This is scarcely original (Cory hammers on this all the time) but it is inconceivable that the Y2K "problem" can be fixed on failure in, say, three days or so after rollover.

First, for those companies that have done little while their peers have spent weeks (small business), months (SMEs) or years (big boys) on Y2K, it will take, MINIMALLY, the same period of time post-rollover (actually, that period plus whatever the drag posed by the business problems for the entity caused by NOT having remediated or not having completed remediation).

Second, with the supply chain damaged (degree of damage not necessary for purposes of this thread), what "might" have taken three "days" will take longer ....

Third, but why go on?

FOF in "three days" is absurdly ludicrous.

A more pertinent question might be, "why will it take less than the two or three years and then some that has been spent working on the problem already?"

Against the legitimate point that much remediation has been done worldwide must, regrettably, the point be matched that it is entirely possible, globally speaking, that no more than 50% will complete remediation. Factor in a damaged supply chain and "at least as much time" may be needed as has already been spent.

Don't like that?

OK, WAY MORE than three days.

Point? The government, media and consultant spin on this matter is ludicrously deceitful on its face.

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), August 03, 1999

Answers

Very simply, a lot of companies will go out of business. Buy consumer goods, now, if there's something you really, really love and must have. Don't expect to find all your favorites a year from now, or two years, or whenever supply lines slowly re-emerge.

-- Mara Wayne (MaraWayne@aol.com), August 03, 1999.

I concur with your diagnosis, Dr. BigDog. Keep thinking, and don't get dizzy,

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_99_2000@2000.com), August 03, 1999.

Big Dog, I insist. You ain't no Big Dog, you is Huge Dog. Because you are right AGAIN sir. I agree .

-- George (jvilches@sminter.com.ar), August 03, 1999.

BigDog, I agree with you that the FOF publicity spin is ludicrous, but here is one thing I wonder. Might it shorten the time for the fix, considering that once something has failed, it will be easier to pin point the problem? For instance, a company has four systems in question, but even though they do little to no remediation, only one of them fails due to Y2K. In theory, they then have 75% fewer embedded chips or lines of code to assess, than if they had assessed all prior to Y2K.

Granted, even a quarter of systems failure will cascade through the various sectors, and we're still likely to be in deep doo, but couldn't one argue that this might mean less time to bring a company, utility, whatever back online?

-- CD (CDOKeefe@aol.com), August 04, 1999.

CD,

You've perfectly summarized the lame logic of those companies that plan to FOF. The inherent flaws of this position are that each failure may take much more time than anticipated to fix, and/or that there may be more failures than anticipated, beyond the capacity of a company to fix before tanking.

Of course, if the company is involved in a business who's failure can result in an environmental or economic disaster if not prevented (oil, chemical, nuclear, et al.), then all bets are off.

FOF is a crapshoot, at best.

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_2000@2000.com), August 04, 1999.

Well, don't know about the big iron, and all those embedded systems in chemical plants, oil processing, etc....

But in my little area of y2k, PC's and Intel based Servers, lans & wans, FOF = F*cked On Failure, because of something called JIT Inventory (Just In Time)...

It's already started. Taiwan's little power boo-boo drove memory chip prices up 20% yesterday.. just found out the main motherboard we use also suddenly became constrained (made by Intel), also the unit cost on cd-roms jumped... we rely heavily on components from Asia, as does every other pc maker and service center in the world, and the hiccups are already screwing up deliveries and creating shortages, driving prices up, not to mention the problem of the big players getting nervous and trying to hoard components...

So come January, or February, and your server crashes, or your pc starts coughing up bloody excel sheets and dumping databases you've spent years building... guess what? The cheap repair you could have quickly and easily made months ago now can't be had for love nor money...

The vast majority of components that go into making personal computers all the way up the ladder to your mid-range file servers are manufactured, guess what? Not here..., but in the countries listed to be among the most at risk for major disruptions...

JIT inventory, the darling of Wall Street, now both teetering on the edge of a very deep hole...

-- Carl (clilly@goentre.com), August 04, 1999.

Durr.... I hadn't thought about the environmental aspects. I was just thinking in terms of your average joe schmoe sort of company, like the one I used to work for before I decided to work for myself.

-- CD (CDOKeefe@aol.com), August 04, 1999.

