Marathas (my area of research), have been mentioned several times (Bartlett, etc.) in this discussion, hence these remarks. To begin, I come down very much on the side of the "short" bifurcation rather than the long one. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, Indian rulers did not look to any of the European trading powers for anything of any significance. Indigenous, as opposed to European, records show that kingly income from trade was minor compared to income from taxation on agriculture and indigeous manufacture. The Maratha tax system was the among the most sophisticated in the world, complete with field by field yearly surveys, written contracts and accounts, auditing and written apppeals processes. Similarly, the court system had full written records of evidence. precedence, and judgements. Kings knew how to promote prosperity through tax breaks for development of agricuture, and tax breaks for development of market towns. The credit networks and the check-clearing system were very sophisticated and quite capable of moving very large sums across the lenghth and breadth of India. India was not looking to Europe for institutional forms, either in business or government.(posted 8749 days ago)When, then, did kings begin to be aware that European traders were something different than, for example, the Armenians and Arabs who had been along the western coast for centuries? For the Mararthas, it was some time in the late seventeenth century. A mirror-of-princes style advice by a senior courtier to a young ruler suggested that he never grant land to the "hat wearing" traders because, unlike all the others, these groups "represented kings". The Marathas knew all about the Portuguese seizure of Goa (many of their Brahmin administrators were from Goa) and had some contact with the British at Bombay
It was not until the middle decades of the eighteeth century that Maratha rulers thought that the Europeans had anything significant that they wanted; that was military, specifically the infantry/artillery combination which had been successful in the French-British wars fought in both South India and Bengal. Within a few years, many Indian kings knew that their artillery casting, musket manufacture, and infantry training were inferior to what they saw the Europeans producing; they moved vigorously to hire units and expertise. The East India Company moved just as vigorously to deny this knowledge to Indian rulers (through severe restrictions on access to their armouries, for example),
We should remember that it was in the same period that the Europeans realized that collecting taxes through the indigenous system was far more profitable than trade and - even more importantly - that indigeous taxes were the only thing against which indigenous bankers would offer large scale credit. This credit was esential to paying troops and running a war. It was only after the British seized Bengal and land up the Madras coast that they were credible players to the Indian banking community.
We should be very cautious in our analysis of "alliances" between European powers and Indian "elites". Often, the Europeans were only pusuing a standard Indian diplomatic/military practice, that is, supporting a weak candidtate for a throne who could only stay in power with their support, then extracting tax revenue ro their "help".
Overall, the change I see happening in England and not happening in India especially in the eighteeth century was a gradual movement of useful knowledge from personal/family/guild to a somewhat more public sphere. I am thinking of the establishment of the Woolich arsenal with its constant experiments and documentation leading to regularization of ball size and weight and codification of firing procedure and drill throughout the British forces. I am thinking of the patent process and journals of agricultural improvement. Also, the shipping newpapers and publication of agricutural prices. Government sponsopship of naval testing.
I am not arguing the older "guns and sails" formulation. There was nothing inevitable about the Europeans winning in India. They had their share of serious setbacks, both military losses and financial disasters. Still, their "edge" seems to be the results of this sort of accumulation of knowledge, especially government patronized military knowledge which kept acccumulating in the home country and was then used in colonial ventures.