable given the desire for prompt action". So if the licensee (the power plant) thinks it's safe then it's ok to go ahead without approval (the last part of the sentence).

Chuck

-- Anonymous, December 11, 1998

Chuck-

Did I? I don't think so.

Now I'm not any kind of expert on any of this stuff,I'm only trying to interpret this one paragraph. What your response didn't say is what the utility that owns the faulty nuke is "requesting" from nerc. The way I see it is that the utility is requesting "approval for relief" from a technical specification or license condition under current practices for notification of enforcement discretion"

In other words they (utility) want approval from nerc to be excused from the current regulations. Approval which would be "cumbersome and unworkable given the desire for prompt action."

What else could the utility be asking for? Approval to be shut down?

Incidentally and where my arguement could be really flawed is with the phrase "enforcement discretion" what does that mean?

Actually I feel like the "devil's advocate." I am normally distrustful of governmental information like this. When I read Rick's original post I got chills too. But I can't help what I see. Am I making sense?

Jeff

-- Anonymous, December 12, 1998

I agree with Rick's definition. I simplify this paragraph as:

1. NRC - The standard safety regulations are not necessarily compatible with this new y2k problem that may require speedier and prompt action

2. The licensee needs to be given the benefit of the doubt as to whether they can continue to operate in a safe manner and the freedom to make prompt decisions that the current regulations and red tape hinder.

It sounds good, kindof, but it will actually put the public at more risk if you begin doing away with the regulations that were put in affect for very good reasons and they do apply to y2k induced concerns as well.

-- Anonymous, December 12, 1998

This NRC statement neither surprises me, nor do I consider it to be the first "whisp of smoke", albeit it is the first which is documented straight from an NRC publication. There was some discussion relating to this in the 10/16/1998 question under Nuclear Facilities on this Forum. At that time this statement was under consideration:

" I heard Mr. Jared Wermiel of NRC speak at the Infocast Y2K conference in Las Vegas last month. Mr. Wermiel is the NRC's point man for Y2K. What he said was astounding. NRC has been ordered to consider the lack of nuclear power production in 2000 as a threat to the nation, and therefore to work cooperatively with the nuclear plant owners to allow them to keep running. "

Rick stated that he chaired this conference and had not heard the above statement, nor was it documented in any transcript that I know of. At the time, I could understand Rick's correct skepticism that the NRC would in any way step outside the bounds of their charter, since they have never done so to date. Having less confidence in the bureaucratic mindset, I did not then, and do not now, think it's beyond possibility for traditional regulatory agencies to bend their normal steadfastness in the face of "averting a national threat" pressure from on high. Is this what is happening? The following are reasons why I believe the answer to that question is "Yes."

Context is very important in deciphering any statement. As I understand it, the broad context for the nuclear generating plant situation is this:

1. According to NERC forecast charts, generating capacity margins (the "buffer" of production above demand) have been decreasing steadily and now stand at about 15% to 20% for all generation in the U.S.

2. Nuclear power generation accounts for 20% of the U.S. total capacity.

3. For the East coast of the U.S., nuclear power generation accounts for approximately 40% of the power generation, with some East coast states getting up to 60% of their power from nuclear sources.

4. * If* all the nuclear plants cannot accomplish Y2K remediation under the NRC regulatory time frame, and must shut down due to those safety regulations, then all the U.S. generating margin is gone in one fell swoop. On the East coast, not only is the margin gone, but there would be a further 20% to 40% drop in NEEDED generation. Assuming all other generating facilities have fixed *ALL* of their systems and have no supplier or interconnection problems at all, just taking the nukes off line would *severely* impact the supply of power to the eastern grid, and hence all the businesses and people residing there. (Including Washington, D.C., home of the powers-that-be, and the United Nations complex in New York City.)

5. It has been stated or implied in several documents that year 2000 problems affect the safety systems in nuclear facilities but that the actual generation of nuclear power is not subject to the same concerns. In other words, a year 2000 problem may cause a plant's safety systems to "trip" and force a shutdown, but that this would be due to a problem in the safety systems themselves and would not indicate the reactor was actually unsafe.