Maybe some good will come of a lot of companies failing. Maybe reduce the supermarket pet food area taking a whole aisle with fifty types of "Pussy Galore" and "Fancy Feast" cat food down to a couple of bins. Maybe reduce the disposable diaper shelves by 80% by getting rid of his and hers varieties and ten different sizes. Maybe get rid of half an aisle of "juice drinks" (liquid sugar plus fruit flavoring) to maybe be replaced by real juice. I know you want more examples, but I'll stop, anyway.

-- A (A@AisA.com), August 04, 1999.

Remember, this thread focused on the absurdity of FOF in "three days". After all, that statement is still the "conventional wisdom" in the media based on the cumulative spin of the last two years.

While this thread might seem trivially true to folks on this board, people in my community, by a ratio of 10 to 1, believe everything will be fixed in no more than "a week or so." EVERYTHING. ALL Y2K ISSUES WILL BE FIXED.

In answer to a post above, post-rollover remediation will exhibit many confusing aspects.

First, remediated code that has not been well-tested or tested at all (except noddingly) will itself break.

Second, remediated code that has been well-tested will break occasionally.

Third, non-remediated code (whether mission-critical, non mission-critical or in applications that -- ooops --- turn out to be critical) will break.

Fourth, as a result of the above, in-house tech folk, PROVIDING that their families are secure enough that they can get to work and be productive, will be under enormous stress trying to fix and test all of the above while facing ENORMOUS pressure to bring everything back online with minimal or no testing, so the business can survive. That, in turn, will exacerbate the complexity of the work still to be done and delay it.

Fifth, depending on what breaks and what is needed for replacement (software), businesses will be competing with their peers for access to those products (assuming the businesses that supply them are in business and can get product to them) and will need to implement them in "failure" (FOF) conditions.

Sixth, depending on what other aspects of the local supply chain are nonfunctional or merely less efficient, all attempts at remediation will be slowed.

Seventh, depending on what happens with embedded systems, all attempts at remediation will be slowed or, for a given business and application, rendered impossible until (or if) replacements can be secured.

While it is unquestionable that remediation ALREADY achieved will make all these tasks dramatically easier for those companies that are either "done" (they will mainly wrestle with remediation breakages and embedded systems) or almost done, this thread focuses on the situation that will be experienced by ....

... entire countries (50?) that are mainly fixing FOF (and these ain't just the third-world ones).

... millions of SMEs (up to 1000 employees) that are mainly fixing FOF.

... tens of millions of small businesses (up to 100 employees) that are mainly fixing FOF.

Keeping in mind that, even if the larger U.S. entities are remediated, the hit to the supply chain worldwide from failure of those who supply parts for JIT (ranging from the entire country of China to your neighborhood auto parts mfg) will go outrageously beyond a ....

"fix in three days."

Therefore, I repeat my assertion that it will take AT LEAST as long to complete remediation after rollover as before. It does no good to say the time will be shortened because these millions of businesses will go OUT of business while the strong survive. The strong will survive but with often crippling hits to their own businesses for 'x' period of time ... and these strong businesses will ALSO cope simultaneously with levels of unemployment, uncertainty and crushed consumer confidence.

Will the remediation completed shorten the effort post-rollover. In some cases, for the responsible entities, of course!

Does that affect the topic of this thread. Not one whit.

It is also why we will very soon go beyond contingency plans to recovery issues. Y2K recovery will be a five year proposition, at least.

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), August 04, 1999.

To "A":

Yeah a "Good"thing! Who needs variety or choices or competition. We can have the kind of consumer choices they had in the good old USSR. " Is one type shoe only comrade, you taking or leaving Da? (Sarcasm mode off).

-- kozak (kozak@formerusaf.guv), August 04, 1999.

Some things WILL be fixable in three days. If an error is in a simple windowing routine, or such a routine needs to be added, it can be done. It takes less time to fix on failure (in this case) because you don't have to set up a parallel isolated system for testing, etc. If it's the company's life on the line, you just load and go, and see if it works. Been there. It ain't pretty, but you do it.

How many things can be fixed that way? Maybe 1%? Maybe 5%? If the problem is architectural, like a 2-digit year being used in a database index, you have to unload, restructure, reload, and recompile and test every program that hits the index. In a running environment that might be a 3- to 6-month process. If the system is crashed it still might take a couple weeks or a month. If the PCs are suffering damage, too, or if the power is dirty, maybe it takes 6 months even after Y2k. If your people decide it's a lost cause, and stay home with the family, maybe it doesn't get done at all.

