I expect you've all read this.

//www.nrc.gov/NRC/Y2K/Audit/Y2K50443.html#_1_15

Any engineers who can gauge the seriousness of the non-compliant items. Looks REALLY bad to me, but what do I know.

-- Richard Dale (rdale@figroup.co.uk), November 25, 1998

Answers

2.2.7 Contingency Planning

The purpose of the internal risk contingency is to anticipate and prepare for events that could occur due to system failures and reduce their impact on safe operations. Contingency planning external risks covers the means for mitigation of external millennium events that could compromise safety or continued operation of Seabrook station. One of the external risks to be considered is transmission/ distribution system events. Concerns addressed include loss of off- site power, grid instability and voltage fluctuation, load fluctuations and loss of grid control systems. This contingency planning effort included information exchanges with the appropriate Independent System Operators (ISO) New England subcommittees with grid control responsibilities.

[So, in a nutshell, no matter how well they remediate and test internally, and are Y2K ready, as always, they are still vulnerable to external Y2K forces/events].

3.0 Audit Team Observations

The audit team developed the following observations:

7. The Seabrook licensee has identified a Y2K problem with the Radiation Data Monitor System (RDMS). The RDMS is a vendor package provide by Sorrento Electric which has been determined to be not Y2K compliant. The vendor has indicated that they have no plans to make this system Y2K compliant...

...The vendor has indicated to their customers that the RDMS cannot properly function with a year identification that ends in 00 (every decade), but that when the year 2000 comes to an end, the system will be able to operate properly in the year 2001. An approach identified by the Seabrook licensee is to change the system date to some date in the past when Seabrook was not tracking data; that is, the date will be setback 28 years. (Initial testing at the Seabrook test bed indicated the RMDS operated with the date of 1972 inserted, but did not function correctly with "00.") Procedurally, the licensee could insert a "dummy" date of say 1978 for the year 2000, and then reset the date correctly to 2001 when that year arrives. The present schedule calls for having either the RDMS replacement or work around option implemented by the fourth quarter of 1999. (The necessary Main Plant Computer System software change to "dummy" a date for the RDMS input is scheduled for November 1998 and planned for testing and actual use in the last quarter of 1999.)

[So we just reverse time for a year, then just jump forward again in the future. Sort of like a Y2K Yearlong Daylight Savings time plan. Interesting, and simple. Would this work elsewhere?].

-- Diane J. Squire (sacredspaces@yahoo.com), November 25, 1998.

Did any other codeheads notice that the non-compliant RDMS (radiation data monitoring system) software is on a DEC PDP-11? Some months ago I posted a crosspost from c.s.y2k about a university testing lab that had huge y2k problems with their PDP-11. Bottom line is that you basically have to scrap all the software because the PDP-11 simply CAN"T be made compliant. The solution here would be a new computer and new software. As I had said before, there are still thousands of PDP-11's running worldwide and they will all be toast unless you roll the date back.

-- R. D..Herring (drherr@erols.com), November 26, 1998.

Just bringing this one to the front again, asking Robert, are you familiar with the (many) devices that are non-compliant in this Nuclear facility. Do you know what effect their failure may have on the plant's operation. Many Thanks.

-- Richard Dale (rdale@figroup.co.uk), December 01, 1998.

Arghh- Yes, just what effect will they have?! I only live 15 minutes away. This was not a nice thing to wake up to! Marie

-- Marie (a7656@hotmail.com), December 01, 1998.