Now, imagine you are a government official. This is what you might be thinking to yourself: "If the nukes go offline because of this Y2K bug, we've got an emergency situation on our hands, even if there's nothing really wrong with them. There's no guarantee the other generating facilities will be fully up to snuff either. If the plants squeak by with getting fixes in at the last minute, there won't be enough time for all the paperwork to keep them legally up and running, if the NRC keeps being a stickler for regulations. And if the plants don't get done, I'm told the systems will automatically force a shutdown if something is wrong. So....seems to me it would be better to keep them up and give them every bit of time to get those fixes in. It's the only way we've got a chance of avoiding an east coast blackout or brownout/rationing situation. Yeah, considering this could become a national emergency, it would be a safe enough risk...probably..... Maybe I'd better see about putting the appropriate pressure on the people at the NRC."

Let me state that I personally do NOT approve of this mindset, I consider it extremely dangerous - but I can quite easily imagine it occurring. I also DO agree with Rick's assessment of what the NRC statement is saying. Here's my paraphrase of the statement:

The NRC has decided that if we were to address Y2K issues affecting plant operability.. [operability is the key word throughout this statement] using our normal procedures, continued safe *operation*... [operability again] of the facility could be unnecessarily impacted for the worse... ["unnecessarily" is key, also. This is saying that shutting down the facilities might actually be unnecessary in regards to their safe operation, but would only be necessary because of those NRC normal procedures.] thereby potentially causing an adverse impact on public health and safety by forcing an UNNECESSARY plant shutdown. NRC approval for bypassing a technicality would be..." too cumbersome and unworkable given the desire for prompt action if the licensee determines that continued safe plant operation is possible."

I sum this whole thing up in this way: "These fixes are going to go down to the wire. It's a last minute race. The nation needs all the generation up and running that it can get. If we stick to normal procedures they'll take too long. If a plant says it's ready one week before 2000, then we're going to take the chance of letting them stay online because by the time they prove their readiness to us it will be too late for us to say "Go!".

There are no good options. If nuclear generation is shut down for safety reasons, there will be terrible problems. If they're not, the safety risks present terrible problems and plants may end up doing an emergency shutdown anyway. I think we're going to be walking on a razor edge of risks, and I think it's obvious our government knows that successful remediation before 2000 for electrical utilities is in grave doubt.

-- Anonymous, December 12, 1998

Thanks to all for the further clarification

(I think)

I can just see the poor NRC beauracrat sweating over this one, "Damned if I do, damned if I don't...damned if I do, damned if I don't"

Jeff

-- Anonymous, December 12, 1998

Yes, the first wisp of smoke? I agree with Rick's interpretation, but not that the NRC is, itself, about to take that action. But they're fishing. The NRC statement is a perfect bureacratic proposition. It states the problem, carefully puts forward a characterization of the problem ("unnecessarily," repeated), but actually proposes nothing and takes no position. A whisper of a trial balloon. As a bureaucrat myself, I admire the craftsmanship. What's next, I wonder... but that probably depends upon the reaction to the trial balloon.

-- Anonymous, December 12, 1998

Jeff. You've pegged the NRC position exactly. If the poor guys don't have ulcers by now, odds are they will have by Dec.31, 1999.

-- Anonymous, December 12, 1998

Ooooooops. I'm going to contradict the posting I made a minute ago, as I just noticed, right above the paragraph which Rick cited, the following recommendation.

"In an effort to help ensure reliable power to the electric grid during the transitional period of the Y2K rollover date, as an important aspect of the protection of public health and safety in the broader sense discussed above, the task force recommends the following:

Licensees may invoke 10 CFR 50.54(x) to maintain continued plant operation, providing the licensee determines that no significant safety concern results during a Y2K transition period of several days beginning on January 1, 2000."

I am not familiar with the regs. What does 10 CFR 50.54(x) say? So NRC is not being coy, as I had thought, afterall?

-- Anonymous, December 12, 1998

Rik, here it is: "(x) A licensee may take reasonable action that departs from a license condition or a technical specification (contained in a license issued under this part) in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent."