How many companies will survive? Nobody knows.

-- bw (home@puget.sound), August 04, 1999.

bw -- thanks, yes, no doubt, some things will be fixable in three days. I expect a full-court press to try to make that happen. I wish everyone the greatest possible success. Generally, I agree with your post in every detail.

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), August 04, 1999.

BD and others,

Might this accelerate the mergers and acquisitions in balance of 1999?

Surely, business owners that will likely experience a Y2K critical failure will know with certainity that they will not make it at some point in time. On this forum, I believe that point is called the Omega Point. ( The point at which those in the know (business owners, regulators, government agencies come to see true picture for Y2K impacts).

For example if a large bank is known to have severe Y2K issues still pending, wouldnt they be likely rolled into another stronger entity?

Same for power companies or any other entity? Won't the weak selloff voluntarily rather than ride Y2K into the ground.

-- Bill P (porterwn@one.net), August 04, 1999.

bw and Big Dog:

From your description, it sounds like you are treating FOF as a "pure strategy" (in game theory) -- that a company has decided to remediate either everything or nothing. But I haven't seen any indication that this is true except among the smallest businessess (with 1-day remediation tasks facing them).

From what I've seen, companies have attempted to address the most serious y2k problems (like that database issue) ahead of time. Priority has also been placed on critical systems. FOF as a strategy has been relegated to three types of issues -- (1) Systems (hopefully the least necessary) that they simply won't have time to get to; (2) systems that will suffer failures because remediation of them wasn't perfect; and (3) systems either too minor to worry about (company coffee maker) or too expensive to test (like systems 'down the hole' of the oil well, when similar uninstalled systems work fine).

Sysman has said that 5% of the bugs will cause 95% (or more) of the impacts. The problem is, it's often impossible to tell in advance how serious a bug buried in a huge program might be in practice. So ahead of time, we address design issues and try to repair every bug we can find. FOF remains for those we didn't get to.

But we'd appear to have two advantages here then: (1) The 5% of killer bugs would announce (differentiate) themselves quite clearly after they bite; and (2) These would be the *worst* 5% of bugs in the *least* critical systems. In some cases, FOF is also a misnomer, since we know that some (most?) companies have identified cosmetic bugs they can live with, and have decided never to remediate them at all.

So my point is that in reality, all of these mitigating factors will combine to make the 3-day estimate fairly realistic for the worst of the problems. Of course, companies that had basic design issues (like that database) and decided to ignore it and pray they could redesign and rebuild in three days deserve to go broke. But I doubt many will turn out to have been that stupid.

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), August 04, 1999.

FOF as a strategy has been relegated to three types of issues -- (1) Systems (hopefully the least necessary) that they simply won't have time to get to; (2) systems that will suffer failures because remediation of them wasn't perfect; and (3) systems either too minor to worry about (company coffee maker) or too expensive to test (like systems 'down the hole' of the oil well, when similar uninstalled systems work fine).

See June Y2K Experts Poll Results, question #10, third and fourth answers. Note, 7 in 10 of respondents came from companies with 1,000 or more employees.

-- Lane Core Jr. (elcore@sgi.net), August 04, 1999.

Flint said [I reply]

From your description, it sounds like you are treating FOF as a "pure strategy" (in game theory) -- that a company has decided to remediate either everything or nothing. But I haven't seen any indication that this is true except among the smallest businessess (with 1-day remediation tasks facing them).

[What the heck does this mean? First of all, I dealt with companies that have remediated most stuff, go back and read what I said in the second post on this thread. Secondly, I stressed that I was mainly focusing on the EFFECTS of the entire countries and millions of other entities whose STRATEGY for FOF will screw up others. Thirdly, I could care less about the "smallest businesses."] From what I've seen, companies have attempted to address the most serious y2k problems (like that database issue) ahead of time. Priority has also been placed on critical systems. FOF as a strategy has been relegated to three types of issues -- (1) Systems (hopefully the least necessary) that they simply won't have time to get to; (2) systems that will suffer failures because remediation of them wasn't perfect; and (3) systems either too minor to worry about (company coffee maker) or too expensive to test (like systems 'down the hole' of the oil well, when similar uninstalled systems work fine).

