Architecture and the Calabresi and Melamed frameworkgreenspun.com : LUSENET : 6805-team-6 : One Thread
[I had to start a new post because the previous one was getting very long.]
Yesterday, Abelson asked the question: What type of architecture would we build to make property or trespass more sensible?
In light of the Calabresi and Melamed article, it's sensible to also ask: what type of architecture would make inalienability more sensible?
So, in light of unauthorized access, spam and other unsolicited email solicitations, viruses and malicious code or unintentional entry or damage, can we think of these events as involving entitlements (e.g. the entitlement to system integrity (viruses), the entitlement to be undisturbed (spam), the entitlement to keep one's data private (unauthorized access) or to keep on's travels through the Internet private (wtracker)). And if they involve entitlements, how can we build architectures which make the entitlements more like property rights, tort (trespass) or inalienable rights?
Here are the questions I see developing, based on the Calabresi and Melamed article. [I hope you can follow this.}
Ask: are the transfers beneficial to society?
-- we allow free transfers in the market (property rules) and impose liability rules because we want certain transactions to occur; we forbid other transactions by making entitlements inalienable because we don't think they benefit society.
-- if no >>>>>>>>> make transfers inalienable
THE CHALLENGE BECOMES A DESIGN ISSUE: -- what types of architectures make an entitlement inalienable? --prevent transfers even between willing buyers and sellers --may prevent all transfers or only transfers in certain circumstancs
-- if yes >>>>>>>> consider transaction costs and which party is the cheapest cost avoider
ANOTHER DEGIGN ISSUE: -- what types of architecture reduce transaction costs and make property rules the most sensible rules to apply? --reduce costs of negotiation --place a value on the entitlement; help to "monetize it" --reveal which party is the cheapest cost avoider (assign entitlement to the party OPPOSING the cheapest cost avoider; the cheapest cost avoider can just buy the entitlement from the owner)
THE FINAL DESIGN ISSUE: -- what types of architecture facilitate collective determinations of value and make liability rules the most sensible rules to apply? --ensure that beneficial transactions will not be foiled by subjective values --don't force people to reveal the true value they place on an activity
I'm going to need input from MIT folks to come up with architectures which would fit these characteristics.
-- Anonymous, October 26, 1998