-- Anonymous, December 12, 1998

Bonnie writes -- "If nuclear generation is shut down for safety reasons, there will be terrible problems. If they're not, the safety risks present terrible problems and plants may end up doing an emergency shutdown anyway."

Aren't the various monitoring systems throughout a nuclear power plant themselves at risk of failure (in embedded systems, for instance)? And aren't these are the systems the operators depend on to trip an emergency shutdown?

If I've got that right -- and I'm no engineer -- NOT shutting down is even MORE of a risk, since a situation can get out of hand in a hurry.

-- Anonymous, December 16, 1998

Tom, in the NRC task force recommendation,

"Licensees may invoke 10 CFR 50.54(x) to maintain continued plant operation, providing the licensee determines that no significant safety concern results during a Y2K transition period of several days beginning on January 1, 2000."

the operative words appear to be "providing no significant safety concern results". In my view, the only way to be absolutely sure there are no significant safety concerns would be to have tested all the relevant systems post-remediation AND be confident that all other grid partners, etc. had done the same. Otherwise you come up with a "did we miss anything?" scenario.

It's my understanding that the safety systems which are mission critical (in fact ALL mission critical systems of any type) are supposed to be assessed, remediated and tested before a decision is made to stay online. The unease comes because there is doubt that some nuclear plants will finish this mission- critical process with time enough left for the NRC paperwork and oversight process to work as it normally does. It *appears* from the above draft (not final) contingency plan that the NRC is going to leave the go-ahead decision for a down-to-the-wire remediation to the judgement of the "licensee". Frankly, if I were in the position of having to make a decision like that, I would have to be absolutely, totally confident that all necessary testing had been done and the results were a clean bill of health. If I had the slightest doubt, I'd shut the plant down even if I did have the power to keep it online.

That's the kind of decision I hope anyone would make. The safety risks I mentioned had more to do with a possible lack of knowledge about testing procedures (such as accepting vendor certification for mission critical systems) and a possible misjudgement about staying online based on insufficient IT data. A managerial judgement call about information technology systems performance would be a tough responsibility. The outside-the-plant risks would also have to be taken into consideration.

While I honestly don't think anyone would deliberately stay online if they believed there were safety risks, I do think that a controlled shut down over the rollover and then coming online would seem to be a safer choice. If there weren't so many interconnection "unknowns" then I might look at it differently. However every single utility 10Q I've read has stated serious concerns about outside events over which the utility would have no control. If something "gets out of hand" in a fossil fuel generating plant it's a different story than with a nuclear plant. I'm not a nuclear engineer either, but I agree with you. If there is any doubt whatsoever, I'd rather have the nukes offline than on. I do not want to scare anybody, because I actually think the odds of a problem other than an automatic shutdown are VERY low. It's just that the year 2000 problem hasn't been "done" before so there are no guarantees - and I don't like surprises. On the other hand, I'm well aware of how much the country needs the nuclear generation. Sigh. I'm glad I don't have to make the decisions about this. God bless the ones that do.

-- Anonymous, December 16, 1998

My question about safety systems may have been answered in the thread What happens to Nukes on Aug. 22, 1999?. The post by Nick Laird (December 16, 1998) copies a message by Murray Jennex, who writes in part:

US nuclear shutdown systems are not reliant upon digital technology. Critical valves are designed to operate with spring and pneumatic operators that would cause the valve to fail to its required emergency position should the plant trip and power be lost. No digital logic is used in this scheme. Critical control systems tend to be electro-mechanical and analog and are not Y2K impacted. The nuclear plants I am responsible for do not have any digital components in the key safety systems.

Yet this statement seems to focus on the physical actuators used to execute emergency shutdown procedures, and doesn't speak directly to the monitoring systems which call these procedures when some pre-established parameter is met. If it's the case that no IF condition, THEN execute logic is used in the monitoring process, then there's no problem.

-- Anonymous, December 16, 1998

The quote from Dr. Jennex is correct within its context.

However, if the monitoring system -- which is digital and does use IBM PCs -- fails, do you keep the plant running or not?

--AJ

-- Anonymous, December 16, 1998