[Right, Flint, for those companies that have remediated. Old news and has nothing to do with this thread, except that this class will have to deal with 'x' failures to well-tested remediated systems and embedded systems failures. Maybe they can do it in three days. Hope so, of course.]

Sysman has said that 5% of the bugs will cause 95% (or more) of the impacts. The problem is, it's often impossible to tell in advance how serious a bug buried in a huge program might be in practice. So ahead of time, we address design issues and try to repair every bug we can find. FOF remains for those we didn't get to.

[Agree. But doesn't have anything to do with the point of this thread, which is that the spin has been deceitful in its legitimate impact upon citizens and ridiculous when looking at Y2K GLOBALLY. Your entire Y2K perspective always seems to be U.S. and, even then, while you criticize people for assuming everyone is lying, you assume everyone is telling the truth. I assume neither. But let's not get into that. It's another diversion from this thread.]

But we'd appear to have two advantages here then: (1) The 5% of killer bugs would announce (differentiate) themselves quite clearly after they bite; and (2) These would be the *worst* 5% of bugs in the *least* critical systems. In some cases, FOF is also a misnomer, since we know that some (most?) companies have identified cosmetic bugs they can live with, and have decided never to remediate them at all.

[Very true and will be the case for most companies whose remediation efforts are complete, hopefully. Why don't you start your own thread on this? It doesn't bear substantively on this thread.]

So my point is that in reality, all of these mitigating factors will combine to make the 3-day estimate fairly realistic forthe worst of the problems. Of course, companies that had basic design issues (like that database) and decided to ignore it and pray they could redesign and rebuild in three days deserve to go broke. But I doubt many will turn out to have been that stupid.

[OK, so you're saying that the three-day scenario IS legitimate for the countries and millions of entities who are NOT remediating and that this thread is all wet (ie, that it is, taken all in all, a legitimate position for the WORLD impact and stuff still to be fixed post-rollover). If you believe that, you haven't understood this thread at all. Or, and I say this respectfully, you have become so blinded by your own convictions that you won't consider any other scenario than the one you are wedded to. I would have thought this thread was trivially and obviously true on August 4, 1999 (with the exception of the five year to recover prediction, which is just my own opinion).

Trivially true: the three-day FOF global declaration is absurd. Yes or no?]

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), August 04, 1999.

Big Dog Sir, would you please post more often? How much more solid stuff like this analysis do you have inside your brain to share with the world?

-- George (jvilches@sminter.com.ar), August 04, 1999.

Face it folks, Fix on Failure is the ONLY option left...Just 90 (count 'em) Federal Days to DA ROLL! ROFLMAO!!!

I don't know of a single bureaucrat (or a married one, for that matter) who can fix ANYTHING in 90 days.

Private industry is NO BETTER...I ordered a cable modem last October, and maybe I'll get it this Millennium.

Come on folks, it's ALL going away in January...better preped than PERPED!!!

See ( www.tasc.dot.gov/Y2K/ ) where this DOT group is STILL trying to PEDDLE its services to other gov't agencies.

Can anyone Whistle "WIPE OUT"???

-- K. Stevens (kstevens@It's ALL going away in January.com), August 04, 1999.

"But in my little area of y2k, PC's and Intel based Servers, lans & wans, FOF = F*cked On Failure, because of something called JIT Inventory (Just In Time)... "

This is the crux of the matter here. JIT is the purpose for the spin. Stocking up or "hoarding" as it is now called was standard procedure for businesses and homes all over the world. As transportation increased and land prices went up "stock rooms" (hoard rooms?) were minimized to make room for parking spaces.

This worked fine since goods were delivered everyday, cash flowed through the phone lines and all the customers could park, walk in and buy stuff.

It was a tremendous boon to small and medium businesses because they didn't have to have cash tied up in inventory that was sitting on the back shelves.

The consumer was happy because there was more variety of goods available and they were generally cheaper.

This naturally gave rise to the ultimate JIT experience. The Warehouse Store. Cost Co, Sams, Staples, Home Depot et. all.

JIT inventories, the highest population densities ever seen, fragile overloaded infrastructure. We are truly F*cked on Failure.

(rant on)

FOF as a rational solution to Y2k is absurd, but then so is everything else about Y2k. The seeds of this destruction were planted before I was born. There is nothing I could have done to prevent it. It is coming at us like a run-away train. I went through school, worked, had kids, made choices all my life with no idea there was this Sword of Damacles hanging over my head.

(rant off)

However, to truly address the simple hazards of FOF - there is one vital industry which must continue in order for the society to function - health care. FOF will just not do it if your IV stops working. FOF will not help you at all when hospitals have to do all procedures and paperwork by hand for even ONE day. I'm not talking power outages here. I'm talking equipment malfunction.

FOF is the perfect PR tool. It says nothing and means less.

Meanwhile we get to live in the illusion of JIT Everlasting.

-- R (riversoma@aol.com), August 04, 1999.

First, for the record I don't think FOF is a viable tact for any organization that cannot run their business manually.

But, to address your main point. First, the "two to three years" to correct the problem taken currently by organizations also includes inventory and assessment phases, used to find potential problems. FOF essentially eliminates these phases, since the problems are already "failing".

I know, the next thing to pop up is "well, why didn't everybody just do that from the start?". I've seen this asked before, and it is truly funny, to anyone that has worked on large-scale projects. This would require setting up a separate test system, which many have done. However, this assumes a comprehensive "test-bed" of scenarios, which I can honestly say I have never seen. Unfortunately, true "regression" testing is basically a pipe-dream in most organizations.

Short of that, the test system could be run in parallel. Again, a true laugher, to anyone who has attempted to get users to run a parallel system for any length of time. In this case, you would in essence be forced to run parallel for a full year, in order to attempt to encounter any meaningful percentage of scenarios.

Second, even taking only the remediation phase as a guide probably overstates the time. FOF would mean attempting to allow current processing to proceed. Remediation is attempting to address all processing. A simple example is financial applications. Remediation would address both individual postings, month-end processing, and year-end processing. FOF would first encounter problems with individual postings. Once fixed, the application could proceed until month-end, where it would encounter more errors. Finally, it could proceed to year-end, where more errors occur. In totality, it could indeed be quite some time before all errors are fixed. That is not the same, however, as not being functional.

Again, though I'm in no way advocating FOF. Which leads me to my next question. Everytime I post an analysis, every nuance and assumption is questioned. Actually, I think that is good, so let me do the honors here. Where do you get these numbers of organizations that are truly just using FOF? I mean, even my dentist has replaced his systems because of Y2k, and he runs a 3 person business (1 dentist, 1 assistant, and a receptionist). Since you make it clear you are only addressing organizations that adopted FOF as their primary strategy, where do your estimates come from?

-- Hoffmeister (hoff_meister@my-deja.com), August 04, 1999.

When the engine stops, it is going to BE REAL HARD to get it going again.

Computers don't fix themselves!

Got Olive oil. I love Olive Oil. Since Italy has admitted that they are going to crash big time, Olive Oil will be like liquid gold. Perfect for saute' of dehydrated vegetables.

Vintage Port from Portugal? Better stock up on all your favorites.

-- Y2K-OK (happy@risperdane.com), August 04, 1999.

George -- Listen, you're got to stop complimenting me like that, seriously. This isn't a fan club and regular pollies think I'm an idiot, by and large. Nevertheless, thanks for encouragement. I don't have time to post anymore except occasionally; too busy focusing on preps and Y2K recovery stuff.

Hoff -- I admit (and should have said so) that that line of comparison was highly crude, maybe impossibly so. Thanks for pointing out. I am, in essence, washing out assessment on one side with my (worried) conviction that Y2K supply chain noise PLUS the consequences of fixing FOF will add their own roughly equivalent time delay to pre-rollover assessment. As I said, horribly crude. I'm basically just trying to find a way to say, "this is going to take WAY more than 3 days."

Like I said to Flint, this thread is actually trivially true (though depressing to me at least) and is really aimed at the way Y2K has been SPUN to fellow citizens who are non-tech.

I don't believe the fix process will be as linear as you suggest but will instead cause major "non" functionality for significant periods of time for most orgs. That said, of course, once the worst of FOF is over (one week? one month? six months? one year?), systems and apps will run for progressively longer periods of time with greater accuracy. Y2K recovery in 2004 will look very different than 2001 or 2000.

Heck, for me even TEOTAWAWKI has never meant TEOTW. Folks like you and me will be in huge demand post-rollover, alas for the world, IMO.

Finally, you have EVERY right to ask for my stats and I honestly don't have them ready to hand. I can only say sincerely that they reflect statements I have seen made by "reputable" orgs, some gov, some consulting, some biz. If I can dig them up, I will. Linkmeister, are you there? Can you help? Others?

I am also the first to admit, as I have for months, that, IMO, the world could be further along or father behind in remediation than is being reported. I consider Y2K absolutely unique and fascinating in the near-total politicization of results reporting. This doesn't mean everyone is lying, just that the chances of getting good data are slim to none. That is 90% of the reason why true professionals, like you and I, can disagree vehemently about what is really going on.

Not too much longer now.

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), August 04, 1999.

Big Dog:

I can see I left out a step. Yes, absolutely, I agree that it's absurd to believe that after 3 days everything will be all better, no problems by the 73rd hour. But that's a straw man anyway, I think.

I expect y2k fallout to have a half-life as problems are addressed in order of immediate severity. I picture that half-life as being about a week, with total problems dropping below the radar in 4-6 months (but still cropping up and being dealt with well into 2001). I expect this fallout to combine with other factors to cause a market correction and economic slowdown, which will be felt for several years (maybe as many as 5 years).

As to why I feel this way, I explained some of it and Hoffmeister clarified some as well. Problems will identify themselves and prioritize themselves. Whereas contingency plans must try to cover *all* eventualities, post-bug reactions need only address what actually goes wrong. Where assessment and remediation have been done (whether completed or not), focus has been placed on the most important stuff, so what fails should be less important. Where it has not been done (LDCs and some not-so-LDCs) the functionality of some organizations can be expected to drop significantly and recover slowly. Some will not survive.

On the whole, I think I have more faith in FOF than you do, if only because (especially in LDCs) that's what daily life is all about. And there are days when I feel that if I survive at all, everything I had to do to accomplish that was only an inconvenience.

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), August 04, 1999.

Flint --- Your half-life analogy isn't a bad one. My conviction is that the half-life will be greatly extended by the FOF condition itself. That is, by FOF PLUS the noise-confusion supply chain limitations surrounding Y2K. This isn't going to be some sort of laboratory clean FOF process.

Also, I dispute (as does Robert Cook and some others) the way that you and Hoff often discuss debug-test, etc. But let's not rehash that here.

What I really object to in your answer and I still feel you are radically DGI about this thread is your, this is a "straw man". Not that you don't agree the effects will last longer, because you do.

NO. The problem is that, in my town of 2,000, about 1,800 bright but computer illiterate people are NOT preparing for months of Y2K disruptions or indeed preparing at all. Why? Because they are smart. If Y2K can be fixed in a few days, why prepare? Duh. Most people believe they have three days of food, etc., or can pick it up on Dec. 30, 1999.

To repeat from my top post:

"Point? The government, media and consultant spin on this matter is ludicrously deceitful on its face."

Why deceitful? Because, just like you Flint, anyone who has looked at this problem KNOWS it won't be anything like three days. They could have said,

"We will most likely take three to six months to recover from Y2K disruptions, but recommend you prepare for two weeks. Or three days. Decide what is best for your family."

Instead of,

"Y2K will be fixed in 72 hours and prepare for 3 days."

Are other answers/spins given too? Natch. But that is the DOMINANT message that has been promoted by Koskinen et al. That is the message that has STUCK. And they know it. If it were a case of a msg that had gotten away from them, it could have been corrected -- and still could be:

""We will most likely take three to six months to recover from Y2K disruptions, but recommend you prepare for two weeks. Or three days. Decide what is best for your family."

By dismissing this thread as a "straw man", you dismiss something very egregious about this entire episode that really may cost lives, for instance, the lives of my parents, who BELIEVE the official line.

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), August 04, 1999.

BigDog, you are equating Y2k IT problems with Y2k disruptions.

While I would agree with assessments that IT departments will be dealing with Y2k problems for quite some time, I disagree that the normal person will feel the effects of these.

Just as the average person has felt any effects from pre-Y2k errors. I think it was a Cap Gemini survey that resulted in 75% of large corporations have already experienced Y2k errors. How many average people have felt the effects?

I started a thread recently, where I think we've in all liklihood experienced more errors, simultaneously, due to Y2k fixes, than we will due to Y2k rollover errors.

In any case, relating Y2k errors to Y2k disruptions is invalid.

-- Hoffmeister (hoff_meister@my-deja.com), August 04, 1999.

I see Hoff kind of beat me to it while my connection vanished briefly. But even Hoff kind of begs the definition of a 'disruption'. My expectation is that to the degree that y2k errors cause publicly felt problems, these will take the form of mixups to get straightened out, higher prices for some items, fewer choices at the WalMart, longer waits for backordered items (and more backordered items), and many other similar disruptions.

I think that the likelihood of major power losses, or failure of the financial/banking system, or no dial tone, or a complete halt to major manufacturing, etc. has dropped below the level where anyone except the loonies will lose any sleep. There is a huge difference between problems that cannot be entirely ruled out (if there is such a problem), and problems that have high odds of happening.

The more I read, the more I agree with Duggan, head of y2k research at Gartner Group, who said "doing nothing is probably a safe bet." Duggan is right. Of course, having no fire or auto insurance is also probably a safe bet too, just not probably enough. Insurance is still wise and prudent, so long as you don't regard the advisability of carrying insurance as a guarantee that you'll need it. Few will need it. Best that those few have it, which means all should have it.

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), August 04, 1999.

Big Dog, I don't agree with you on this one.

First, because pollies ('regular' or any other strain) just can't think, by definition. So pollies' opinion about yourself or anybody else is simply irrelevant.

Second, this thread, and your previous thread on the "Simplicity of Y2K" are part of future Y2K history. Whether you like it or not, whether you wanted or not Big Dog. You've done sir. Too late now!

Flint, Hoffmeister, would you two kindly step out of the peanutbutter and jelly sandwich you live in and please take a quick look beyond your noses and realize that there is a HUGE WIDE GLOBALIZED ECONOMY OUT THERE that ALSO EXISTS AND IS COMPLETELY UNOBSERVANT OF ALL YOUR SHORT-SIGHTED, GRINGO-MINDED, WISHFULL-THINKING, HIDDEN-AGENDA BIASED "ideas" !!

Thank you...

-- George (jvilches@sminter.com.ar), August 04, 1999.

I once had a car that I never took care of, never changed the oil, anti-freeze, tires, nuttin. One day while driving down I-95 the parts blew all over the place. But not to worry, I had it fixed and was back on my way within ten minutes.

Sure I was.

-- Uncle Deedah (unkeed@yahoo.com), August 04, 1999.

This thread has had the surprising result, to me at least, result of demonstrating that Hoff and Flint believe Y2K will be a BITR of the easiest order. CPR's expectations are more severe.

Flint: "My expectation is that to the degree that y2k errors cause publicly felt problems, these will take the form of mixups to get straightened out, higher prices for some items, fewer choices at the WalMart, longer waits for backordered items (and more backordered items), and many other similar disruptions."

At least Flint has finally stated clearly what his view of Y2K impacts will be: essentially nil. Yeah, yeah, I know, a few businesses will fail, etc. and insurance never hurts. This will make legitimate posting material whenever Flint suggests that Y2K will be damaging and I will post it. Not that I care what Flint believes (his perogative) but so that he is compelled to post with some semblance of consistency for the rest of the year.

Hoff -- Yes, disruptions are different than IT problems, OF COURSE. It is common coin that ESTIMATES of global readiness have never climbed above 80% max. Max. Admitting the squishiness of this (stated in post above and repeatedly on this forum and, personally, I consider this way too high), expectations that 20% "non" readiness is going to result in trivial impact globally is dumb. You may know IT but you are clueless about business. Decker is a doomer compared to you and Flint. Decker's EXPECTATION is for a sharp recession.

It is quite interesting that the polly views on this forum (Flint especially) always track the media spin of the moment. Now, the spin is, "U.S. is great, it's those other countries that will have problems, but none of it will affect us, don't worry, be happy." Pace Flint.

And, contra Flint and Hoff, this thread still stands trivially and obviously as it did at the beginning:

"Point? The government, media and consultant spin on this matter is ludicrously deceitful on its face."

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), August 05, 1999.